Laura Lambert, Researcher, Leuphana University Lüneburg 

While European debates on the outsourcing of asylum are often shaped by legal and economic criticism, a more fundamental anti-racist critique can also be heard in Africa. Using the example of emergency evacuations from Libya to Niger under the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM), this article shows how affected refugees and Nigerien officials exposed the ETM as a racist and neo-colonial project and thus pointed to the vision of a different migration policy based on their treatment as equals.

Introduction

Current European debates often criticize the externalization of asylum with regard to the violation of the human and procedural rights of asylum seekers and the immense costs of these procedures.[1] Such criticisms provide valid arguments for everyday political debates, but risk further normalizing these policies. For example, they may consider it legitimate to assess the costs of an asylum seeker or to deport them to a ‘safe’ third country if the asylum system there is considered operational.

Emergency evacuations are an important example of outsourcing asylum to third countries in the Global South. They are an instrument of protection for particularly vulnerable or endangered recognized refugees with an “urgent need of resettlement”.[2]  This includes refugees in detention. They should first be brought to a transit facility where their resettlement can be organized.

In 2017, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) created the “Emergency Transit Mechanism” (ETM) with European funding. The aim was to free protection seekers from Libyan torture prisons and bring them to Niger in West Africa. They would have their asylum applications examined there and then be resettled. Two years later, Rwanda followed suit and has since become Europe’s major accomplice in initiatives for the externalization of asylum. By April 2024, the ETM has evacuated almost 6,500 protection seekers from Libya to the two countries.[3]

Despite this protection focus, a more fundamental anti-racist critique on the ETM was audible in Niger than is often the case in Europe. Based on my ethnographic fieldwork in Niger from 2018-2019,[4] in this article I show how African officials and migrants expressed their disagreement with the European outsourcing of asylum and highlighted it as a racist, neo-colonial project. By criticizing racism and resisting unequal cooperation with Europe and the UNHCR, officials and migrants tried to shape a new migration policy based on the recognition as equals. I focus on four aspects: the visibilization of racist violence in Libya, the resistance to humanitarian borders, the assertion of sovereignty and migration as decolonization. In conclusion, I argue that Europe should learn from these practices of critique when attempting to shape a new migration policy.

Making Racist Violence Visible

In 2017, CNN published a video in which African migrants were sold at a slave auction in Libya, the most important transit country in North Africa. People and politicians in Africa and beyond were shocked. Niger’s president Issoufou expressed his “deep indignation” at this “practice from another time” and called for political solutions.[5] At the same time, this video was just the tip of the iceberg. Numerous reports documented the torture and extortion of migrants in Libya. They also proved Europe’s involvement in this violence. As a bottleneck on the Central Mediterranean Route, Libya is an important partner in the fight against migrants on their way to Europe. The European Union (EU) supports and finances the Libyan coast guard, which intercepts migrants in the Mediterranean and returns them to the torture camps.[6]

At the height of the international outrage over this “Libya crisis” facilitated by EU migration control, the UNHCR presented the ETM as a “solution”.[7] The ETM was to bring 3,800 of the most vulnerable people seeking protection from the Libyan camps to safety in Niger. There they were to undergo asylum and resettlement procedures and then be resettled to Europe and North America. The UNHCR spoke of a “corridor of hope” out of the torture camps.[8] The EU financed and promoted the project, as its focus on protection emphasized the “bright side” of an externalization policy otherwise dominated by repression, as an EU official explained to me.

The evacuated refugees resisted this presentation of the ETM as a “solution” to the violence in Libya. They made the violence visible in the asylum interviews and in conversations with journalists and academics. One of them was Semret[9], a young woman from East Africa who had gone to Libya in the hope of reaching Europe. She told me how the Libyan coast guard intercepted her boat and towed it back to Libya and she described the camp where she and her fellow travelers were detained for months at the violent hands of their torturers. This camp was known for its cruel detention conditions. Like most of the evacuees in Niger, Semret was traumatized. She was probably unaware of Europe’s role in Libyan migration controls. Externalization policies often rely on opacity and informality, which makes their critical analysis difficult.[10] But for Semret, the violence against Black migrants that she had experienced in Libya was a great injustice.

In their criticism, the evacuees also called for further evacuations from Libya. One of them said: “We are fine, but what about our compatriots who are still in Libya?” They criticized the inadequate scale of evacuations as well as the continuation of violence against migrants in Libya. It is estimated that about 5,000 migrants were detained in Libyan prisons at any time.[11]  Each evacuation to Niger also created space for a new detention.

In their criticism, the evacuees highlighted the racist violence experienced in Libya and campaigned for the evacuation of those still in detention. The ETM, presented by the UNHCR and the EU as a “solution”, continued the violence against migrants in Libya and legitimized it as a supposedly available offer of protection for a minority instead of eliminating it.

Challenging Humanitarian Borders

In their criticism, the evacuees also objected to their continued containment in Niger, 3,000 km south of Europe, under arduous conditions.

Those responsible for the ETM had explicitly sought an African third country for the evacuation from Libya and refrained from bringing evacuees to the Emergency Transit Center Timișoara in Romania, which had been set up for such purposes. “It was also about not taking them to Europe,” a UNHCR employee explained to me. “They would have continued their journey there or applied for asylum.” Evacuations to Niger made it possible to exercise spatial control over the migrants. It was difficult for them to reach Europe from this sub-Saharan country. They often had to pay several thousand euros and once again navigate the violence in Libya.

Semret and the other evacuees had agreed in Libya to be evacuated after the UNHCR had assured them that Niger was merely for “transit”, for a temporary stay with imminent resettlement to Europe or North America. When I met Semret, however, she had already been waiting in the capital Niamey for over a year for the asylum decision. “Why am I here? It’s too much. This country is not good,” Semret criticized. “The UNHCR told us it’s only transit. I had no interest in coming to Niger. My plan was to cross the sea to Europe.”

The UNHCR had informed Semret and her friends verbally that the Nigerien asylum office had rejected their asylum application. They had since been waiting for months for the written decision so that they could file an appeal. A friend of Semret said: “How can it take three months to get a piece of paper? We are responsible [for our families]. Even we have life.” Occasionally, UNHCR staff would come to them at the shelter and ask them to “be patient”, but the worried asylum seekers felt uninformed about their individual cases. Therefore, they secretly tried to mobilize journalists and researchers like me to exert pressure for them.

This waiting also meant enduring precariousness in a context of underdevelopment. A UNHCR officer in Niger told me: “Of course, all of this [support] is happening in this, in the poorest country in the world. Of course, here a refugee is not happy. There is no work for a Nigerien.” Even though the care provided by the UNHCR for the evacuees was significantly better than for other refugee groups in Niger, it remained inadequate. Semret particularly missed healthcare, hygiene products and clothing. Sex work was one of the few opportunities to earn some extra money. This had led to a heated public debate in Muslim-majority Niamey and put pressure on the UNHCR. Semret justified this: “Women have to go out and do bad things and then the UNHCR doesn’t like it. But what are they supposed to do?” As long as humanitarian care remained inadequate and procedures dragged on, Semret took the necessary steps to ensure her needs were met.

At the same time, Semret and her friends emphasized the UNHCR’s responsibility for them: “The UNHCR brought us here. It is playing with us. We can’t do anything. We are in the hands of the UNHCR,” Semret told me. Her friend nodded: “It’s like ping-pong. We are the ball and the UNHCR is the player. The UNHCR doesn’t care about refugees.”  Several dozens of them organized a demonstration in the embassy district and a sit-in in front of the UNHCR to demand the processing of their cases and resettlement. The demonstrators held banners reading “We need solutions”, “We appeal to justice”, “UNHCR, no discrimination” and “We are victims”. The Nigerien police dispersed the protest with teargas.

Semret and other evacuees fought for the promised resettlement to Europe and an improvement in their assistance. In doing so, they resisted the humanitarian border, which promised them care in Niger to control their mobility. Little attention has been paid to these practices of critique by refugees in public and academic discussions on the outsourcing of asylum.

Asserting Sovereignty

As the ETM continued, resistance also grew among Nigerien officials.

In 2017, Niger was the only African country willing to host the ETM. This model project polished up its international reputation as a humanitarian host country. Since 2015, Niger had been criticized for being a “European border guard” that unduly restricted the West African freedom of movement in return for European funds. In addition to reputational gains, the ETM promised additional infrastructure and funding. Numerous other African countries refused to participate. Rwanda only follow suit in 2019, at a time when a further participation by Niger had long since become uncertain in view of the many problems associated with the ETM.

Due to this pioneering role, the Nigerien authorities had great negotiating power in the design of the ETM. At this time, France, as one of the driving forces, spoke publicly about the establishment of a “hotspot” in Niamey. This meant setting up an office of the French asylum authority OFPRA in Niamey, similar to the Greek and Italian islands. French officials were to carry out asylum procedures and grant refugee status there. Nigerien politicians vehemently rejected this. They saw the hotspot model as a violation of their national sovereignty. Instead, as a French official told me, they insisted that the evacuees pass the Nigerien asylum procedure and, if they were recognized by Niger, the UNHCR would examine their resettlement. Thanks to its strong negotiating position in the ETM, Niger was able to push back France’s influence and instead declare its own asylum administration and the UNHCR responsible. Instead of European officials, it was the Nigerien asylum officials who made the asylum decisions, followed by the UNHCR and European resettlement missions that occasionally came to Niamey.

These and other rules were laid down in a treaty. Yet, they were quickly undermined and partially amended by the UNHCR. For example, there was a ceiling for the number of evacuations, which the UNHCR quickly exceeded. It argued that this was an emergency and that human lives were being saved in Libya. This breach of contract caused incomprehension and frustration among the tasked Nigerien officials. One official criticized in our conversation: “This is not serious. Normally a text is to be respected. It is a contract. There are principles.” The official, who had spent months negotiating the contract, criticized the UNHCR’s informal practice of seeking non-contractual solutions without consent.

Officials’ indignation grew when the UNHCR took over responsibility for most asylum decisions. After six months in which the Nigerien asylum authority had been responsible, the UNHCR had the impression that the procedures were being processed too slowly. Instead, the UNHCR persuaded the Minister of the Interior to decide the cases itself and, in the event of recognition, to resettle them directly. The responsible Nigerien asylum officials saw this as disempowerment and a violation of their sovereignty. “The UNHCR is doing it instead of us!”, one of them exclaimed. They still remained responsible for the rejected cases and lost the allowances paid by UNHCR for the asylum decision-making.

In view of this frustration on the part of Nigerien officials, UNHCR representatives worried about the extension of the ETM in 2019. After two years, the original memorandum expired and had to be extended. In the end, however, the UNHCR succeeded in negotiating an extension of the ETM.

In the ETM, Nigerien officials fought for their influence and sovereignty vis-à-vis EU states and the UNHCR. They used their agency to reject the power claims of the former colonial power France and to convince the UNHCR of respecting treaties. Similar to refugees, this agency of leading officials in third countries has so far been addressed too little in public debates and research on externalization policies.

Migration as Decolonization

Among the refugees and civil servants, migration to Europe remained a point of reference.

Semret and some of her friends considered putting an end to the wait and leaving Niger themselves. Semret told me: “Libya is better than Niger […]. Why did they bring me here from Libya? Many of us want to go back to Libya.” Some officials also assumed this. One of them claimed about those waiting: “They will leave Niger themselves without us knowing. They will take the same route back to Libya.” In 2021, the UNHCR concluded that most cases with long waiting times “decide to leave the centre and are hard to track”.[12]

The migrants’ agency lies also in these decisions. They decided to return to Libya and on to Europe despite the risks and migration controls. Studies have long shown that African migrants are aware of the risks of their migration and accept them in view of the associated social mobility.[13] The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Racism and legal scholar Tendayi Achiume has described this migration as “decolonization”.[14]

Similar decolonial efforts have also intensified at state level in Niger. Since the coup in 2023, the new military government has voiced clear anti-colonial criticism of Western influence, expelled its military units from the country and intensified contacts with Russia. When the EU did not recognize the new Nigerien regime and stopped aid payments, Niger decriminalized transit migration at the end of 2023, as the underlying law “did not take into account the interests of Niger and its citizens”.[15]  Since then, migrants have been officially transported through the Sahara again. The European Union reacted nervously in view of the expected migration movements.[16]

Despite these strained diplomatic relations with Europe and the end of some projects, the new Nigerien government has continued the ETM just like the UNHCR has continued its work. In contrast to the anti-migration law, the ETM has probably not experienced the same politicization and has less curtailed local interests.

A positive relationship to migration as a rejection of neo-colonial power relations was thus found among refugees and civil servants and recently also in the new military government.

Thinking from the Border

From the perspective of the refugees and civil servants affected in Niger, a more fundamental criticism of the externalization of asylum can be heard than is often the case in European debates.

The Nigerien officials’ self-confident demands for sovereignty as well as the refugees’ resistance to racist violence and humanitarian borders and their willingness to recognize migration as a means of decolonization contain a demand for their treatment as equals. This position is incompatible with European policies of externalizing asylum.

At present, it remains uncertain in which direction Niger and the Sahel in general will move. Anti-democratic tendencies such as the suspension of elections and the repression of the opposition and journalists should be viewed with concern.[17] However, these practices also make it clear that the European externalization policy – in addition to military aid and development policy – has so far not provided a solution for people and politicians in the Sahel. Deep in a poly-crisis, the Sahel is struggling for its future. Its past and present have been characterized by migration. Its future will almost certainly be too. Its turn away from European-dictated migration and asylum policies and attempt to define its own standards is understandable.

They are also compelling Europe to rethink migration and asylum. Europe’s fears for the future are poorly concealed in the European policies of deferral, the boats and torture prisons of the Libyan coast guard and the transit camps in Niger. Even Europe is struggling, in the face of climate change and wars, to find a project that promises sustainable prosperity, security and peace. Violent isolation is not only constantly failing in its implementation. It also fails as a supposedly unifying project between the West and the Rest.

Without succumbing to the temptation to romanticize these current shifts, the demand of acknowledging each other as equals allows for new alliances between Africa and Europe. A contemporary migration policy should address the issue of equality instead of indulging in the illusion of being able to address the massive global inequalities of our times and the migration movements associated with them through border control and the outsourcing of refugee protection to third countries.

Footnotes

[1] See BBC (2024): What Is the UK’s Plan to Send Asylum Seekers to Rwanda? 13/06/2024. https://www.bbc.com/news/explainers-61782866.

[2] UNHCR (2011): Guidance Note on Emergency Transit Facilities. https://www.refworld.org/pdfid/4dddec3a2.pdf.

[3] UNHCR (2024): Flash Update. Emergency Transit Mechanism. April 2024. https://reporting.unhcr.org/niger-and-rwanda-emergency-transit-mechanism-etm-flash-update-8493.

[4] Lambert, Laura (2021): Extraterritorial Asylum Processing: The Libya-Niger Emergency Transit Mechanism. Forced Migration Review 68:18–21. Lambert, Laura (2020): Who is Doing Asylum in Niger? State Bureaucrats’ Perspectives and Strategies on the Externalization of Refugee Protection. Anthropologie et Développement 51:87–103.

[5] RFI (2017): Migrants vendus comme esclaves en Libye: Antonio Guterres “horrifié”. 21/11/2017. https://www.rfi.fr/fr/afrique/20171121-migrants-vendus-esclaves-libye-guterres-horrifie-issoufou-reactions.

[6] Euronews (2019): EU funds Libyan Coast Guard but has limited monitoring capacity, leaked report suggests. 03/11/2019. https://www.euronews.com/2019/11/03/eu-funds-libyan-coast-guard-but-has-limited-monitoring-capacity-leaked-report-suggests.

[7] RFI (2017): Le HCR évacue des migrants africains de Libye. 13/11/2017. www.rfi.fr/afrique/20171112-hcr-evacue-migrants-libye-niger.

[8] Boyer, Florence, and Pascaline Chappart (2018): Les enjeux de la protection au Niger: Les nouvelles impasses politiques du “transit” ? Mouvements. http://mouvements.info/les-enjeux-de-la-protection-au-niger/

[9] Names and biographical details have been anonymized.

[10] Landau, Loren B (2019): A Chronotope of Containment Development: Europe’s Migrant Crisis and Africa’s Reterritorialisation. Antipode 51 (1): 169–186. DOI: 10.1111/anti.12420.

[11] UNHCR (2019): Desperate Journeys. January – December 2018. https://www.unhcr.org/desperatejourneys/

[12] Altai Consulting (2021): Case Study. Emergency Transit Mechanism. for EUTF. https://trust-fund-for-africa.europa.eu/system/files/2021-12/etm_case_study_june_2021_final_dec_2021_0.pdf, 24f.

[13] UNDP (2019): Scaling Fences: Voices of Irregular African Migrants to Europe. https://www.undp.org/publications/scaling-fences.

[14] Achiume, E. Tendayi (2019): Migration as Decolonization. Stanford Law Review 71 (1509).

[15] BBC (2023): Niger coup leaders repeal law against migrant smuggling. 28/11/2023. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-67550481

[16] Zeit (2024): Der Weg durch die Wüste ist frei. 14/05/2024. https://www.zeit.de/2024/21/niger-migration-fluchtroute-agadez-putsch

[17] Freedom House (2024): Freedom in the World 2024. Niger. https://freedomhouse.org/country/niger/freedom-world/2024