Agnese Pacciardi, PhD Researcher, Lund University, and Joakim Berndtsson, Senior Lecturer, Gothenburg University
In recent decades, North Africa has increasingly served as a buffer zone for the European Union (EU), with extensive funding and cooperation projects aimed at reinforcing border security and managing migration. This trend has accelerated with recent agreements between the EU Commission, member states, and North African countries. This article examines border externalization initiatives in North Africa, focusing on Libya as a case study. The Libyan case highlights the intersection of security and development, involving various actors and raising significant issues of transparency and human rights abuses. The extreme consequences of border externalization in Libya offer insights applicable to similar initiatives in other North African countries. The analysis emphasizes the challenges and ethical concerns of externalization, calling for systematic scrutiny to ensure accountability and address the broader implications of these policies.
Introduction
In March 2024, the European Commission, together with six heads of state and government, signed an agreement with Egypt to manage migration flows. This adds to the list of recent agreements with Tunisia, Mauritania, and Morocco, as well as established ones with Libya and Turkey, which paved the way for a European migration policy which is now mainly based on efforts to prevent departures.
Despite criticism from human rights organizations, which denounce systemic abuses against those trying to cross the border, as well as the high costs and uncertain success of such policies, relocating migration control is still presented by the European Commission, as well as the governments of most Member States, as the most effective method for managing migration flows.[1] This migration management technique, known as border externalization, complements traditional border control at the territorial limits and within the state. Externalization encompasses a range of extraterritorial economic, social, legal and military actions implemented by states and supra-state entities, supported by various public and private actors. Naturally, since the EU lacks the power and jurisdiction to intervene in third countries, border externalization goes hand in hand with the outsourcing of border control functions to international organizations, private companies, and third-state entities. This approach, which started three decades ago[2], has been recently reinforced and confirmed in the New Pact on Migration and Asylum[3].
The logic at the basis of border externalization is the idea that migration flows can be stopped by pursuing an approach that integrates development policies with security policies. According to such a rationale, which has been disproven by researchers[4], migration flows directed towards Europe can be stopped with a combination of development-oriented policies that address the so-called “root causes” of migration (e.g., socio-economic projects), and security-oriented policies that physically prevent migrants from reaching Europe. This approach includes initiatives such as financing the border policies of third countries, deploying European agencies like Frontex in these territories, providing material support for border control (e.g., GPS, vehicles, biometric data border checks) and financing development projects that should allegedly reverse migration trends.
Based on several years of research on the topic[5], this article will outline the landscape of border externalization initiatives in North Africa and then focus on the Libyan case. Libya is considered a border externalization laboratory, where such initiatives have been ongoing for a long time. Thus, and also because of the country’s continued instability, the case of Libya can reveal the extreme and most unpredictable consequences of border externalization. While the situation in other North African countries may differ, the Libyan case serves as a particularly illustrative example with parallels and lessons to be drawn, especially now that the EU appears to be seeking to implement similar strategies in other countries.
North Africa as the European “buffer zone”
Although the externalization and outsourcing of border control extend to all territories that border the EU to the east and south, North Africa has long been a key area, as the EU sees it as a buffer zone to shield Europe from migration flows. As such, North African countries have been at the forefront of border externalization initiatives, de facto acting as Europe’s border police.
Indeed, North Africa has been a primary focus area for various multilateral European initiatives, such as the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), the European Union’s Neighborhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI), as well as the recent Pact on Migration and Asylum. The EUTF, created in 2015, has been the most comprehensive instrument to implement externalization projects, with the North Africa region featuring in several projects aimed at reinforcing the border, and with Libya notably prominent. This trend continues with the EUTF’s successor, NDICI, focusing significantly on North Africa within the Southern Neighborhood, encompassing Libya, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, and Egypt. Similarly, the EU’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum emphasizes cooperation with third countries, particularly in reinforcing borders and return agreements, with North African nations taking a lead role. While project specifics vary across these countries, a common thread is funding allocation for bolstering border patrols, providing equipment such as vehicles, boats, GPS devices, and delivering specialized training for intercepting migrants both at sea and on land, as well as development projects.
In addition to overarching cooperation agreements, bilateral agreements aimed at enhancing migration cooperation have been established with individual North African countries. While informal arrangements had been in place since the early 2000s, recent years have seen a formalization and intensification of these partnerships. This acceleration has resulted in several official agreements integrating migration policies, development cooperation, and economic ties. The first notable precedent is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between Italy and Libya, initially concluded in 2017 and officially endorsed by the EU. This MoU, automatically renewed every three years (most recently in 2023), focuses on development and border security cooperation, particularly strengthening the Libyan Coast Guard and Border Guards to deter departures and intercept migrants at sea.[6]
Following Italy’s leadership in the MoU with Libya, the Italian government also led talks with Tunisia, despite documented human rights violations involving illegal pushbacks at sea and in the desert, arbitrary detentions, and violence by Tunisian authorities towards migrants.[7] These talks culminated in the signing of the EU-Tunisia Memorandum of Understanding in July 2023 covering “macro-economic stability, economy and trade, green energy, people-to-people contacts and migration and mobility.”[8] With the MoU, the EU pledges financial cooperation with Tunisia to enhance border management, conduct search and rescue operations at sea, and implement ‘anti-trafficking’ measures to reduce the number of arrivals from the country. The MoU signed with Tunisia closely parallels the agreement with Libya both in terms of scope and content. Moreover, the relationship between these agreements is compounded by documented cases of Tunisian authorities conducting pushbacks into Libyan territory, often in collaboration with Libyan militias accused of indirectly receiving EU funds aimed at halting migration.[9]
Cooperation on migration-related issues with Morocco began over two decades ago, as Morocco has long been recognized as the EU’s closest African frontier, notably due to its proximity to Spain through the enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, and its short maritime border with mainland Europe. In 2023, following similar agreements with other North African countries, the EU Commission initiated a new cooperation program with Morocco. This program allocated €152 million to enhance Morocco’s border management against smuggling networks, support its National Strategy on Immigration and Asylum, and facilitate voluntary return and reintegration of migrants to their home countries. In Morocco’s case, migration cooperation has often been leveraged to influence the EU’s stance on Morocco’s claims over Western Sahara, as demonstrated by the deliberate opening of borders in Ceuta and Melilla in 2021 in retaliation against Spain’s stance on the status of Western Sahara, particularly after Spain allowed the leader of the Polisario Front, Brahim Ghali, to receive medical treatment in a Spanish hospital. [10]
In March 2024, following the EU-Tunisia MoU model, a similar agreement was signed with Egypt. While broader in scope, the deal aligns with the EU Commission’s strategy of integrating security and development policies, emphasizing migration control, border management, and cooperation on returns as key pillars.[11] In particular, the €200 million serves to “assist Egypt on migration-related programs that entail developing a holistic approach to migration including legal migration pathways in line with national competences […] tackling the root causes of irregular migration, combating smuggling of migrants and trafficking in persons, strengthening border management, and ensuring dignified and sustainable return and reintegration”.[12] This agreement, hailed by the EU Commission as a new milestone in EU-Egypt relations, has been harshly criticized by human rights organization and Egyptian civil society for turning a blind eye on the documented abuses of Egyptian authorities against migrants, including illegal deportations[13].
Against this backdrop, where Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt are all on a continuous cooperation track with the EU on migration and border management matters, Algeria stands out as an exception. Unlike the other North African countries, Algeria has been generally reluctant to cooperate on migration, perceiving it as a matter of national sovereignty and resisting external interference.[14] Nevertheless, the approaches of the Algerian government towards migration are aligning with EU priorities to some extent, as the Algerian administration is focused on closing its borders to migrants from sub-Saharan Africa, whom they perceive as a security risk for the country.[15]
Zooming in on Libya: border externalization between security and development
Libya stands out prominently in the realm of external migration management due to its strategic importance and unique geopolitical challenges. Its proximity to Europe as a key departure point, coupled with political instability and porous borders, has long made it a testing ground for these strategies. Examining Libya’s experience with border externalization and security outsourcing, therefore, provides valuable insights into the implications of Europe’s increasingly favored migration management approach. Notably, agreements with Libya date back to the 1990s, covering energy, development cooperation, and migration control[16]. Given Libya’s pivotal location for migration routes from West Africa, Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen, as well as from countries in the Middle East and Asia converging towards southern Italy, irregular migration has significantly influenced the relationship between Italy and Libya. As such, Italy has positioned itself as a leading advocate on migration issues within the EU, championing bilateral initiatives with Libya that subsequently receive EU-level support and funding.
A cornerstone is the 2008 Italy-Libya friendship and cooperation agreement[17], which initially outlined collaboration across various sectors, including economic interests and migration. This agreement is considered one of the first instances of border externalization with Libya. Following the 2011 Libyan civil war and subsequent NATO-led intervention that toppled the Gaddafi government, and the subsequent fragmentation of the country amid challenges in border control against migration, the EU launched several initiatives. These included the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) in 2013, followed by operations like Operation Sophia (2015) and Operation Irini (2020). These efforts aimed to disrupt smuggling networks and enforce arms embargoes, incorporating diverse strategies such as training the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy, and engaging commercial security firms for project implementation.
In 2017, Italy and Libya signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU), laying the foundation for future EU-level cooperation on border externalization, particularly through the aforementioned European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) and its successor, the Neighborhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI). The EUTF, viewed by scholars as the EU’s pioneering comprehensive instrument for externalizing and outsourcing migration control, integrates both developmental and security approaches to deter departures.
An analysis of EUTF projects in Libya, exemplified by major initiatives like the Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya (IBM) and the Recovery, Stability, and Socio-Economic Development (RSSD) projects, offers important insight into the dynamics and challenges of border control beyond EU territory.[18] It highlights the intersection of security and development and the emergence of a migration industry—a complex network involving governments, security forces, private actors, NGOs, and militias—that shapes border security and migration management structures. While specific to Libya, the findings presented below can offer broader insights into border externalization in North Africa, given the EU’s apparent intention to pursue similar paths with other countries in the region, mixing security and development approaches to prevent departures.
Integrated border and migration management: the security approach
The project Support to Integrated Border and Migration Management in Libya (IBM) was launched in 2020 in two consequent phases and partially co-financed by the Italian Ministry of the Interior had the dual purpose of strengthening the capacities of the Libyan coast guard and border guard and promoting the creation of a Libyan Search and Rescue (SAR) zone.
Within this project, since 2018, several million euros have been awarded to Italian companies specializing in defense and consultancy for the provision of training, boats, vehicles, and other services for controlling the Libyan borders. Contractors have included both civilian and defense industry companies, such as IVECO Defence Vehicle, TEKNE, and MED Spa, Cantiere Navale Vittoria, EY Advisory Spa, Il Sole 24 Ore. Interestingly, some of these private companies contributing to border reinforcement also have strong political ties with both Italian and Libyan authorities. An emblematic case is that of Cantiere Navale Vittoria, an Italian naval company that participated in bilateral meetings between Italian and Libyan authorities held in Tripoli in 2017 and 2020, also on the occasion of the renewal of the Memorandum between Italy and Libya. This points to unclear relations between companies, and Libyan and Italian authorities as well as opaque tendering and contracting processes, dangerously blurring the lines between public and private actors, as well as between security and migration management.
Moreover, considering the complexity of the Libyan situation and the involvement of militias, traffickers, and private security groups (e.g., Wagner Group) that are more or less formally connected to the official Libyan beneficiaries of the projects, it cannot be excluded that the funds are received, at least in part, by these actors. This hypothesis is even more plausible if we consider the fact that many armed groups have been integrated by the Government of National Accord into the official state apparatus. At the same time, several authoritative sources have denounced a flow of funds between Italy and the militias to stop migratory flows. On the other hand, the Libyan Coast Guard, which is openly financed and supported by Italian and EUTF funds, has repeatedly been accused of serious human rights violations against migrants and has proven ties with some of the most dangerous human traffickers.
Recovery, Stability and Socio-Economic Development: the developmental approach
The project “Recovery, Stability and Socio-Economic Development in Libya” implemented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation (AICS) had the official goal to support the resilience of Libyan communities most affected by migration by improving basic services and fostering economic recovery. Besides, it aimed to provide alternative livelihoods to migrant trafficking and reduce migration push factors by enhancing access to services, especially healthcare. These projects have been carried out by several Italian and international NGOs sometimes in cooperation with local organizations, given the impossibility for international actor to have a stable presence in Libya. The most emblematic case that shows both the challenges, the lack of transparency and the risk of fund diversion is that of an Italian NGO involved in this project whose project aimed at restoring hospital facilities, providing medical equipment, delivering medicines, and training local staff.
The project, aligned with the EUTF’s objectives of addressing root causes of migration and fostering development in priority areas, selected Ghat and Zawya—cities positioned along major migration routes. This strategic choice indicates that intervention decisions were influenced more by European migration management goals than humanitarian concerns, potentially marginalizing other areas. Implemented by a Libyan NGO, the project budget notably includes significant investment in a remote monitoring mechanism using an app and satellite images to oversee aid deliveries. This setup raises two critical issues. Firstly, involving a private company to provide monitoring raises concerns about data security and accessibility, especially in a sensitive area like Libya where migration is criminalized and punished with several years of detention and forced labor and physical mistreatment. Secondly, reports from 2019 indicated that militias in Libya confiscated humanitarian aid linked to the NGO involved in the EUTF project, casting doubt on the efficacy of remote monitoring and potentially suggesting reinforcement of a corrupt system through which EU funding end up financing violations of migrants’ human rights.[19]
Additionally, the Libyan human rights activist network “Biladi Foundation for Human Rights” has criticized the NGO for concurrently assisting in the repair of a migrant facility near Tripoli, contributing to a dysfunctional detention system plagued by severe human rights abuses. Conditions in this facility are described as dire—overcrowded, unsanitary, with limited food and water, and restricted movement, highlighting broader ethical concerns surrounding the project’s impact. Overall, an analysis of EU-funded development projects with migration management objectives reveals several pitfalls and real and potential challenges. These projects may inadvertently divert funds to militias, potentially reinforcing both a corrupt system that destabilizes the country and a criminal system of abuses against migrants.
Challenges and way forward
As the two cases above clearly illustrate, border externalization in Libya encompasses a wide array of actions, ranging from training and equipping to halt migrant flows, to search and rescue operations, and even encompassing projects such as repairing detention centers and restoring healthcare facilities. Despite the diverse nature of these initiatives, their overarching goal remains consistent: reducing migration through a blend of border security, development cooperation, and humanitarian efforts.
These efforts bring forth significant challenges, extensively criticized by human rights organizations and researchers alike. Foremost among these is the diversion of funds and the informalization of migration management. The involvement of multiple actors complicates project implementation oversight, making it difficult to assess their real impact on the ground, or forcing stakeholders to use doubtful monitoring mechanism that could lead to yet other issues related to data management and accessibility. As evident in both projects, the EU delegates the execution of migration-curbing projects to member states, who, in turn, often subcontract to NGOs, private companies, or even third country actors like the Libyan Ministry of the Interior and Defense. This decentralized approach involves a network of often untraceable local actors, including militias controlling vast Libyan territories, or other local stakeholders, creating a semi-autonomous migration industry where accountability for human rights violations becomes exceedingly difficult.
Transparency is another critical issue, evidenced by restricted access to public documents regarding contracting and project implementation processes.[20] This lack of transparency hampers scrutiny by researchers, media, and political representatives, including the EU Parliament, potentially undermining democratic oversight within the EU. Indeed, since most externalization projects are managed by the European Commission,[21] the European Parliament is largely excluded from these decisions and from exercising oversight. This exclusion could potentially pose a risk to the proper democratic scrutiny of such initiatives.[22]
Moreover, by implementing these projects in authoritarian contexts, Europe shifts away from its initial support for reforms and democratic development in North Africa. Instead, it prioritizes short-term security measures aligned with European interests, often neglecting urgent socio-economic needs within these countries. This approach risks bolstering non-democratic regimes and empowering non-state actors, leading to a disconnect between EU values and pragmatic policy decisions. It also exposes the EU to dependency on neighboring countries as de facto border guards, potentially subjecting it to diplomatic manipulation or exploitation, such as Morocco’s leveraging of migration control in negotiations over Western Sahara or turning a blind eye to crackdowns on civil society and opposition, as well as the mistreatment of migrants by governments such as those in Egypt and Tunisia.
Additionally, as recently shown by a year-long investigation by several authoritative media outlets[23], EU externalization funding, including EUTF funding, has directly and indirectly financed a system of clandestine operations in North African countries. These operations have resulted in tens of thousands of Black people being dumped in the desert or remote areas each year to prevent them from reaching the EU. These operations, which involved countries such as Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria, demonstrate how border externalization funding in one country fuels a system of abuses across multiple countries in North Africa. This occurs due to the interconnected nature of these countries along migration routes, with migrants passing through several of them on their journeys, as well as their broader involvement in EU externalization projects which creates, reinforces and encourages collaborations among them at the borders.
In conclusion, these cases illustrate the paradox of externalization well: while the EU seeks to protect itself from migration, it simultaneously becomes reliant on third countries to manage migratory flows, exposing itself to vulnerability, diplomatic complexities, and complicity in human rights abuses both against migrants, and against the civil society and opposition within these countries. Even so, externalization is likely to remain central to EU migration policy for the foreseeable future, and the involvement of North African countries will continue to be key. Therefore, it is important that the consequences of externalization policies continue to be subjected to systematic scrutiny by political representatives, civil society organizations, the media, and researchers.
Footnotes
[1] Pacciardi, A. (2024). A European narrative of border externalisation: the European trust fund for Africa story. European Security, 1–20.
[2] FitzGerald, D. S. (2019). Remote control of migration: theorising territoriality, shared coercion, and deterrence. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46(1), 4–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1680115
[3] https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en
[4] de Haas, H. (2024). How Migration Really Works: Insights from Global Patterns and Trends. Oxford University Press.
[5] Pacciardi, A., & Casaglia, A. (2022). Il nesso sicurezza-sviluppo nella gestione migratoria europea in nord Africa. Memorie Geografiche Vol. XIX: 743-751; Pacciardi, A., & Berndtsson, J. (2022). EU border externalisation and security outsourcing: exploring the migration industry in Libya. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48(17), 4010–4028; Casaglia, A., and Pacciardi, A., (2022). A close look at the EU–Turkey deal: the language of border externalisation. Environment and planning C: politics and space, 40 (8), 1659–1676; Pacciardi, A. (2024). A European narrative of border externalisation: the European trust fund for Africa story. European Security, 1–20; Cappiali, T., & Pacciardi, A. (2024). Reorienting EU Border Externalization Studies: A Decolonial Intersectional Approach. Geopolitics, 1–25; Pacciardi , A. (forthcoming) Governing Migration through Development: the “Bad” and “Good” Face of EU External Migration Control in Libya
[6] Pacciardi, A., & Berndtsson, J. (2022). EU border externalisation and security outsourcing: exploring the migration industry in Libya. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48(17), 4010–4028.
[7] Strik, T., Robbesom, R. (2024) Compliance or Complicity? An Analysis of the EU-Tunisia Deal in the Context of the Externalisation of Migration Control. Neth Int Law Rev 71, 199–225.
[8] https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_23_3887
[9] https://ecre.org/eu-external-partners-tunisia-rejects-eu-funding-casting-doubt-on-deal-as-reports-of-abuse-continue-to-mount-new-attack-by-so-called-libyan-coast-guard/
[10] https://euobserver.com/migration/ar48612178
[11] https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/press-statement-president-von-der-leyen-austrian-chancellor-nehammer-belgian-prime-minister-de-croo-2024-03-17_en
[12] https://www.politico.eu/article/eu-leaders-egypt-e7-4b-economic-aid-migration-deal-italy-greece-belgium-austria-cyprus/
[13] https://www.statewatch.org/news/2023/november/eu-planning-new-anti-migration-deals-with-egypt-and-tunisia-unrepentant-in-support-for-libya/
[14] Zardo, F., & Loschi, C. (2020). EU-Algeria (non)cooperation on migration: A tale of two fortresses. Mediterranean Politics, 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1080/13629395.2020.1758453
[15] Ouhemmou, M. (2021). Migration, governance and geopolitical conflicts in Africa: A comparative analysis of the Moroccan Algerian migration policies. In I. Moyo, J. Laine, & C. C. Nshimbi (Eds.), Border regions series. Intra-Africa migrations: Reimaging borders and migration management (pp. 159–177). Routledge.
[16] Paoletti, E., & Pastore, F. (2010). Sharing the dirty job on the southern front? Italian–Libyan relations on migration and their impact on the European Union. International Migration Institute (IMI) Working Papers Series, No. 29, 4-40.
[17] https://security-legislation.ly/latest-laws/law-no-2-of-2009-on-ratifying-the-treaty-of-friendship-and-cooperation-between-the-great-socialist-peoples-libyan-arab-jamahiriya-and-the-republic-of-italy/
[18] The findings presented here are drawn from the authors’ previous research, in particular Pacciardi, A., & Berndtsson, J. (2022). EU border externalisation and security outsourcing: exploring the migration industry in Libya. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48(17), 4010–4028; Pacciardi, A., & Casaglia, A. (2022). Il nesso sicurezza-sviluppo nella gestione migratoria europea in nord Africa. Memorie Geografiche Vol. XIX: 743-751; Pacciardi , A. (forthcoming) Governing Migration through Development: the “Bad” and “Good” Face of EU External Migration Control in Libya.
[19] https://www.avvenire.it/attualita/pagine/i-fondi-segreti-ai-sindaci-libici-nello-scavo
[20] Pacciardi, A., & Berndtsson, J. (2022). EU border externalisation and security outsourcing: exploring the migration industry in Libya. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 48(17), 4010–4028
[21] Pacciardi, A. (2024). A European narrative of border externalisation: the European trust fund for Africa story. European Security, 1–20
[22] https://eu.boell.org/en/secrecy-externalisation-eu-migration
[23] https://www.lighthousereports.com/investigation/desert-dumps/