Lena Riemer, Robina Fellow, Yale Law School, and Fellow, Stiftung Mercator
This contribution examines the extensive measures implemented by the United States to control and deter migration both internally and externally. Internally, it analyzes the policies of the Trump and Biden administrations, highlighting the militarization of the border, increased detention, and the erosion of asylum protections. Externally, it explores the U.S.’s use of externalization strategies, such as the “Remain in Mexico” program, militarizing borders in the region, and bilateral agreements with Latin American countries. The contribution shows how these policies have resulted in significant human rights violations. The paper also evaluates the Biden administration’s “Safe Mobility Initiative”, designed to provide lawful migration pathways from partner countries in Latin America – on which the administration relies as justification for its restrictive migration policy. Despite the initiative’s potential, its limited scope and effectiveness raise concerns. The analysis underscores the need for comprehensive and humane migration and asylum policies that respect international law, and provide adequate and immediate protection for those seeking refuge as well as legal pathways.
The official southern US border with Mexico is 1,951 miles long. Many parts of it are fortified with wall and fence structures to prevent irregular crossings. The unofficial, less directly visible border however stretches all the way through Central and South America.
In recent years, the United States has continuously implemented a variety of measures to prevent the entry of migrants and refugees into its territory. These measures are twofold: first, they consist of securitization, fortification, and the reduction of access to asylum alongside immigration detention[1]. These policies aim at restricting irregular entry and expelling or deporting those who do not meet the increasingly restrictive standards for receiving protection. Second, by externalizing its migration control to Latin American countries, the U.S. seeks to extend its policy beyond its physical borders to reduce the number of arrivals in the first place. Both forms of preventive measures come in manifold ways, as will be shown below.
This contribution shows the interplay of inwards and outwards aiming migration policies to reduce the arrival of migrants and asylum seekers. It will first briefly address some of the most recent internal migration control policies in the US that restrict access to the US territory and its legal implications (A.). Second, it will look at the policies’ external dimension explaining where and in which way the USA influenced and shaped migration control in Latin America (B.). Third, the contribution turns to the second component of the externalization policy, the Safe Mobility Initiative, which explains its concept and provides some key lessons learned after one year of piloting (C.). The paper concludes then with a summary and outlook (D.).
A. The internal dimension: The Abrogation of Asylum, Detention, Expulsion
Assessing the asylum policies of the current Biden and past Trump governments, it becomes apparent, that sealing off the border, detaining migrants in large numbers[2] , and chipping away fundamental protection guarantees for asylum seekers at the border, has been the dominant policy approach at the US border.[3]
From 2017 to 2021, the Trump administration relied on a mix of militarization of its border and continuous erosion of standards of protection for migrants and asylum seekers trying to enter U.S. territory.[4] President Trump labeled the migrant group as a foreign “invasion,” justifying the deployment of up to 15,000 army members to support border patrol.[5] His rhetoric emphasized the danger of immigration and culminated in disturbing images of U.S. officers firing tear gas at migrants, including children, trying to enter the country.[6]
This rhetoric went hand in hand with the Trump administration’s series of restrictive measures aimed at migrants both outside and inside the United States. These included a policy restricting immigrants from using public benefits, which could affect their eligibility for permanent residency[7], and the abolition of programs such as Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)[8] and Temporary Protected Status (TPS)[9], disrupting the lives of over two million regularly residing migrants in the country and increasing immigration detention and family separation.[10]
Trump’s policies also extended to the international stage, with notable actions such as the “Travel Ban” [11], also known as the “Muslim Ban”[12] and the refusal to agree to global migration standards.[13] The administration prioritized deterrence and restrictions, withdrawing benefits and rights from migrants and asylum seekers. This approach included the criminalization of irregular entries, collective expulsions during the pandemic (Title 42 expulsions[14]), and imposing severe restrictions on asylum applications. The Title 42 policy, for example, allowed U.S. officials to turn away migrants who came to the U.S.-Mexico border or expel them from U.S. territory without granting the possibility to apply for protection on the grounds of preventing the spread of COVID-19. Even though the abrogation of asylum at the border under the guise of public health protection in the form of Title 42 was discontinued, its spirit lives on in other shapes. Sadly, this is not only the case in the USA, but also states like Colombia, Peru, and Chile have responded to the pandemic by sealing off and militarizing their borders[15] under the pretext of public health protection, following the U.S. example.[16] In the USA, despite pledging a more lenient and human rights-centered approach to migration policies at the southern border, Biden continued in Trump’s footsteps when it comes to abrogating asylum standards.[17]
At the same time, both administrations increasingly relied on fortifying their borders, increasing detention, and reducing protection measures as a means of deterrence. This went hand in hand with the externalization of asylum processing and increased cooperation with third states in the region to ensure that fewer people reach the southern border.
B. The external dimension: the many facets of externalizing migration control
This sort of cooperation and the externalization of asylum processing is not a recent phenomenon in the U.S. but has a long-standing history.[18] Already in the 1980s, the USA introduced extraterritorial asylum processing onboard U.S. ships or at Guantanamo Bay for Cuban and Haitian asylum seekers.[19]
The external dimension of U.S. migration control comes in many forms and shapes. In the following, this contribution will address the most significant ones, namely externalized and restricted asylum processing (1.) and the militarization of migration control in the region (2.).
1. Externalized and restricted asylum processing
Since the 1980s, Mexico, the southern neighbor of the USA has served as a buffer zone to prevent large-scale movement up north.[20] However, under both, Trump and Biden, these policies have reached new levels of intensification. To halt and decrease the number of asylum seekers in the last years, in December 2018, Trump introduced externalized asylum processing, in the form of a program called the “Migrant Protection Protocols” (MPPs) or “Remain in Mexico Policy”.[21] The program forced nearly 70,000 asylum seekers who arrived at the US border or crossed into U.S. territory to return to Mexico and wait for their designated date for a court hearing. [22] Many reports by NGOs testify to the dire and dangerous situation thousands of asylum seekers had to wait in to have their fair day in court.[23]
Shortly after, in June 2019, Trump announced a migration agreement with Mexico which reportedly provides for “a regional approach to burden-sharing concerning the processing of refugee status claims to migrants”[24]. In practice, the deal established a ‘safe third country’ agreement which forced asylum seekers to apply for protection in Mexico first or else they were ineligible for asylum in the USA. The deal was struck after a combination of immense pressure from the US government and good coaxing.[25]
Even though the MPPs were officially terminated by the Biden administration, in June 2024, his administration announced Proclamation 10773 which resembles significantly his predecessor’s Remain-in-Mexico-Policy. The proclamation titled “Securing the Border”[26] introduced a significant restriction on U.S. asylum policies. The policy restricts asylum applications to those made through the CBP One app[27], effectively precluding applications from migrants who enter the country irregularly between ports of entry. This policy enforces a numerical cap, barring asylum seekers if more than 2,500 individuals per day have entered irregularly over seven days, with the ban persisting until the average drops below 1,500 per day for two weeks.
Under this new policy, the onus is placed on asylum seekers to proactively declare their fear of persecution without any prompting from border agents, potentially disadvantaging those who are either unaware of this requirement, scared, or for other reasons reluctant to articulate their fears. Notably, exceptions are made for unaccompanied children, trafficking victims, and individuals with acute medical emergencies or imminent threats. Previous attempts by former President Trump to impose similar restrictions were invalidated by the courts.
What is more, the U.S.-Mexico cooperation on migration control continued throughout Biden’s term in office with devastating effects on the lives and well-being of Central American asylum seekers who did not make use of the official ports of entry or were expelled for other reasons. Based on the Title 42 policy established as a measure to combat the spread of COVID-19, the U.S. began flying Central Americans in large numbers to southern Mexico in August 2021. From there, Mexican authorities bused about 300 migrants daily, including those expelled from the U.S. to the Guatemalan border, forcing them to the border on foot.[28] Many migrants were denied applying for asylum, were expelled despite ongoing asylum processes in Mexico, and were forced to leave without notification to consular officials or the Guatemalan government.[29] In doing so, the Biden administration intensified the drastic expulsion policy established by Trump and extended the external dimension even further, ensuring that expelled foreigners are moved far away from the U.S. border.
All these described practices ranging from externalized asylum processing to chain expulsions from the U.S. to Guatemala without the possibility of claiming asylum disregarding basic due process guarantees are a clear violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion and the non-refoulement principle, both principles of customary international law.[30] The denial of entry combined with the duty to wait in Mexico despite dangers to one’s life effectively violates the duty not to penalize irregular entry[31] and the principles of non-refoulement.[32] The restrictions of access to the territory could be construed as procedural penalties, failing to meet the standards for a fair asylum process, particularly given the barriers posed by the CBP One app.
2. The militarization of migration control in the region
The U.S. has not only implemented these externalization strategies through legal and administrative means restricting asylum but also through pressure on Latin American states to curb migration and military cooperation with them aiming at creating physical barriers.[33] The effects thereof are the securitizing of Latin American borders and the shift of migration routes to ever more dangerous ones. This, in turn, endangers the lives of migrants and plays into the hands of human smugglers.[34]
One concrete example of such cooperation is the 2021 Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities between the USA and Mexico. The agreement emphasizes a cooperative security approach in many areas including public health, safety, and the prevention of transborder crime including human smuggling.[35] This cooperation led since its establishment to an increased military presence at Mexico’s northern and southern borders, and countless incidents of severe human rights violations towards migrants and asylum seekers committed by military personnel.[36]
Mexico is not the only example, where the U.S.’s influence caused an increased militarization of migration control. In the fall of 2022, the U.S. also provided concrete military aid to Guatemala via the program Creando Capacidaded de los Aliados (translating to Creating Allies’ Capabilities program to reinforce its “border security”.[37] Here too, this kind of military cooperation led to many reports about severe human rights violations of migrants trying to cross Guatemala committed in the context of the militarization of migration control.[38]
On top of that, in July 2024, also Panama made headlines in this context. Based on a bilateral memorandum of understanding between Panama and the United States,[39] the former vows to seal off its border with Colombia in the Darién Gap, a dangerous migration route through the jungle[40]. In return, the U.S. will finance the repatriation costs of migrants who enter Panama irregularly.[41] The sealing off of the border with Colombia has not only caused uproar among human rights activists, but also the Colombian Ombudsman’s Office cautioned Panama to protect the rights of migrants.[42]
This increased militarization has severe human rights implications. Human Rights organizations[43], the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights[44], and academics[45] documented these impacts on migrants, which include arbitrary detentions, racial profiling, violence against women, excessive force, deportations in violation of the non-refoulement principle, and collective expulsion.[46] Many of these deportations that disregarded international safeguards were conducted based on bilateral agreements between the United States and Latin American countries in disregard of minimum international protection standards.[47]
C. A trade-off? Expanding lawful pathways for swift removals and stiff consequences for those who do not use the official paths
When assessing the Biden administration’s externalization policies of the past years, a justification pattern emerges for the administration’s restrictive approach. Strict measures at the border, a reduction of protection guarantees, an increase of expulsions and deterrence but all of this in turn for “safe and orderly processes” at the border and through legal pathways.
This terminology of justification has, for example, been used in the context of the introduction of the above-described mandatory CBP One App to receive an appointment to present oneself at a port of entry to the U.S. as an asylum seeker. The U.S. government advertises the app as a tool to “streamline the experience at the port of entry” which “may reduce wait times, and permits a safe and orderly process at POEs for all travelers”[48] However, in practice, the app is often malfunctioning, only available in a few languages, and excludes people who are illiterate or do not possess phones[49], not to mention that the wait time for the appointments continuously increased since its implementation.[50] Here, the “trade-off” the app promises has failed those waiting in dire and life-threatening situations for months in Mexican border cities.
This is not the only example of a suggested trade-off for a restrictive migration policy. The U.S. Department of State and the Department of Homeland Security relied on similar language when announcing a set of migration control measures on April 27, 2023, stressing their aims to “reduce unlawful migration, expand lawful migration pathways, and ensure the humane processing of migrants”[51]. Some of these legal pathways include a new family reunification parole process for citizens of El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Colombia and the doubling of resettlement numbers to the U.S. alongside an expansion of parole processes.[52] These policies are positive examples of how perilous journeys to safety can be avoided – as long as they are effective, provide sufficient spots, and are rapid.
Another novel element of U.S. externalization policy in the context of these 2023 measures was the establishment of Regional Processing Centers, which were later recoined as Safe Mobility Offices (SMOs) in countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Costa Rica, and Guatemala[53] with the aim of “facilitating lawful pathways and reduce irregular migration”.[54] According to the official website of the SMOs, these centers are designed to alleviate pressure on the U.S. border by offering protection and legal migration options earlier in the migration journey, ideally before individuals cross international borders.[55] The International Organization for Migration (IOM), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and other local partners implement the process in the partner countries. The initiative aims to help eligible refugees and migrants in South and Central America find lawful pathways to the United States or other participating countries, such as Canada or Spain.[56] These pathways include refugee resettlement, specific parole processes for certain nationalities, family reunification parole processes, and seasonal or temporary employment opportunities.[57]
As Andrew Selee points out “if done well, regional processing of protection claims has some clear advantages. It can both reduce migration pressures and help identify those with protection needs before they hire a smuggler and flee.”[58] However, in the context at hand, one should be cautious about the impact of these centers and more so, about seeing this as the sole alternative to the existence of an asylum system. If done well, such centers may serve as an additional approach to an effective and fair asylum system upon arrival in the USA and all Latin American states.
Assessing the current status quo of the SMOs in Colombia as an example, it becomes apparent, that there is very little, vague, and often outdated information on the official website. Besides that, notably, these services are currently only available to a very limited group of foreigners[59], which limits the initiatives’ impact significantly. According to estimates of the International Refugee Assistance Project, nearly 190,000 people have registered on the SOMs website for processing as of mid-May 2024.[60] Of them, 9,300 have arrived in their destination country USA and Spain.[61] Conversations with organizations working with migrants and asylum seekers in Colombia reveal, that the two partners UNHCR and IOM regularly produce new data on how many migrants and refugees go through the legal pathway, but are reluctant to have them published.[62]
What is more, initial studies on the effectiveness of these centers in Colombia and Costa Rica also indicate significant practical hurdles. A study by the Mixed Migration Center shows that almost all respondents in the study (98% in Colombia and 99% in Costa Rica) would not be eligible for the Safe Mobility Offices[63] which highlights its great limitation for current migration and asylum-seekers seeking secure pathways. Additionally, the study found “a considerable level of misbelief about the purpose and scope of the Safe Mobility Offices”[64] amongst migrants and asylum seekers, which shows that more information distribution about the initiative is urgently necessary.
In this context, and most significantly, the question remains how those waiting for months or maybe even years for the start of their screening process sustain their livelihood and remain safe, especially those most vulnerable. DHS speaks of assistance to vulnerable migrants and asylum seekers by international organizations and NGOs[65], details on such support services are however not publicly available and conversations with actors in the field could not verify a systematic existence thereof.
Considering all these elements, the SMOs may, in the long run, serve as valuable additional elements to secure safe pathways for protection and labor migration, however, as of summer 2024, the implemented system is only available to a small fraction of those who need to seek protection in the U.S., needs more transparency, efficiency and awareness building to live up to its claims as a legal and effective pathway. Either way, it can never serve as a justification for abrogating the U.S. asylum system, but can only exist in parallel.
D. Conclusion and Outlook
In conclusion, this contribution has shown the extensive measures the United States has implemented both internally and externally to control and deter migration, especially during the past two presidencies.
Internally, both the Trump and Biden administrations have resorted to militarizing the border, increasing detention, and eroding asylum protections, often under the pretext of public health and safety. Despite the Biden administration’s pledges for a more humane approach, many restrictive policies persist, exemplified by the continuation of practices that severely limit asylum applications and protection guarantees.
Externally, the U.S. has engaged in the externalization of migration control by leveraging agreements with Latin American countries to act as buffers and enforcing policies like the “Remain in Mexico” program. This cooperation has often involved militarization and significant human rights violations, such as forced expulsions and chain deportations, which contravene international protection standards. These external measures are a clear violation of principles like the non-penalization of entry, the non-refoulement, and the prohibition of collective expulsion.
While initiatives like the Safe Mobility Offices aim to provide lawful migration pathways, their limited scope and effectiveness cannot replace a robust asylum system. This mixed approach of restrictions of movement, externalization, and offering (very limited) legal pathways comes with many human rights implications for those migrating and seeking asylum – not only for those at the US border but also for those thousands of miles further south trying to cross borders to seek better economic opportunities and/or safety. Therefore, the contribution highlights the need for comprehensive and humane migration policies that respect international law and provide adequate protection for those seeking refuge.
Looking ahead, the future of U.S. migration policy is uncertain and rather grim – particularly with the potential re-election of Trump in November 2024. His proposed plans for mass expulsions, the dismantling of the remaining asylum system, and increased cooperation with third states[66] to curb arrivals pose serious concerns.
Footnotes
[1] For example, as of July 2023, the USA detains on average 30,003 migrants and asylum seeker each day. This is a significant increase from the start of the Biden administration in January 2021, when an average of 15,444 migrants and asylum seekers were detained each day. See: Eunice Hyunhye Cho, Unchecked Growth: Private Prison Corporations and Immigration Detention, Three Years Into the Biden Administration, American Civil Liberties Union, available at: https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/unchecked-growth-private-prison-corporations-and-immigration-detention-three-years-into-the-biden-administration.
[2] For a detailed assessment of the consequences of this mass incarceration of migrants and asylum seekers and the use of private prisons see: Eunice Hyunhye Cho, Unchecked Growth: Private Prison Corporations and Immigration Detention, Three Years Into the Biden Administration, American Civil Liberties Union, available at: https://www.aclu.org/news/immigrants-rights/unchecked-growth-private-prison-corporations-and-immigration-detention-three-years-into-the-biden-administration.
[3] For details on the Trump policies see here: Lena Riemer, How Trump’s Migration Policy Erodes National and International Standards of Protection for Migrants and Asylum Seekers, EJIL:Talk!, 28 November 2018, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/how-trumps-migration-policy-erodes-national-and-international-standards-of-protection-for-migrants-and-asylum-seekers/. For details on Biden’s restrictions on asylum in 2024, see: Lena Riemer, The Abrogation of Asylum. Biden’s New Border Policies Under Scrutiny, Verfassungsblog, 25 June 2024, available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/the-abrogation-of-asylum/.
[4] The militarization of the border situation became quite visible with the deployment of 5,600 U.S. soldiers in 2018 to the southern border in response to an approaching migrant caravan of several thousand Central Americans.
[5] The Guardian, ‘Nobody’s coming in’: Trump prepares to send troops to border to stop migrant caravan – video, 31 October 2018, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2018/oct/31/trump-migrant-caravan-15000-troops-to-border-video.
[6] The Guardian, US officers fire teargas at migrant caravan – video, 26 November 2018, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/global/video/2018/nov/26/us-officers-fire-tear-gas-at-migrant-caravan-video.
[7] ECRE, New immigration policy set to restrict US immigrants from using public benefits, or risk residency eligibility, 5 October 2018, available at: https://ecre.org/new-immigration-policy-set-to-restrict-us-immigrants-from-using-public-benefits-or-risk-residency-eligibility/.
[8] Morgan Baskin, Defying Early Promises, Trump Announces an End to DACA. The program affects about 800,000 people, Pacific Standard, 5 September 2017, available at: https://psmag.com/news/trump-ends-daca.
[9] Massoud Hayoun, The White House’s Crusade to Eliminate Temporary Protected Status Could Tear Families Apart, Pacific Standard, 8 November 2017, available at: https://psmag.com/social-justice/white-house-crusade-to-eliminate-temporary-protected-status.
[10] For details on the family separation policy and its evolution see: Southern Poverty Law Center, Family Separation – A Timeline, March 2022, available at: https://www.splcenter.org/news/2022/03/23/family-separation-timeline.
[11] On January 27, 2017, President Trump issued Executive Order 13769 imposing a 90-day travel ban on citizens from seven predominantly Muslim countries. These were Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. The ban also halted the resettlement of Syrian refugees to the USA. This order prompted multiple legal challenges, including Darweesh v. Trump, which blocked deportations under the order. A second version of the order was also blocked, as evidenced in Hawaii v. Trump. However, on June 26, 2018, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 decision, upheld a third version of the order. On January 20, 2021, President Joe Biden revoked the Trump travel bans.
[12] US President Donald J. Trump, Presidential Proclamation Enhancing Vetting Capabilities and Processes for Detecting Attempted Entry Into the United States by Terrorists or Other Public-Safety Threats, issued on 24 September, 2017. For details on the history and evolution of the Travel ban, see here: Immigration History, Muslim Travel Ban, available at: https://immigrationhistory.org/item/muslim-travel-ban/.
[13] In 2018, while 164 states adopted the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration in Marrakech and 152 states endorsed it in a UN General Assembly resolution, the USA ‘withdrew’ from the drafting process with much fanfare. For the USA’s rejectionist stance, see: United States Mission to the United Nations, National Statement of the United States of America on the Adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly, and Regular Migration, United States Mission to the United Nations, 7 December 2018, available at: https://usun.usmission.gov/national-statement-of-the-united-states-of-america-on-the-adoption-of-the-global-compact-for-safe-orderly-and-regular-migration.
[14] Title 42 was introduced in March 2020 and based on a health authority. The authority allowed U.S. officials to turn away migrants who came to the U.S.-Mexico border or expel them from U.S. territory without granting the possibility to apply for protection on the grounds of preventing the spread of COVID-19.
[15] For more details, see below B. 2.
[16] Lina Arroyave, Militarización de fronteras en América Latina, otra barrera para los migrantes, Dejusticia, 11 August 2021, availabe in Spanish at: https://www.dejusticia.org/column/militarizacion-de-fronteras-en-america-latina-otra-barrera-para-los-migrantes/.
[17] For details, see below B. 1.
[18] Lena Riemer, Carrot and Stick: How Western States Lure and Pressure Third States into Cooperating in Migration Control and What This Means for Migrants’ Rights, Opinio Juris, 22 July 2019, available at: http://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/22/carrot-and-stick-how-western-states-lure-and-pressure-third-states-into-cooperating-in-migration-control-and-what-this-means-for-migrants-rights/.
[19] Jeff Crisp, What is Externalization and Why is it a Threat to Refugees?, Chatham House, 5 March 2021, available at: https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/10/what-externalization-and-why-it-threat-refugees.
[20] David Scott FitzGerald, Refuge Beyond Reach, Oxford University Press (2019) pp. 123-159.
[21] Due to numerous reports of severe human rights abuses and significant logistical challenges, the Biden administration suspended and eventually terminated the program after President Biden took office. Despite this, a federal court order reinstated the program, resulting in 7,505 migrants being returned to Mexico between December 2021 and August 2022, before the Supreme Court ultimately overturned the order.
[22] American Immigration Council, Fact Sheet, The Migrant Protection Protocols, 1 February 2024, available at: https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/research/migrant-protection-protocols
[23] See, for example: Amnesty International, Press Release, USA: Government must stop illegal pushbacks of asylum seekers to Mexico, 11 April 2019, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/press-release/2019/04/usa-government-must-stop-illegal-pushbacks-of-asylum-seekers-to-mexico/.
[24] Reuters, U.S.-Mexico migrant deal includes regional asylum plan: document, 11 June 2019, available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-mexico-document/us-mexico-migrant-deal-includes-regional-asylum-plan-document-idUSKCN1TC2GU/.
[25] Michael D. Shear and Maggie Haberman, Mexico Agreed to take Border Actions Months before Trump announced Tariff Deal, New York Times, 8 June 2019, available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/08/us/politics/trump-mexico-deal-tariffs.html.
[26] President of the United States of America, Proclamation 10773, June 3, 2024, Securing the Border, Federal Register, Vol. 89, No. 111, available at: https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2024-06-07/pdf/2024-12647.pdf.
[27] The CBP One app, introduced in January 2023 provides appointments for noncitizens without
appropriate documents for admission at specific points of entry at the U.S. southern border. The appointments can be made when the noncitizen is physically in Central or Northern Mexico. For more information on the downside of CBP One, see below, section C.
[28] Ted Hesson, U.S. starts flying migrant families into Mexico far from border, Reuters, 5 August 2021, available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/us/exclusive-us-starts-flying-migrant-families-into-mexico-far-border-source-2021-08-06/.
[29] Human Rights Watch, Mexico: Mass Expulsion of Asylum Seekers to Guatemala Migrants Expelled From US, Mexico Without Due Process, 8 September 2021, available at: https://www.hrw.org/news/2021/09/08/mexico-mass-expulsion-asylum-seekers-guatemala.
[30] The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees expressed its concerns about this practice and its compatibility with international refugee law standards. See: UNHCR, UNHCR alarmed over US ‘expulsion flights’ to southern Mexico, 11 August 2021, available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2021/08/1097612.
[31] As enshrined in Art. 31 (1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention and its Protocol, to which the USA is a party.
[32] As enshrined in Art. 33 (1) 1951 Refugee Convention. This customary law principle obliges states not to turn a refugee away if their life or well-being is at risk upon removal.
[33] For an assessment of some human rights implications see: Ximena Ortiz Ortiz and Lina Arroyave, La política migratoria de Estados Unidos y sus implicaciones en América Latina, Dejusticia, 6 January 2023, available at: https://www.dejusticia.org/column/la-politica-migratoria-de-estados-unidos-y-sus-implicaciones-en-america-latina/.
[34] International Crisis Group, Bottleneck of the Americas: Crime and Migration in the Darién Gap, 3 November 2023, available at: https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/andes/colombia-central-america/102-bottleneck-americas-crime-and-migration.
[35] Government of Mexico, The Mexico-U.S. Bicentennial Framework for Security, Public Health, and Safe Communities Mexico and the United States: Security, Public Health and Safe Communities, 8 October 2021, available at: https://www.gob.mx/sre/documentos/fact-sheet-the-mexico-u-s-bicentennial-framework-for-security-public-health-and-safe-communities, the prevention of human smuggling as a goal of the framework is mentioned on p. 2.
[36] Alejando Santos CID, El uso de militares para la migración en México resulta en violaciones a los derechos humanos, según un informe, El País, 24 May 2022, available at: https://elpais.com/mexico/2022-05-24/el-muro-militar-de-lopez-obrador-ante-la-migracion-atenta-contra-los-derechos-humanos.html.
[37] Alberto López, EEUU dona un centenar de vehículos a Guatemala valorados en 4,4 millones de dólares, Infodensa, 18 October 2022, available at: https://www.infodefensa.com/texto-diario/mostrar/3928956/eeuu-dona-casi-centenar-vehiculos-ministerio-defensa-guatemala.
[38] United Nations News, Los migrantes guatemaltecos sufren abusos no solo de las pandillas, también de los funcionarios, 16 April 2019, available at: https://news.un.org/es/story/2019/04/1454461 and more recently: United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, La Securitización y la Aplicación de Medidas Restrictivas de Gobernanza Migratoria en las Fronteras, report no. 5, August 2023, p. 5.
[39] The White House, Statement from NSC Spokesperson Adrienne Watson Welcoming the Agreement with Panama to Address Irregular Migration Jointly, 1 July 2024, available at: https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2024/07/01/statement-from-nsc-spokesperson-adrienne-watson-welcoming-the-agreement-with-panama-to-address-irregular-migration-jointly/.
[40] In 2022, a record 520,000 migrants, often guided by people smugglers, traversed the Darién Gap. The International Organization for Migration Missing Migrant Project reported 141 known deaths in the Darién Gap in 2023. The actual number is very likely much higher due to the hurdles of identifying and recovering bodies in the dense jungle. For details see here: https://missingmigrants.iom.int/region/americas.
[41] The Guardian, Panama to shut down Darién Gap route in deal that will see US pay to repatriate migrants, 2 July 2024, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/02/panama-to-shut-down-darien-gap-migrants-usa.
[42] Laura Gamba Fadul, Colombia warns about danger for migrants after Panama closes Darien routes, 6 July 2024, AA, available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/americas/colombia-warns-about-danger-for-migrants-after-panama-closes-darien-routes/3267671.
[43] Fundación para la Justicia, Bajo la Bota: Militarización de la Política Migratoria en México, 24 May 2022, available at: https://www.fundacionjusticia.org/bajo-la-bota-militarizacion-de-la-politica-migratoria-en-mexico/, or Adam Isacson, The United States’ Influence on Latin America’s New Militarism, WOLA, 22 November 2022, available at: https://www.wola.org/analysis/the-united-states-influence-on-latin-americas-new-militarism/.
[44] Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, IACHR: States Must Strengthen National Protection Systems for Refugees, Press Release No. 144, 20 June 2024, available at: https://www.oas.org/en/IACHR/jsForm/?File=/en/iachr/media_center/PReleases/2024/144.asp.
[45] For an analysis on immigration detention in Mexico, see: Alethia Fernández de la Reguera Ahedo, The Militarization of Immigration Control and the Effects of Detention on Migrant Women in Mexico, In: Chamberlen, A., Bandyopadhyay, M. (eds.) Geographies of Gendered Punishment, Palgrave Studies in Prisons and Penology, Palgrave Macmillan (2024), pp. 109-131.
[46] For a detailed assessment, see, for example: Alesia Ash, The Militarization of Mexico’s Border and its Impacts on Human Rights, International Journal of Legal Information, Cambridge University Press, 7 November 2023.
[47] Ximena Ortiz Ortiz and Lina Arroyave, La política migratoria de Estados Unidos y sus implicaciones en América Latina, Dejusticia, 6 January 2023, available at: https://www.dejusticia.org/column/la-politica-migratoria-de-estados-unidos-y-sus-implicaciones-en-america-latina/.
[48] U.S. government, Fact Sheet: Using CBP One™ to Schedule an Appointment, January 2023, available at: https://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/files/assets/documents/2023-Jan/CBP%20One%20Fact%20Sheet_English_3.pdf.
[49] Raul Pinto, CBP One Is Riddled With Flaws That Make the App Inaccessible to Many Asylum Seekers Immigration Impact, 28 February 2023, available at: https://immigrationimpact.com/2023/02/28/cbp-one-app-flaws-asylum-seekers/.
[50] Human Rights Watch, “We Couldn’t Wait” Digital Metering at the US-Mexico Border, 1 May 2024, available at: https://www.hrw.org/report/2024/05/01/we-couldnt-wait/digital-metering-us-mexico-border.
[51] DHS, Fact Sheet: U.S. Government Announces Sweeping New Actions to Manage Regional Migration, 27 April 2023, available at: https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/04/27/fact-sheet-us-government-announces-sweeping-new-actions-manage-regional-migration. From here on cited as: DHS, Fact Sheet (2023).
[52] Ibid.
[53] International Refugee Assistance Project, Backgrounder: What we know about the Biden Administration’s Safe Mobility Initiative, 28 May 2024, available at: https://refugeerights.org/news-resources/even-more-things-we-know-about.
[54] DHS, Fact Sheet (2023).
[55] Movilidad Segura, General information on the ‘Safe Mobility’ initiative, available at: https://movilidadsegura.org/en/.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Ibid.
[58] Andrew Selee, Regional Processing Centers: Can This Key Component of the Post-Title 42 U.S. Strategy Work?, Migration Policy Institute, May 2023, available at: https://www.migrationpolicy.org/news/regional-processing-centers-post-title-42-strategy.
[59] These are in Colombia, for example, Cubans, Haitians, and Venezuelans in Colombia on or before June 11, 2023. Nicaraguan, Venezuelan, and Ecuadorian nationals in Costa Rica on or before June 12, 2023. Cubans, Haitians, Nicaraguans, Venezuelans, and Colombians in Ecuador on or before October 18, 2023.
Guatemalan nationals in Guatemala. All of them must have resided lawfully in the respective country at the moment in question.
[60] International Refugee Assistance Project, Backgrounder: What we know about the Biden Administration’s Safe Mobility Initiative, 28 May 2024, available at: https://refugeerights.org/news-resources/even-more-things-we-know-about, p. 1.
[61] Ibid., p. 2.
[62] Conversations conducted in Bogotá, Colombia with academics and local organizations between June and August 2024.
[63] Mixed Migration Center, Safe Mobility Offices: Awareness, Migrants’ Interest, and Potential Influence on mixed migration dynamics in Latin America and the Caribbean, 4Mi INFOGRAPHIC, March 2024, available at: https://mixedmigration.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/320_Safe-Mobility-Offices-Infographics_EN.pdf, p. 2.
[64] Ibid., p. 4.
[65] DHS Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, Safe Mobility Initiative, available at: https://www.state.gov/refugee-admissions/safe-mobility-initiative/.
[66] Ed Pilkington, Mass deportations, detention camps, troops on the street: Trump spells out migrant plan, The Guardian, 3 May 2024, available at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/article/2024/may/03/trump-mass-deportations-detention-camps-military-migrants.