Over the past few decades, the world has witnessed the rise of externalisation policies. This trend has deepened the existing global “non-entrée” system, which is designed to contain people of the South within the South.^[1] These policies include the establishment of offshore asylum processing centres, intercepting refugees at sea, and introducing concepts such as safe country of origin, safe transit country, and safe third country (STC). Countries in the Global North have primarily utilised these policies to shift the burden of refugee protection onto countries in the Global South, with Africa increasingly becoming a focal point for European policymakers, particularly following what they described as the “refugee crisis.”^[2] While Africa has been drawn into the heart of externalisation, its legal mechanisms have remained at the margins of the debate.

This blog post aims to rebalance the discussion. It argues that African regional and sub-regional human rights bodies, beginning with the African Commission, function as crucial yet underused forums for addressing externalisation practices, particularly the recent reliance on STC agreements. The focus here will be centred on two of the African Commission’s primary mandates: to protect and promote human rights, and how these can be effectively utilised to challenge externalisation practices that may threaten or undermine essential refugee rights under the African human rights and regional refugee law frameworks.^[3]

A Brief Overview of Externalisation in Africa

Since the mid-20th century, Eurocentric narratives and legal reforms have overwhelmingly dominated or, instead, monopolised the field of international refugee law.^[4] Much of the literature, academic debates, and litigation strategies have primarily focused on European legal instruments, such as the European Convention on Human Rights, and European institutions, including the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU).

Externalisation has been no exception. Its practices can be traced back nearly three decades, particularly with the United States’ interception of Haitian asylum-seekers, processing them in Guantanamo Bay, and Australia’s introduction of its “Pacific Solution.”^[5] The European states invoked the so-called “refugee crisis” of 2015 as a justification to intensify their efforts to externalise their obligations through formal and informal agreements with countries outside Europe, often in Africa. From the Italy–Libya bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) to various formal readmission agreements and informal arrangements with multiple African countries, Africa has steadily become the preferred destination for Europe’s displaced populations. North Africa has increasingly been perceived as an extension of the European fortress against migration.^[6]

Yet, while Africa has been central to the architecture of externalisation, it has remained ignored in legal strategies designed to contest it. This paradox became evident in the recent controversy surrounding the UK-Rwanda Partnership Agreement.^[7] When the agreement was first announced in 2022, outrage erupted in London and Strasbourg, where the ECtHR sits, yet far less attention was paid in Kigali, the capital of Rwanda, or in Addis Ababa, the headquarters of the African Union. European refugee lawyers launched battles before the ECtHR and UK national courts, and European academic institutions published extensive writings examining the legality of such an agreement.^[8] International and national human rights organisations advocated against sending refugees to Rwanda, and even the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) showed significant engagement with the issue through its litigation team and advocacy channels.^[9] Despite all of this, very few have inquired about the available avenues of litigation on the African side of the equation.^[10]

After all, this blog post argues that if refugee law aims to be genuinely international, it is time to rebalance the centre of gravity away from Strasbourg and Luxembourg and towards Banjul, Arusha, and Addis Ababa.^[11]

The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Brief Background

When the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) was founded in May 1963, its principal focus was not on protecting individual rights but on pursuing collective liberation.^[12] The OAU’s main concentration at this time was on eradicating colonialism, dismantling apartheid in Southern Africa, and achieving political and economic independence.^[13] Although the OAU Charter explicitly recognised the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), protecting human rights remained subordinate to the broader political and decolonial missions.^[14]

This non-prioritisation for human rights remained until the late 1970s and early 1980s, when the OAU began facing increased pressure from intergovernmental organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), the media, and even religious institutions that accused it of double standards: it condemns apartheid and violations committed by colonial powers, still, it remains silent on the widespread abuses perpetrated by its own Member States. Responding to these pressures, African States adopted the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (hereafter “the African Charter”) in 1981, an instrument notable for its innovative synthesis of individual and collective rights and the integration of duties alongside rights.^[15]

The African Charter formally established the African Commission, providing that an independent body would be created “to promote human and peoples’ rights and ensure their protection in Africa.”^[16] The Charter entrusts the Commission with a threefold mandate. First, to promote human and peoples’ rights across the continent.^[17] This promotional function is fulfilled through various instruments, which will be discussed in a subsequent section. Second, to protect human and peoples’ rights by considering individual communications submitted that claim violations of rights enshrined in the Charter.^[18] Third, to interpret the Charter, issuing advisory opinions upon the request of State Parties, AU organs, or on its own initiative.^[19]

The Protective Mandate: Litigating Refugee Rights Through the African Commission

The African Commission’s protective mandate, as stipulated under Articles 30 and 45(2) of the African Charter, provides a distinctive avenue for contesting human rights violations that may arise from externalisation practices. Through the communications procedure, the Commission is tasked with examining allegations of violations of the rights not only enshrined under the African Charter, but also rights enshrined in other relevant regional human rights instruments, including Africa’s Refugee Convention, the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa (hereafter “the 1969 OAU Convention”).

Since its establishment, the African Commission has been recognised for its flexible standing requirement, which allows individuals, NGOs, and even academic institutions to submit communications against state parties.^[20] The Commission has also permitted communications submitted actio popularis - in the public interest, requiring the applicant only to prove the relation between their claim and the public interest behind it.^[21] There is thus no requirement for direct victim status, as often required by other human rights institutions.^[22] No restrictions have been imposed based on the complainant’s nationality or location, as long as the respondent state is a party to the African Charter, which, at the time of writing, includes all African states except Morocco.^[23] This flexible standing regime is particularly significant in the refugee context, where refugees are outside the respondent state, frequently on the move, and may face practical obstacles, such as limited access to counsel, that would prevent them from taking legal action themselves.

Furthermore, the African Commission has shown flexibility in applying its admissibility requirements, which are the basic conditions a case must meet before the Commission will consider it. One of the most important of these requirements is the exhaustion of local remedies. Applicants are generally expected to raise their claims before the local courts of the respondent state, as the Commission is not intended to be a court of first instance, but rather a last resort. The Commission’s jurisprudence has been consistent that respondent states cannot invoke that the applicant did not exhaust local remedies if such remedies are unavailable, ineffective, or unduly prolonged.^[24] However, the Commission’s practice has not always been consistent regarding the requirement for refugees to exhaust local remedies in the country they fled – in some early cases, it refused to hear them because local remedies had not been exhausted.^[25] More recently, the Commission has adopted a more pragmatic approach, clearly indicating that it “would be an affront to common sense and logic to require the complainant [a refugee] to return to his country to exhaust local remedies.”^[26]

Despite the African Commission’s dedicated mandate and its relatively low threshold for access, it remains underutilised in adjudicating refugee rights. However, it has established essential precedents on issues such as arbitrary individual expulsion, mass expulsion, non-refoulement, and the right to seek asylum, providing hope for its viability as a legal avenue for refugee rights cases. In particular, in Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture v Rwanda, the Commission stressed the right to seek asylum and be protected from mass expulsion as embedded within the broader guarantees of Article 12 of the African Charter.^[27] In Union interafricaine des droits de l’Homme v Angola, the African Commission ruled against Angola, condemning its arbitrary expulsion of West African nationals, many of them refugees and asylum-seekers, emphasising that the expulsion of any individual should be based on individualised assessment and subject to independent judicial review.^[28] Also, in the Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Angola, the Commission addressed Angola’s Operaçao Brilhante campaign, which aimed to expel foreigners, including migrants and refugees, from Angola. The African Commission described mass expulsion as a “special threat to human rights” and broader international legal norms.^[29]

The 1969 OAU Convention has remained strikingly underexamined within the Commission’s wider jurisprudence of communications. Even in large-scale violations against refugees, such as in Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture v. Rwanda, the Commission relied heavily on the African Charter without any application or mention of the 1969 OAU Convention, despite its clear normative relevance and although Rwanda is party to it.^[30] Moreover, litigants rarely invoke the African Refugee Convention in their pleadings, further contributing to this judicial marginalisation. However, some exceptions to this observation exist. In Doebbler v. Sudan, the African Commission proactively engaged with the 1969 OAU Convention, even though the applicant had not explicitly invoked it in their submitted arguments.^[31] Similarly, in Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) v Guinea, the African Commission found that actions of the president of Guinea, inciting soldiers and civilians to target Sierra Leonean refugees, had led to mass violations against them throughout the country, constituting a breach to Guinea’s commitments under the African Charter and the 1969 OAU Convention.^[32]

These instances demonstrate that, although the 1969 OAU Convention was not sufficiently utilised in many claims raised before the African Commission, it remains a powerful legal instrument that should not be disregarded when adjudicating violations that may occur to refugees. It is a highly relevant tool that could be strategically used in contemporary refugee litigation, particularly in contesting modern externalisation practices within the African continent, including STC agreements.

As an example of externalisation practices, STC agreements can be strategically challenged under the Commission’s protective mandate in various ways and through different paths. Communications may contest the legality of forced transfer of refugees to third countries without adequate protection guarantees, arguing violations of varying rights under the African Charter, including the right to life (Article 4), dignity (Article 5), personal liberty (Article 6), access to courts and due process (Article 7), freedom of movement (Article 12(1)), asylum (Article 12(3)), and protection against arbitrary individual expulsion and mass expulsion (Article 12(4&5)). These claims should also invoke other relevant human rights, such as the principles of non-refoulement and non-discrimination, as outlined in the 1969 OAU Convention. Engaging with the African Commission through carefully drafted communications can help provide remedies for affected individuals, contributing to the further development of regional refugee law in Africa.

The Promotional Mandate: Advocacy Tools for Refugee Protection

Alongside its role in deciding individual cases, the African Commission also has a promotional mandate, through which it monitors how African states fulfil their human rights commitments, raises awareness about human rights issues, and assists governments in enhancing their compliance. As the main human rights organ of the African Union (AU), the Commission reviews state reports and can issue recommendations and resolutions to such states. The primary legal instrument overseen by the Commission is the African Charter. Still, it also has the capacity to monitor the adherence of African states to other regional human rights instruments, such as the 1969 OAU Convention. Unlike the 1951 Refugee Convention, which establishes UNHCR as its main supervisory body, drafters of the 1969 OAU Convention did not assign such responsibility to a specific institution. Recognising this gap, the AU entrusted the African Commission with this task.^[33] Since then, the Commission has utilised its promotional mandate to encourage states to respect the rights of refugees and asylum seekers under the Convention.^[34] Moreover, the Commission has been calling African states to domesticate the 1969 OAU Convention in their national laws and provided valuable interpretations to its provisions.^[35]

In exercising its promotional mandate, the Commission employs various tools, including resolutions, studies, general comments, country visits, and fact-finding missions, to ensure that the rights provided under the Charter and other regional instruments are protected and safeguarded for Africans. Regarding refugees, there is an increased attention to their situations across the continent, as well as to their specific rights, including the right to seek asylum, non-refoulement, and protection against expulsion.^[36] Furthermore, the Commission has referred to refugees in many of its publications as a vulnerable group that must receive utmost attention from state parties to the Charter.^[37] In various resolutions and studies, the Commission worked on documenting and highlighting the lived experiences of refugees in certain severe situations, sounding the alarm for states to intervene and ensure their protection.^[38] With the rise of recent externalisation and migration control practices that pose a greater risk to the rights of refugees, the African Commission’s promotional mandate becomes a more vital avenue for refugees in Africa.

Throughout the years, the African Commission has established several special mechanisms, including working groups and special rapporteurs, which are distributed thematically depending on topics or groups of people of concern. While many of these mechanisms can contribute to the debate, the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons, and Migrants in Africa remains the most relevant. This position was first established in 2004 by the Commission to perform many tasks, such as to monitor the situation of refugees, engage with states, conduct extensive research about the rights of refugees, ensure state compliance with the 1969 OAU Convention, and collaborate with different stakeholders concerned with refugees, including UNHCR and other international, regional, and national organisations and academic institutions.^[39]

Externalisation has increasingly drawn the attention of the Special Rapporteur on Refugees in recent years. An early example of this focus is the response to the Italy-Libya Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), followed by engagement with a series of readmission agreements concluded between the EU and several North African countries. These arrangements have contributed to a heightened securitisation of refugee movement across the African continent. More recently, the UK-Rwanda STC agreement has raised further concerns. In response, the last two Rapporteurs have employed various tools to address and challenge such situations.^[40]

In one of its latest intersessional reports, the former Special Rapporteur Maya Sahli-Fadel expressed concerns regarding the implications of the UK-Rwanda agreement, identifying it as a burden-shifting mechanism that undermines refugee rights and compromises the refugee protection framework in Africa.^[41] In another intersessional report issued by the current Special Rapporteur, Selma Sassi, she discussed Tunisia’s establishment of its new Search and Rescue (SAR) zone in the Mediterranean.^[42] As a pre-emptive measure, she reflected on Libya’s earlier creation of its SAR zone, supported by Italy, which resulted in grave violations against refugees and migrants. Sassi affirmed that Tunisia must ensure the protection of refugees and migrants, adhering to international and regional standards, including the principle of safe disembarkation.^[43]

Studies conducted by the Commission could be a highly effective promotional tool to ensure wider protection of refugee rights, addressing various modes of externalisation. The Commission’s 2023 Study on African Responses to Migration and the Protection of Migrant Rights, developed in collaboration with several academic institutions and international experts, stands as a clear example. The study highlighted how European migration policies have reshaped Africa’s migration governance. It observed:

“The hardening of European migration policy, focused on deterring irregular migration, has led to the emergence of repressive migration policies across the Maghreb. These countries are subjected to European pressure to control the EU’s external borders and to impose repressive policies focused on securitization.”^[44]

In another study on the Human Rights Impact of Law Enforcement on Asylum Seekers, Refugees, and Migrants in Africa, the Commission critically examined to what extent the externalisation of refugee protection from Europe to some African countries has led to more securitisation of migration, leading to repressive actions against vulnerable populations violating their rights under the African Charter and the 1969 OAU Convention.^[45] The study presents contexts like Niger, where external funding has led to the implementation of some national legislations, such as the anti-smuggling law (Law 2015-36), that criminalise mobility within the country, compromising the rights of refugees and migrants attempting to enter or leave Niger.^[46]

This gradual engagement crystallised in Resolution 645, adopted at the Commission’s 85^th Ordinary Session in October 2025.^[47] This resolution marks a significant contribution to the Commission’s promotional work on the protection of people on the move within the African continent, for many reasons. It is one of the rare incidents in which an African mechanism directly and explicitly engages with the externalisation of refugee protection within the continent. The resolution is written in bold terms, naming certain actors such as the European Union, several European States, the United Kingdom, and the United States as agents of externalisation, and identifying specific practices implemented by them in Africa, including readmission agreements, extraterritorial asylum processing, funding and training of interception units, and the creation of transit or relocation centres.^[48] It addresses the responsibility-shifting nature of externalisation practices and the determination of state responsibility in such circumstances; it stresses that such arrangements “cannot delegate, transfer, or dilute the international obligations of States Parties under the African Charter and international law.”^[49] Regarding African States’ responsibility for such arrangements, it emphasises that they should not enter into any migration partnerships as long as they “know, or ought reasonably to know, that such agreements entail a real risk of serious human rights violations.”^[50] Moreover, it addresses the secrecy surrounding externalisation agreements, which is intentionally aimed at obstructing litigation and evading oversight, by calling on African States to make existing and proposed agreements public to ensure transparency and accountability. Lastly, and most importantly, the Resolution urged African States to prioritise South-South cooperation and to promote “African alternatives to asymmetrical partnerships, grounded in human rights and human dignity,” explicitly recognising the unequal power relations between the architects of such externalisation practices in the Global North and the implementers in Africa.

Through its various promotional tools and special mechanisms, the Commission remains a vital avenue for protecting refugees within the African continent. In the context of externalisation practices, including STC agreements, the existing legal and policy literature remains overwhelmingly Eurocentric. The Commission has a chance to shift this narrative by conducting more in-depth studies that examine such practices through the lens of African regional instruments. While these studies are not binding, their value lies in their interpretative power. They would help clarify legal obligations, raise awareness about the threats such arrangements pose to refugees, and provide an authoritative regional perspective that would inform national policies. Crucially, they can also serve as reference points for advocacy, shadow reporting, and future strategic litigation.

Conclusion

This brief contribution aims to position the African Commission at the centre of the ongoing debates regarding the externalisation of refugee protection in Africa. By outlining both its protective and promotional mandates, it highlights the Commission’s unique capacity to address externalisation practices, including STC agreements. It argues for its significance as a forum for promoting refugee rights across the African continent.

A significant concern pertains to the underdevelopment of the Commission’s relationship with other crucial stakeholders, such as UNHCR. Despite the existing memorandum of understanding between both parties, their engagement has predominantly been limited to promotional activities.^[51] What is missing is meaningful collaboration in litigation, which UNHCR has demonstrated in other regions by actively engaging with the European and Inter-American human rights systems. Greater coordination through collaborative litigation strategies, amicus curiae interventions, expert opinions, and targeted advocacy could enhance the Commission’s ability to address externalisation practices, leading to more effective protection for refugees.

Due to word count limitations, the post did not thoroughly address the interpretative mandate of the Commission under the Charter. This powerful tool has yet to be utilised in adjudicating refugee-related matters. Through advisory opinions, litigators can challenge externalisation practices before the Commission, particularly concerning the legality of STC agreements. Such opinions may be solicited from the Commission without waiting for individual communications, ensuring that guidance will be available for litigants when the time comes for direct litigation. Moreover, this guidance could also assist states considering engagement in such agreements or practices.

Acknowledging that numerous structural constraints impede the Commission’s effectiveness is essential. Political resistance from state parties, low compliance rates with its decisions, and the lack of a strong enforcement mechanism significantly limit the transformative capacity of its findings. Furthermore, various institutional challenges may further impact its efficacy, including underfunding, dependence on donor support, inadequate staffing, substantial case backlogs, and a lack of institutional autonomy.^[52] These constraints do not mean that the Commission has conceded its role; instead, they underscore the practical challenges that shape the impact of its work. This calls for greater engagement with the Commission, which remains an essential forum for adjudicating refugee rights in the African continent. This is especially true in this period of uncertainty when the international and other regional legal systems are seen as failing refugees, particularly those from the Global South.^[53]

For international litigation actors and stakeholders who have carried much of the litigation load before regional and national courts in Europe, this blog post serves as a reminder that many of the modern externalisation practices, including STC agreements, always involve at least two parties, one in Europe and the other in Africa. To effectively challenge such practices, both sides of the equation must be confronted, each state within its own regional system. This highlights the importance of studying the African human rights and refugee law system, which is not optional but essential. It also calls for closer and deeper collaboration with African states, national human rights institutions (NHIRIs), NGOs, civil society organisations and academics to develop strategies that emerge from within the African continent. This movement could spark similar initiatives across the Global South, putting pressure on governments and making them think twice before entering into or implementing any new form of externalisation.

If the voices of Banjul have yet to rival those of Strasbourg, it is not because they lack clarity or conviction, but because they have not yet been fully heard. It is time to listen.

Footnotes

1. This post adopts the definition of externalisation found in para 2 of the Refugee Law Initiative Declaration on Externalisation and Asylum (29 June 2022), reproduced in David Cantor and others, ‘Externalisation, Access to Territorial Asylum, and International Law’ (2022) 34(1) International Journal of Refugee Law 120 https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eeac023. ↑

2. James C Hathaway and Thomas Gammeltoft-Hansen, ‘Non-Refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence’ (2015) 53 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 235. ↑

3. This post will not extensively explore the interpretative mandate of the African Commission as set out in Article 45(3) of the African Charter, since, unlike the other two mandates, it has never been exercised concerning refugee rights. However, it will be briefly addressed in the conclusion. ↑

4. Jay Ramasubramanyam, ‘TWAIL, Archives, and Refugee Law’ (2024) 37(4) Journal of Refugee Studies 994 https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feae013 ↑

5. Violeta Moreno-Lax, ‘The Legality of the “Safe Third Country” Notion Contested: Insights from the Law of Treaties’ in The Centre for Studies and Research in International Law and International Relations Online (Brill | Nijhoff 2017) https://doi.org/10.1163/1875-8096_pplcdu_ej.9789004301238.ch20 ↑

6. Mette Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, ‘Re-Bordering Europe? Collective Action Barriers to “Fortress Europe”’ (2021) 28 Journal of European Public Policy 447. ↑

7. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the Provision of an Asylum Partnership to Strengthen Shared International Commitments on the Protection of Refugees and Migrants (Rwanda–UK Asylum Partnership Treaty, Command Paper CP 994, 6 December 2023) https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-rwanda-treaty-provision-of-an-asylum-partnership ↑

8. N.S.K. v the United Kingdom (interim measure) App No 28774/22 (ECtHR, 14 June 2022). Kirsty Hughes, ‘The Meaning of “Safe” and the UK and Rwanda Asylum Partnership Arrangement’ (2024) 83(2) Cambridge Law Journal 206 https://doi.org/10.1017/S000819732400028X ↑

9. UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR Analysis of the Legality and Appropriateness of the Transfer of Asylum-Seekers under the UK-Rwanda Arrangement: An Update (15 January 2024). ↑

10. Annick Pijnenburg and Kris van der Pas, ‘Litigating Externalisation Policies: The Added Value of a Multi-Level Legal Order?’ (2025) Refugee Survey Quarterly hdaf004 https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdaf004 ↑

11. Strasbourg hosts the European Court of Human Rights; Luxembourg the Court of Justice of the European Union; Banjul the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights; Arusha the African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights; and Addis Ababa the African Union. ↑

12. Organisation of African Unity, Charter of the Organisation of African Unity (25 May 1963). ↑

13. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Information Sheet No 1 (1987) https://archives.au.int/handle/123456789/2073 ↑

14. ibid. ↑

15. Rachel Murray, The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Commentary (OUP 2019) https://doi.org/10.1093/law/9780198810582.001.0001 ↑

16. African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1981) art 30. ↑

17. ibid, art 45(1) ↑

18. ibid, art 45(2). ↑

19. ibid, art 45(3). ↑

20. Frans Viljoen, ‘The African Commission: Protective Mandate’ in International Human Rights Law in Africa (OUP 2012; online edn, Oxford Academic, 20 April 2015) https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199645589.003.0007 ↑

21. Social and Economic Rights Action Centre & the Centre for Economic and Social Rights v Nigeria (Communication No 155/96) (2002) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001). ↑

22. Rules of Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (2020) r 115(2)(e). ↑

23. ACHPR, State Parties to the African Charter (May 2025) https://achpr.au.int/en/states ↑

24. Article 19 v Eritrea, Communication 275/03 (ACHPR, 30 May 2007) paras 46-48; Jawara v The Gambia, Communication 147/95 (ACHPR, 11 May 2000) para 32. ↑

25. Obert Chinhamo v Zimbabwe (Communication No 307/05) (2007) AHRLR 1 (ACHPR 2007); Michael Majuru v Zimbabwe (Communication No 308/05) (2008) AHRLR 1 (ACHPR 2008). ↑

26. Jawara v Gambia (Communication 147 of 1995; Communication 149 of 1996) [2000] ACHPR 17 (11 May 2000), para 36. ↑

27. Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture v Rwanda (Communications Nos 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 99/93) (1996) AHRLR 79 (ACHPR 1996). ↑

28. Union interafricaine des droits de l'Homme v Angola (Communication No 159/96) (1997) AHRLR 43 (ACHPR 1997). ↑

29. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa v Angola (Communication No 292/04) (2008) AHRLR 43 (ACHPR 2008). ↑

30. OMCT v Rwanda (n 27). ↑

31. Doebbler v Sudan (Communication No 235/00) (2009) AHRLR 1 (ACHPR 2009). ↑

32. Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Sierra Leonean refugees in Guinea) v Guinea (Communication No 249/02) (2004) AHRLR 1 (ACHPR 2004). ↑

33. Rachel Murray (ed), ‘Refugees and Human Rights’ in Human Rights in Africa: From the OAU to the African Union (CUP 2004) https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/human-rights-in-africa/refugees-and-human-rights/BB3762435BCD690E5C724E69672A8425 ↑

34. ibid ↑

35. ACHPR, Report on the Human Rights Promotion Mission to the Gabonese Republic, 13–18 January 2014; Report on the Joint Promotion Mission to the Kingdom of Swaziland, 7–11 March 2016 (adopted at the 60th Ordinary Session, 8–22 May 2017, Niamey, Niger). ↑

36. ACHPR, Resolution on Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa ACHPR/Res.61(XXXII)02 (2002). ↑

37. Luwam Dirar, Ian M Kysel and Fatma Raach, ‘The African Guiding Principles on the Rights of Migrants, Refugees and Asylum Seekers (Afr. Comm’n H.P.R.)’ (2024) 63 International Legal Materials 482. ↑

38. ACHPR, Press Release on the Situation of Sub-Saharan Migrants in the State of Libya (3 February 2025). ↑

39. ACHPR, Resolution on the Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers and Internally Displaced Persons in Africa ACHPR/Res.72(XXXVI)03 (36th Ordinary Session, 7 December 2004) https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/72-resolution-mandate-special-rapporteur-refugees-asylum-seekers ↑

40. ACHPR, Study on African Responses to Migration and the Protection of Migrant Rights (soft law instrument, adopted 8 October 2023) https://achpr.au.int/en/soft-law/study-african-responses-migration-and-protection-migrant-rights ↑

41. ACHPR, Intersession Activity Report of the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrants in Africa (71st Ordinary Session, 21 April–13 May 2022). ↑

42. ACHPR, Intersession Activity Report of the Special Rapporteur on Refugees, Asylum Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons and Migrants in Africa (81st Ordinary Session, 17 October–6 November 2024). ↑

43. ibid. ↑

44. ACHPR, ‘Study on African Responses to Migration and the Protection of Migrant Rights’ (n 40). ↑

45. ACHPR, ‘Study on the Human Rights Impact of Law Enforcement on Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Migrants in Africa’ (5 September 2023) https://achpr.au.int/en/documents/2023-09-05/study-human-rights-impact-law-enforcement-asylum-seekers-refugees. ↑

46. ibid. ↑

47. ACHPR, Resolution on the Obligations of African States in the Context of the Externalization of Migration Governance and the Extra-Regional Transfer of Migrants to Africa ACHPR/Res.645 (LXXXV) 2025 (85th Ordinary Session, 7–30 October 2025, Banjul, The Gambia) https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/645-achprres645-lxxxv-2025 ↑

48. ibid. ↑

49. ibid. ↑

50. ibid. ↑

51. ACHPR, ‘Memorandum of Understanding between ACHPR and UNHCR’ (18 January 2023) https://achpr.au.int/en/special-mechanisms-reports/memorandum-understanding-between-achpr-and-unhcr ↑

52. Solomon Ayele Dersso, ‘The Future of Human Rights and the African Human Rights System’ (2022) 40(1) Nordic Journal of Human Rights 28. ↑

53. See S.S. and Others v Italy App No 21660/18 (ECtHR, inadmissibility decision, 2023), where the European Court of Human Rights declared the case inadmissible, even though Italy had played a significant role in supporting the Libyan Coast Guard’s interception at sea, which resulted in the death of 17 African migrants in the Mediterranean Sea. ↑