Leander Kandilige, Professor, University of Ghana, and Thomas Yeboah, Research Fellow/Lecturer, Kwame Nkrumah University of Science and Technology

Since the so-called immigration crisis in Europe in 2015, a number of attempts have been made to stem the flow of irregular migrants into Europe. This has triggered some hazy and populist ‘innovative’ externalisation policies focused on outsourcing asylum processing and hosting responsibilities to mostly impoverished or opportunistic third countries for a fee. We characterise this practice as ‘asylum and protection mercenarism’. We assess the impact of such ephemeral yet devastating policies on continental attempts at a rights-based approach to migration governance in Africa. We conclude that externalising asylum responsibilities by turning third countries into asylum and protection mercenaries directly impacts negatively on the global rules-based system.

Introduction  

In March 2020, EU commission launched its strategy with Africa in which migration management featured strongly.  Cooperation in managing migration between the EU and Africa has taken diverse forms but are all geared towards achieving a common goal with the EU being the initiator of most of the discussions[1]. Initially focused on countries in the southern neighbourhood (Mediterranean countries), migration cooperation between the EU and Africa has extended to West Africa and most recently to the entire African continent[2].  With the removal of internal borders within the EU and a turn to free movement of persons and goods, the EU, has since 1995 faced the challenge of how to handle African mobility. This quandary, in addition to other issues such as a lack of clear agreement on internal aspects of asylum within Europe, has motivated the EU to focus its attention on the external dimension of its migration policy and cooperation with partner (African) countries[3]. Indeed “the making of EU migration policy has been interlinked with intense negotiations on what African mobility means for EU borders”[4]. In this regard, EU externalisation policies towards African migratory movements have considerably focused on returns, readmissions, and stringent migration management and border control practices aimed at restricting mobility from Africa to Europe[5]. This has implications for the sovereignty and image of African States both in terms of global migration management as well as mobility and migration management in Africa more broadly.

This paper draws on a desk review of available literature and our own experience of working on migration governance for more than a decade to examine some of the effects of the EU externalisation measures on Africa’s migration management and governance efforts. The paper does so by first outlining African Union (AU), Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Member States efforts to manage migration and mainstream it for sustainable development and regional integration through the implementation of guidelines, frameworks and policies. The paper then draws on examples and case studies of EU externalisation measures and agreements with individual African states that are affecting human mobility, human rights, and protection of migrants. We highlight how the EU’s policy of outsourcing migration management and border control practices is implicating the image of African states both in terms of the global migration landscape and of fuelling the migration crisis along the EU-Africa corridor. We then provide some concluding reflections.

African migration governance agenda: a snapshot

In line with the recognition of the potential and actual contributions of migration to sustainable development of origin, transit and destination countries, the AU has worked to develop or formulate several legal instruments and frameworks for its member states to govern migration on the continent. In addition to the Agenda 2063―’The Africa We Want’, which highlights the need for effective migration management to promote sustainable development―, two policy documents are fundamental to the AU’s position on migration governance for sustainable development[6]. These include the African Common Position of Migration and Development and the Migration Policy Framework for Africa (MPFA). Developed in 2006 and evaluated and revised in 2018, the MPFA serves as the cardinal framework for AU member states and RECs to develop and implement regional and national migration policies to better manage and govern migration[7]. The MPFA provides guidelines on eight migration-related issues, namely human rights of migrants, border management, labour migration, migration and development, migration data management, forced displacement, irregular migration, inter-state cooperation and partnership, and internal migration[8]. Existing research opines that while the MPFA seems overly ambitious, it highlights the importance of positioning international humanitarian ideals of migration within human rights law. The MPFA directs AU member states and RECs to develop programmes and policies aimed at protecting and upholding the fundamental human rights of migrants through, for example, conducting civic education and awareness-raising to curb discrimination and xenophobia[9]. Additionally, the MPFA calls on member states to ‘harmonise national legislations with international conventions’ to promote the rights of migrants (e.g., ensure access to courts) and promote ‘the integration of migrants in host societies in order to foster mutual cultural acceptance and as a means of ensuring the rights of migrants are respected and protected’[10].

There is also the AU free movement protocol which is a flagship programme of the Agenda 2063. Adopted in 2018, the protocol aims to promote free movement of persons to harness the benefits associated with labour migration, trade, interconnectedness, and integration[11]. Several migration and mobility-related provisions are captured in the protocol including progressive realisation of the free movement of persons, rights of residence and right of establishment (Article 5), free movement of students and researchers (Article 13),  free movement of workers (Article 14), permit and passes (article 15), mutual recognition of qualifications (Article 18), social security portability benefits (Article 19), remittances (Article 23), procedures for the movement of specific groups (Article 24), cooperation between member states (Article 25), as well as coordination and harmonisation (Article 26)[12]. 32 countries had signed the protocol as of 2021. It has contributed to facilitating free movement through the adoption and implementation of visa-free regimes which has removed barriers to entry in some countries[13].

At the regional level, RECs have worked to develop and are at different stages of implementation of migration governance mechanisms manifested mainly through free movement of persons, goods, and services. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) was the first to set the pace for migration management by developing the Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment Protocol in 1979. Other supplementary protocols were developed to guide the implementation of the free movement protocol, key being the Code of Conduct for the Implementation of the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons and the Right of Residence and Establishment (1985) and the Supplementary Protocol (1986) focused on migrant workers moving with the REC as well as on right of residence.  The phase which focuses on establishing the right of entry has been fully implemented. However, there have been delays in the implementation of phase two and three due to difficulties such as a lack of coherence between member states on national laws related to right of residence[14].

Other RECs such as COMESA have focused their attention on developing a conducive environment to facilitate efficient trade among member states. COMESA has worked to develop two important protocols to remove barriers to free movement and labour mobility. They include the Protocol on the Gradual Relaxation and Eventual Elimination of Visa Requirements (1984) and the Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Labour Services, the Right of Establishment and Residence (1998). Moreover, the East African Community’s (EAC) Protocol on the East African Community Common Market (2010), also known as the Common Market Protocol (CMP), provides guidance for partner states on free movement of persons and migrant workers. The Southern African Development Community’s (SADC) Protocol on the Facilitation of Movement of Persons (2005) provides guidelines on all forms of migration (e.g., regular and irregular migration) between member states. Finally, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) member states developed the Protocol on Freedom of Movement and Rights of Establishment of Nationals of Members States (1983) to promote free movement and right of establishment of community citizens across the REC. However, socio-economic instability in the region has hindered the smooth implementation of the protocol[15].

Overall, it is clear that AU and RECs have made substantial efforts at developing guidelines, frameworks, and protocols as a step to manage migration and mainstream its potential for development. However, these attempts sit uneasily with growing externalisation measures from the EU, which we turn attention to in the next section.

EU asylum mercenarism and African migration governance: a frustrated agenda?

We characterize the recent engagement between Europe and some countries in the African continent as ‘asylum and protection mercenarism’ because akin to the military context whereby states employ the services of groups that are motivated by a financial gain to execute missions that might be extrajudicial, territorial asylum processing and the hosting of asylum seekers and refugees is increasingly being outsourced to third countries for a fee. The monetisation of asylum processing is not different from mercenary activities in distant countries. There has been an incremental approach to externalising migration policies and obligations since the onset of the so-called migration crisis in Europe in 2015[16].

Nonetheless, most discourses have been inward-looking rather than outward-looking in terms of migration dynamics within Europe[17]. Until the recent pushbacks against French neo-colonial meddling in Francophone countries in West Africa, Niger was a collaborating state in the EU externalisation agenda. This contractual relationship between the EU and Niger, according to Kandilige and Yeboah[18], was framed around the inducement of Niger through colossal ‘support’ involving equipment and logistical support to the immigration and security forces of Niger, the establishment of field offices in the main transit route of Agadez to ‘build capacity’, and the provision of direct budgetary support to the country[19]. Furthermore, the budget of the civilian EU Common Security and Defence Policy mission (EUCAP Sahel Niger) experienced an astronomical rise from €18.4million to €63.4 million over a period of about seven years[20].

Beyond the taciturn arrangement with Niger, a more overt externalisation project within the broader European continent is dubbed the UK-Rwanda deal, which started as a migration and economic development partnership between the UK and Rwanda in April 2022. Central to this partnership was a five-year asylum partnership arrangement which was initially non-binding. This was, however, elevated into a formal treaty by December 2023 and supported by an Act of Parliament (the Illegal Migration Act, 2023) and additional legislation (the Safety of Rwanda Asylum and Immigration Act, 2024) following litigation over the human rights record of Rwanda.

A recent report[21] examines the financial implications of the UK’s Rwanda policy, speaking directly to the commercialisation of the asylum system. The report analyses the potential deterrent effect, number of people to be relocated, departure rate from Rwanda to other countries and the financial implications of the status quo. The potential deterrent effect of this policy is deemed to be questionable, and the costs are susceptible to escalation due to the per person basis of the cost calculation. The staggering amounts involved call into question the real rationale for such externalisation policies. According to an investigation by the National Audit Office (NAO), the development funding for Rwanda that is imbedded in this deal comprises of a fixed cost of £370 million, plus an additional £120 million once 300 people are relocated to Rwanda. Moreover, an additional £20,000 will be paid to the development fund for each person who is relocated as operational and healthcare payments[22].

In addition to payments into Rwanda’s development fund, the Home Office will send per-person payments to Rwanda to cover asylum processing, operational costs, and an integration package for each relocated person. The integration package includes accommodation, food, education, language training, and professional development. These payments last up to five years and are estimated to cost a total of £150,874 per person. ‘Estimated total costs’ are highly uncertain and this has equally triggered very negative publicity and reputational damage for the UK as a non-respecter of human rights and a rules-based international system. In an attempt to implement a purely political decision, the UK Conservative government has had to suspend its obligations under the European Court of Human Rights as well as force through a hastily put together “Illegal Migration Act” to enable it to operationalise this unpopular policy. The making of fast-tracked legislation by the UK to enable the government to implement a political decision or a party manifesto promise rather than a well-reasoned and coherent policy risks undermining the credibility of an otherwise well-respected country. The fragility of such populist policies was exposed by the immediate reversal of this policy by the new Labour Government in the UK. This is in spite of the fact that considerable amounts of payments have already been made to Rwanda without the transfer of a single asylum seeker to the country. A sudden abrogation might also incur judgement debts against the UK.

The actions of richer countries such as the UK and now Germany are directly jeopardising the rules-based international order and it amounts to double standards in selectively respecting rights that suit rich countries and wilfully overlooking those that seem to be an inconvenience to Europe. An international order cannot be sustained by picking and choosing when and to whom to accord rights and protections. Wealthy countries are turning impoverished countries into what we call ‘asylum and protection mercenaries’.

As noted above, the African continent is actively making continental and regional efforts to streamline migration governance policies across all its regions. The externalisation actions are directly at odds with the collective efforts by the African Union and its eight Regional Economic Communities. The trend of hatching bilateral agreements with vulnerable and impoverished countries such as Niger (prior to the recent coup d’etat) and opportunistic countries such as Rwanda is creating unnecessary suspicion and tension among member states of the AU. In addition to policies and protocols, the AU has set up institutions for capacity building such as the Migration Observatory in Rabat, Morrocco, the African Remittance Institute in Nairobi, Kenya, and the Centre for the Study and Research on Migration in Bamako, Mali, to catch up with the advanced countries on migration governance, while the so-called role models are unraveling the rules-based system.

The African guiding principles on the rights of migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers, for instance, include 38 principles that were unanimously adopted by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights. Principle 21 is on asylum which among other things notes that:

1. Every person has the right to seek and to obtain asylum in other countries in accordance with laws of those countries, regional, and international conventions.
2. Asylum seekers shall not be rejected at the frontier, returned or otherwise expelled without being able to access a fair and efficient status determination.
3. States shall receive refugees and secure the settlement of those refugees who, for well-founded reasons, are unable or unwilling to return to their country of origin or nationality.
4. The granting of asylum is a peaceful and humanitarian act and shall not be regarded as an unfriendly act by any African Union Member State.

In addition, the AU is finalising the AU Guidelines on Return, Readmission and Sustainable Reintegration. Here again, the continent is trying to harmonise its processes by emphasising a rights-based approach to dealing with situations whereby migrants have to be returned, readmitted, and reintegrated. Some of these positive steps on the continent are inspired by the need for a collective rights-based approach to managing migration in line with the 2018 Global Compact on Migration.

There are, therefore, some fundamental questions to be answered by countries that seek to pursue externalisation policies:

• How are rights of asylum seekers who are shipped off to third countries safeguarded?
• What are the long-term plans for such refugees beyond the expiration of such contracts and deals?
• What are the security guarantees and implications for vulnerable asylum seekers if shipped off to a neighbouring country for processing and hosting?
• How will the risk of assassinations in third countries and special protections for high profile or vocal critics of home governments be dealt with?

Once the outsourcing approach[23] is popularised and accepted, it becomes a proof of concept for other global challenges and responsibility sharing. The overwhelming majority of the so-called ‘unwanted’ asylum seekers are from the Global South so what is being communicated indirectly is a geopolitical segregation such that Global Southern asylum seekers are processed in the Global South and only ‘deserving’ asylum seekers from the Global North are processed in Europe. Asylum should not be defined by one’s region of origin, looks, skin colour, religion, or race. The fundamental requirement should remain fleeing due to a well-founded fear of persecution and not whether one is European or not.

Turning Global Southern countries into unwilling but incentivised accomplices in breaching international conventions on the rights of asylum seekers and refugees is unconscionable. In any case, irregular arrivals are a symptom of a problem of inadequate regular pathways to migration rather than the problem itself.

A long-term impact is the erosion of strict adherence to human rights standards in countries that are being recruited to process and host asylum seekers. This invariably leads to a loss of moral authority to hold so-called “partner” countries to account for breaches of international laws. They become “allies” and “accomplices” for better and for worse. The sustainability of such policies is questionable with changes in government while real lives are impacted by such ephemeral policies.

Conclusion

The externalisation of asylum processing and hosting is gaining currency, with Germany actively exploring similar deals to that of the UK-Rwanda deal. This populist approach to the governance of migration amounts to putting plasters over gaping wounds. The stress on asylum systems is largely informed by ever-narrowing legal pathways to migration and bureaucratic inefficiencies. Externalising asylum responsibilities thus turning third countries into asylum and protection mercenaries directly impacts negatively on the global rules-based system. We conclude that continental migration governance initiatives on the African continent are being stifled by short-term populist externalisation policies from Europe. In an era where overseas development aid/assistance is increasingly repurposed by European countries to fund immigration control; it is no surprise that some developing countries would agree to externalisation deals, including those that go contrary to collective continental agreements, protocols, and principles.

Footnotes

[1] Kandilige, L. and Yeboah, T. (2024) West African Migration Regimes and the Externalisation of EU Migration Management Policies in   Heck, G.  Sevinin, E.  Habersky, E, and Sandoval-García C. (eds) Making Routes: Mobility and Politics of Migration in the Global South. American University in Cairo Press.  https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.809341.13

[2] Zanker, F. (2019). Managing or restricting movement? Diverging approaches of African and European migration governance. Comparative Migration Studies, 7(1), 1-18. Bisong, A. (2023). The Failure of European Policy on Africa and Migratory Movements. https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Failure-European-Policy-Africa-Migrations-Bisong-IEMedYearbook2023.pdf. Kandilige, L. and Yeboah, T. (2024) West African Migration Regimes and the Externalisation of EU Migration Management Policies in   Heck, G.  Sevinin, E.  Habersky, E, and Sandoval-García C. (eds) Making Routes: Mobility and Politics of Migration in the Global South. American University in Cairo Press.  https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.809341.13

[3] Bisong, A. (2023). The Failure of European Policy on Africa and Migratory Movements. https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Failure-European-Policy-Africa-Migrations-Bisong-IEMedYearbook2023.pdf.

[4] Schöfberger, I. (2019)  “The EU’s Negotiation of Narratives and Policies on African Migration 1999-2019.” European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 24, Issue 4, pp. 513-53

[5] Bisong, A. (2023). The Failure of European Policy on Africa and Migratory Movements. https://www.iemed.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/09/Failure-European-Policy-Africa-Migrations-Bisong-IEMedYearbook2023.pdf.

[6] Teye, J. K., Yeboah, T., & Setrana, M. B. (2024). The Sustainable Development Goals, migration and regionalism: evidence from Africa. In The Elgar Companion to Migration and the Sustainable Development Goals (pp. 355-375). Edward Elgar Publishing.

[7] ibid

[8] African Union (2018). The Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018-2027) Draft. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/32718-wd-english_ revised_au_migration_policy_framework_for_africa.pdf

[9] Achiume E. T. and Landau, L.B.  (2015) The African Union migration and regional integration framework. https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/195797/PPB-36.pdf

[10] Ibid, p.3.

[11] African Union (2018). The Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018-2027) Draft. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/32718-wd-english_ revised_au_migration_policy_framework_for_africa.pdf. Hirsch, A. (2021) The African Union’s Free Movement of Persons Protocol: Why has it faltered and how can its objectives be achieved?, South African Journal of International Affairs, 28:4, 497-517, DOI: 10.1080/10220461.2021.2007788.

[12] African Union (2018). The Revised Migration Policy Framework for Africa and Plan of Action (2018-2027) Draft. Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. Available at https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/32718-wd-english_ revised_au_migration_policy_framework_for_africa.pdf

[13] African Union (2021). Report on the Implementation of Free Movement Of Persons In Africa 2020 – 2021 Specialised Technical Committee (Stc) On Migration, Refugees And Displaced Persons.

[14] Yeboah, T., Kandilige, L., Bisong, A., Garba, F., & Kofi Teye, J. (2021). The ECOWAS Free Movement Protocol and Diversity of Experiences of Different Categories of Migrants: A Qualitative Study. International Migration, 59(3), 228-244.

[15] Adeola, R. (2019). ‘The African Union Protocol on Free Movement of Persons in Africa: Development, provisions and implementation challenges’. African Human Rights Yearbook: 260 – 275.

[16] Gazzotti, L., M. Mouthaan and K. Natter (2023). “Embracing complexity in ‘Southern’ migration governance.” Territory, Politics, Governance 11(4): 625-637. Fakhoury T. and Mencutek, Z. (2023). The Geopolitics of return migration in the international system. Geopolitics 28(3): 959-978.

[17] Zardo, F. (2020). “The EU Trust Fund for Africa: Geopolitical Space Making through Migration Policy Instruments.” Geopolitics 27(2): 584-603. Zaun, N. and Nantermoz, O. (2023). “Depoliticising EU migration policies: the EUTF Africa and the politicisation of development aid.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 49(12): 2986-3004.

[18] Kandilige, L. and Yeboah, T. (2024) West African Migration Regimes and the Externalisation of EU Migration Management Policies in   Heck, G.  Sevinin, E.  Habersky, E, and Sandoval-García C. (eds) Making Routes: Mobility and Politics of Migration in the Global South. American University in Cairo Press.  https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.809341.13

[19] Iddrisa, A. (2019). Dialogue in divergence: The impact of EU migration policy on West African integration: The case of Nigeria, Mali, and Niger. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung.

[20] Kandilige, L. and Yeboah, T. (2024) West African Migration Regimes and the Externalisation of EU Migration Management Policies in   Heck, G.  Sevinin, E.  Habersky, E, and Sandoval-García C. (eds) Making Routes: Mobility and Politics of Migration in the Global South. American University in Cairo Press.  https://doi.org/10.2307/jj.809341.13. Creta, S. (2020). How Niger became Europe’s invisible new border. RTE February 12, 2020. https://www.rte.ie/

[21] Walsh, P. W. and Sumption, M. (2024). The uncertain financial implications of the UK’s Rwanda Policy. The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford. https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/commentaries/the-uncertain-financial-implications-of-the-uks-rwanda-policy/.

[22] Ibid.

[23] Geiger, M. (2016). “Policy outsourcing and remote management”. In Externalizing Migration Management: Europe, North America and the spread of ‘remote control’ practices, edited by R. Zaiotti, 261-279. London: Routledge.