Martin Lemberg-Pedersen, Honorary Associate Professor, Dpt. of Politics and International Studies (PAIS), University of Warwick, and Research Affiliate, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)
In the 2020s, several European countries have witnessed the reactivation of policy ambitions to externalise parts or the entirety of asylum obligations beyond their national territory. This article explains the trajectory of such recent attempts by Danish and British governments, the controversy surrounding them, and the ways in which these attempts are linked to the diffusion of similar ideas across European states, including in Germany. The article points out that despite notable differences between the plans and policies of parties and governments across Europe, similar strategies seem to be applied in order to generate legitimacy for the controversial policy, namely through vague descriptions and claims of association and common cause. A first section offers a definition of the concept of externalisation, while a second section details the policy drive´s extension to the EU level through negotiations surrounding the implementation of the Migration Pact. A third section then details how European government representatives have disregarded important lessons from failed Australian and Israeli policies before a fourth section describes and critically assesses strategies and arguments deployed by pro-externalisation governments. A fifth section points out the need for a postcolonial critical perspective on the challenges facing externalisation policies, before a conclusion is offered.
Introduction
In the 2020s, several European governments have reactivated older policy ambitions to externalise parts or the entirety of asylum obligations beyond their national territory. This article explains the trajectory of such recent attempts by focusing on proposals from Danish and British governments, the controversy surrounding them, and the ways in which these attempts are linked to the diffusion of similar ideas across Europe, including the processes of the EU Migration Pact as well as in Member States like Germany. Despite notable differences between plans and policies emanating from parties and governments across Europe, similar strategies of vague descriptions, claims of association and of common cause are applied in order to gain legitimacy.
The infamous Rwanda-policy pursued by British and Danish governments is one example of externalisation policy, which, for states, can be broadly defined as processes whereby they pursue initiatives seeking to contain and control migration beyond their territory. Importantly, when border control, including asylum processing are decoupled from a state´s territorial borders, this does not imply a disappearance of migration control linked to the externalising state´s territory. Rather, externalisation is the attempt to construct further, transnational, spheres of control complementing the national ones, and is therefore more accurately described as the multiplication and transnational expansion of territorial control.[1] This can involve other governments, law enforcement, companies or other non-state actors, as well as different practices, such as interception, deportations, push and pull backs, detention, but also asylum processing and relocation. This article concerns some variants of externalisation, but it is important to note, as will be discussed below, that different variants come with different challenges, policy implications and geographies. Thus, the unrealized Rwanda policies of the UK and Denmark have been met with a series of legal critiques. By comparison, the actually implemented externalisation policies of Spain, Italy and Greece when it comes to deflecting responsibility for Search and Rescue-missions for small boats in the Atlantic, Central Mediterranean and Aegean Seas continue to face other, but equally important, moral, political and legal challenges.
This article engages with this through four sections: The first offers a definition of the concept of externalisation, its various forms, and externalisation projects in recent European history. A second section details how the policy drive has been extended on to the EU level, specifically through negotiations surrounding the implementation of the Migration Pact. A third section describes how European government representatives have disregarded important lessons from failed Australian and Israeli policies. A fourth then details and critically discusses some of the strategies and arguments deployed by pro-externalization governments to bolster support and legitimacy. A fifth section points out the need for a postcolonial perspective on externalisation policy, before a conclusion is offered.
Northern European Asylum Dreams of Rwanda
On 4 July 2024, the British elections witnessed the Conservatives fall from power, being replaced by the Starner-led Labour government. A key issue separating the two parties had been British approaches to externalization, and more specifically, the so-called Rwanda-policy. While Labour had issued guarantees that they would withdraw the SafetyofRwanda-legislation, the Tories had been embroiled in a protracted battle on the policy against civil society, international organizations and ultimately the British judiciary branch. It is worth remembering the key steps through which this spectacle evolved. On 15 November 2023, the British Supreme Court delivered a verdict that declared unlawful the highly mediatized “Rwanda policy” pushed by successive Tory governments to send asylum seekers to processing and stay in Rwanda. The verdict sided with an earlier Court of Appeal-decision on the policy penned in a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) from 14 April 2022. This had already been declared “unlawful” due to the risk of refoulement, that is the return of individuals to a territory where they are subjected to inhumane and degrading conditions. Moreover, Rwanda´s asylum system and political climate has been considered not in compliance with international obligations. Already previously, serious legal questions about the policy had been raised: During the fall of 2022, while the British High Court declared the Rwanda-policy lawful, it still referred all the individual cases back to the Home Office due to flawed case processing. And in June 2022, deportation flights to Rwanda had been halted in the last minute by interim measures imposed by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), fearing refoulement. Despite all of these legal challenges, however, the Conservative Sunak-government had persisted in its push for externalization to Rwanda, leading to the Safety of Rwanda Act in April 25, which in an extremely controversial manner, stipulated that it was now beyond the realm of British courts to assess claims that Rwanda is not a safe country.
In 2023, news of the British Supreme Court-verdict had reverberated across Europe. In particular, it was unwelcome news for the Danish Social Democratic Party (SD), who, unsuccessfully, had pursued its own Rwanda-policy, even before, and allegedly also inspiring, the British Johnson government. In Denmark, a one-party SD-government had passed Law 226 of 3 June 2021 on extraterritorial “reception centres”. Law 226 is an example of externalisation policy in that it dictates that all people applying for asylum in Denmark should be sent to a non-EU state, where their claims will be assessed. If successful, people will then attain residency permit in that country, rather than in Denmark. As such the legislation introduces a radical rupture between the notion of asylum seeking and that of the durable solution of residency and settlement for refugees.[2] Also worth noticing is that the law did not in fact mention Rwanda. An important implication of this is that while the legislation remains in effect, any Danish governments can pursue externalization to any country. Despite this aspect, however, during the discussions of the law in the Danish parliament, media discussions began to turn almost exclusively on the possibility of an arrangement with Rwanda. This was accelerated because two Danish ministers travelled to Rwanda in the middle of the parliamentary discussions where they signed a MoU with Rwandan authorities. The revolved around a vaguely defined objective of creating “a mechanism for bilateral cooperation on asylum and migration” between the two states, and focused more on Rwanda´s refugee status determination. Accordingly, the MoU did not mention externalised Danish reception centres. Despite this, SD government spokespersons and media commentators were quick to reference it as evidence of a fast-moving “Rwanda Plan”. In the public discourse, this lends the policy an unmerited, yet highly mediatized, air of realism and imminent implementation.
Three years later, however, Law 226 remains in effect, but un-implemented, and most of the critique against it unanswered. It appears that an insurmountable stumbling block during the Danish-Rwandan negotiations has been the latter´s insistence on not assuming responsibility for rejected Danish asylum seekers. The Kagame regime instead preferred being able to deport such people onwards to other country territories, which would effectively create a chain-functionality of externalisation – and multiply the moral, political and legal challenges it faces.[3] A specially appointed Danish Migration Envoy did not manage to persuade other governments to enter into a “host state” partnership, and since January 2023, the position has been vacated, giving rise to critique that the policy is without content, and primarily retained in order to gain support from domestic anti-immigration voters
This speaks to assumptions that hard-line immigration policies are a recipe for election success. However, the Danish Social Democrats won office in 2019 based on a campaign primarily focusing on climate change, and where immigration was surprisingly peripheral in discussions. The November 2022 Danish elections witnessed the SD lose ground and being forced enter a government-coalition with two other centre-right parties. This also led to a change in the Rwanda policy: In January 2023, the Minister of Immigration, Kaare Dybvad Bek, announced that he would no longer actively pursue bilateral negotiations with the Rwandan regime, but instead work at arrangements at the EU-level.
Despite the legal troubles, and the widespread criticism of the Danish and British externalisation plans from civil society, and international organizations, other parties and governments began to take notice of these plans in Sweden, Holland, and Germany, voicing interest and even support. And in November 2023, some German Social Democrats drafted a so-called “impulse paper” on the potential of extraterritorial asylum processing, which, however, seemed never to be able to take off the ground within the party. The verdict of the British Supreme Court from November 2023 is therefore important as it constitutes new case law and policy drive away from that kind of bilateral policy in a political landscape where several European governments pivot towards policies designed to deflect and transfer their asylum responsibilities beyond EU territory. And the incumbent Labour-government´s dismantling of the British Rwanda-policy then constituted the policy´s final fall from grace.
From 2023, the new three-party Frederiksen II-government performed a strategic shift away from the bilateral diplomatic Danish-Rwandan track insisted upon during the one-party SD government. The compromise reached was a more open-ended track of pursuing externalization through the EU. Accordingly, on May 15, 2024, Denmark, alongside the Czech Republic, and 13 other EU Member States sent a letter to the European Commission calling the Union´s current asylum and migration system “unsustainable” and citing concerns that it would exacerbate polarization in European societies. The countries claimed that the main cause for such polarization was irregular migrant arrivals, and called on the Commission to “think outside the box” in order to “break the business model of smugglers”. The solution proposed was “return hub mechanisms” created in “partnership” with countries outside Europe, along the key migration routes to the continent. The May 15 letter was publicized only days after a Migration Conference held in Copenhagen gathered representatives from the Commission, Member States, as well as from Rwanda and Albania, and certain EU think tanks, in order to discuss partnerships and externalization. The letter´s signatories included Denmark, the Czech Republic, Austria, Poland, Greece, Italy, the Baltic countries, Malta and Bulgaria. Notably, however, it did not include powerful Member States such as Germany, France, Spain, nor Belgium, Sweden or Hungary. The Letter reflects how the Safe Third Country-concept has been emerging as a key battleground for EU-level externalization, because it encouraged the Commission to revise wording in the Migration Pact concerning the “connection criteria” required to exist between asylum seekers and the non-European countries to which they can be sent.
Whether or not this most recent coalition of countries will be successful in their lobbyism efforts, the general process and its dynamics illustrates certain important aspect of externalisation policies. In Danish politics, however, this mediatization have had the concrete implication that all substantial asylum policy discussions about violent border control, increasing numbers of asylum seekers or integration measures are avoided via routine promises that externalization will function as a fix-all remedy. This illustrates a disturbing trend whereby asylum policy-making move away from experience-based and solution-oriented discussions, and towards vague appeals to the principle of deterrence. As such, externalization can be seen as the logical end-point of the deterrence paradigm, since it turns the very existence of an asylum system into a device for deterrence and extraterritorial deportations.
Externalisation, containment and safe routes to protection in the EU
At a general level, a distinction can be made between externalisation policies which aim at, respectively, extraterritorial containment and those aiming at protected entry. Recent Danish and British attempts to relocate asylum processing, refugee residence permits and people with rejected status to Rwandan territory are examples of the former policy. So are EU-policies of funding Libyan, Egyptian and Tunisian coast guard capacity to pull back boat migrants so as to pre-empt the legal obligation to process asylum applications on European territory. Examples of protected entry include UN quota refugees resettled in Europe, embassy or consulate access to territory or asylum processes, and relocation schemes, such as the one launched by the EU Commission in 2015, but not implemented due to resistance from the Visegrad states. Most recently, the EU Temporary Protection Directive activated for displaced persons from Ukraine in 2022 can also be seen as such a policy. These share the function of allowing various protection claims to be processed in regions of origin, in order to construct legal routes to safety.
The current push for policies of extraterritorial containment does not constitute a radical innovation, but rather a retrogression to ideas and logics that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. Remarkably, then as now, policy circles from the same European states attempt to drive this policy forward, namely UK, Denmark, Netherlands and some fractions in the German political or think tank establishment. Already in 1986, the Danish government proposed the creation of extraterritorial “processing centres” in Eastern Europe, and possibly also in the African continent, in order to contain refugees from the crumbling Soviet Union, during a session in the UN´s Third Committee. It was, however, quickly rejected as lacking solidarity with refugees and the global South. In 1994-5, Dutch minister Aad Kosto revived the idea, suggesting extraterritorial European “reception centres” modelled on the American Guantanamo Base on Cuba. In 2002-3, the British Blair-government, seconded by its Danish and Dutch counterparts, launched a large campaign for “regional protection areas”, and “transit processing zones” in Eastern Europe and North Africa. Once more, however, these attempts were criticized as undermining international solidarity for protection.[4] During a July 2004 Council meeting, the German minister of the interior, Otto Schily, also entered the fray, lobbying for “registration facilities” which were to contain displaced persons outside Europe, controversially identifying Libya as a preferred location. In the two decades since, EU policies have moved away from protected entry and towards expanding deflection, containment and smuggling-combatting policies at the union´s external border regions – with truly historic humanitarian consequences.
Extraterritorial containment also ended up as the result of the so called “EU-Turkey deal” negotiated in 2015-2016 on initiative from especially German and Dutch policy circles. Yet, quickly failing its stated resettlement goals from Turkey to the EU, which could have constituted a protected entry procedure, the deal instead unravelled and turned into a policy of containing millions of displaced persons in Turkey, with a terrible humanitarian cost, as well as profound repercussions for Turkish society. Both because the deal granted Erdogan´s AKP government international legitimacy, which it used to crack down on domestic dissidence and critique, but also because the presence of Syrian refugees emerged as a fiercely contested issue in several election campaigns. Moreover, in 2017, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) noted that the EU-Turkey deal was in fact not mandated by the EU. In 2018 another externalisation plan briefly emerged, only to be taken quickly off the table again, namely when the EU MS JHA ministers issued a press release announcing the creation of “regional disembarkation platforms” in the Mediterranean. After devastating critique from MENA-states, however, there was no follow-up on the idea, and no such structures materialized. In 2024, however, the May 15 Letter, and its idea of return hub mechanisms represents a renewal of the policy push for such an approach pushed by states eager to persuade also international organisations, such as the UNHCR, to align with their priorities.
Through four decades, the policy drive for extraterritorial containment has been countered by a parallel, but inverted policy push for protected entry procedures. This, however, has received much less political support. As mentioned, a recent example of this policy is the EU´s Temporary Protection Directive, which had been activated 20 years after its inception in response to the displacement of more than 6,3 million people from Ukraine to Europe. In fact, up until the mid-2000s, more than 12 European states, including Denmark, allowed for access to territory or to asylum application processing from embassies and consulates outside their national territory.[5] Combined with more liberal regulations for entry visas, these initiatives were argued to make unnecessary the services of irregular migration facilitators, often grouped together as human smugglers by policy-makers. However, EU member states are now focussing on closing legal immigration routes to asylum and criminalizing irregular ones too, which also affects such opportunities for protected entry.
Lacking lessons from externalisation policies beyond the EU: Australia and Israel
Whilst issuing blanket-guarantees of human rights-compliance in connection with criticized externalization plans, Danish, British but also German policy-makers have increasingly referenced externalisation policies from Australia and Israel. But they have generally failed to substantially engage with the severe problems of human rights-compliance and political ramifications that these policies have faced.
The Australia-Papa New Guinea (PNG) externalisation policy from 2013 established asylum processing and refugee stay for people intercepted by the Australian coast guard who were transferred onto the Manus Island Regional Processing Centre on Papua-New Guinean territory. However, a series of scandals quickly engulfed this policy, including murders, child abuse, sexual violence, inhuman and degrading conditions, inadequate medical care and financial embezzlement. In 2017, the Australian government and the private security companies G4S and Transfield Services chose to settle a class action suit on behalf of people detained in the centre, alleging false detention between 2012 and 2016, as well as a failure to take reasonable care of detainees. In 2016 the Papua-New Guinean Supreme Court found the detention of asylum seekers under the PNG-Australia agreement was illegal and unconstitutional. The centre was officially closed in 2021. These developments have typically been disregarded as policy lessons by European politicians, focusing instead on the success criteria of barring asylum applications on Australian territory.
Israel pursued an externalisation policy with Rwanda from 2014-2017. Here too, the British government seemed only vaguely familiar with this policy predecessor, and in 2022, the Danish government also disregarded it, despite Amnesty International pointing to its high relevance. The UK Supreme Court, however, noted it as a crucial experience that ought to influence any assessment of the risks of any externalisation deal with Rwandan authorities. Under this deal, Israel imprisoned and deported 3.959 primarily Sudanese and Eritrean asylum seekers from the Holot prison to Rwanda. A similar deal was concluded with Uganda, but quickly thereafter both states renegated from assurances of legal responsibility, and deportees were robbed, abandoned, or further deported to other territories, in violation of the ban on non-refoulement. Shrouded in secrecy, the Rwandan project only became known in 2017. The year after, following damaging media exposés and protests from Israeli activists and migrant networks, the Israeli Supreme Court found it illegal. UNHCR also reported how, as a result of the deal, many people deported from Israel were re-inserted in smuggling networks ending up in Libya and Europe. As such, the Israeli policy actually provides concrete evidence against a claim repeated by the British and Danish governments, namely that extraterritorial structures will undermine the business model of human smugglers. It in fact enabled the trade, but this lesson has also been ignored by the supporters of externalization policies in Europe.
Strategies and arguments on externalisation
In order to gain support for externalisation projects, their advocates use various argumentative strategies. For example, it can be observed that a certain strategic vagueness is used to mix different externalisation practices in order to portray other governments as pursuing the same goal. A closely related strategy is the attempt to link the policies with other actors, such as international organisations or non-European states, in order to gain legitimacy
Some European politicians and EU think tank consultants have begun to refer to Danish policies in order to bolster similar initiatives, while Danish politicians, in particular from the Social Democratic Party, in turn also refer to British and German plans. For instance, attempting to convey a picture of international support after the devastating British Supreme Court-verdict in November 2023, the secretary of state for the Home Department, James Cleverley, referred to statements from the German government. This despite the fact that both these statements were very vague, and also differed from the UK government´s policy on essential issues.
The faltered externalisation plans of the Danish SDs offer several examples of these intertwined strategies. For instance, in the mid 2010s, SD spokespersons began offering several North African and Middle Eastern states as likely hosts for Danish externalisation. In each case, however, the governments involved expressed surprise about this, and rejected any desire for such partnerships. In June 2021, the African Union (AU) also explicitly condemned the Danish policy in June 2021 on the basis of it being xenophobic, unacceptable and an abdication of international responsibility which would distort the international asylum regime. In 2018, an SD spokesperson emphasized that the planned policy would be in compliance with international rights obligations, since operated by the UNHCR and the EU. Once more, however, these claims were refuted when, shortly after, both the EU Commission and the UNHCR refused involvement in these plans.
Governments also try to sidestep political-legal challenges by giving the impression that their externalization plans are also pursued by other governments or actors, despite crucial differences between them. One of several such examples, is the so-called Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) in Rwanda. In 2021 and 2023, separately, Danish and British government representatives visited the Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) in the country. These visits have repeatedly led to confusion in British and Danish media with reports that the “Rwanda policy” was already being enacted, or that the ETM showed the viability of the British or Danish plans. Actually, though, the Rwanda ETM involves evacuations of displaced persons from Libya, primarily. It was supposed to lead to resettlement and residence permits in European and other states, which, however, it failed to do. But crucially, the policy logic is in fact the opposite of the British and Danish plans: It is operated by the UNHCR, not Rwanda, and it offers extraterritorial asylum processing and resettlement instead of containing refugee residence permits in Rwanda.
A circular justification for the forms of externalisation is observable across Europe, when the policy is argued to be in accordance with international obligations and human rights standards simply because if it is implemented then it will be because in compliance with these standards. Danish and British government continue to claim this, despite critique of the plans a range of from civil society actors, international bodies and organizations pointing to serious human rights-related concerns, including from the African Union (AU), the EU Commission, Amnesty International, Save the Children, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Organization for Migration (IOM).
The policy, however, has been defended through certain arguments identifiable across national contexts. One framing is that this kind of externalisation saves a broken asylum system. Here, government representatives typically invoke moral grammars of rescue and care, co-opting the language of human rights by humanitarian and rights-based organizations. At other times, however, government arguments have been rather straightforward about the desire to signal deterrence to prospective asylum seekers, through these plans. The Danish and British governments have shifted between these incompatible justifications, emphasizing the moral grammar when communicating internationally, whilst focusing on deterrence when communicating to domestic audiences.
Another variant of this argumentation concerns agency and responsibility. A 2022 white paper from the Danish SD government argued that it was not acceptable to maintain an outdated asylum system run by human smugglers. The notion that the global asylum system is run by smugglers, and not states, is one frequently communicated by proponents of externalisation in Denmark, UK, Germany, Sweden and Holland. However, European states have actively fostered beneficial conditions for smuggling networks by closing down safe and regular paths to protection. As such, responsibility for the harm befalling people trying to access European asylum procedures through irregular and dangerous routes should also be ascribed to the governments bringing about these consequences.
Conclusion: Externalisation as recycled imperialism
The common arguments for externalization, and the manner in which European decision-makers have engaged selectively with the Turkish, Australian and Israeli cases illustrate the policy´s recurring problems with Western-, Euro- and state-centric gazes.[6] European decision-makers have made numerous appeals to the Australian policy in order to substantiate developing European policies, but no references to either the Papua-New Guinean Supreme Court-verdict, or the crucial point made by the EU Court of Justice that the agreement with Turkey does not involve the EU. This selective gaze focuses on state-level actors at the expense of human rights of populations, civil society or opposition networks in those territories targeted by European governments for externalization partnerships. For instance, when discussing the impact of the EU-Turkey policy, European decision-makers and think tank consultants consistently bypass the ramifications of the Eu-Turkey 2015-6 deal for Turkish civil society. In the fall of 2015, the AKP faced widespread domestic and international critique of its authoritarian repression of Turkish civil society and minorities. However, when Dutch prime minister Mark Rutte and German chancellor Angela Merkel concluded negotiations with Erdogan, this European critique gave way to political legitimacy and collaboration, aiding the AKP in solidifying its power in Turkey. Since then, the EU´s reliance on Turkish control and containment of displaced people on its territory increased, the union´s critique of the widespread imprisonment of journalists, lawyers, opposition politicians and academics in Turkey has been muted and without consequence.
A multidirectional gaze reveals how externalization deals allow prospective host states to use European desires for partnerships to continue domestic repression or to silence international critique from states or organizations. Thus, at the same time as the Rwandan government signed MoUs with Danish and British governments, and hosted highly mediatized meetings with their ministers, it also accelerated its material and financial support to the M23 militia operating in neighbouring Congo, according to UN expert reports. And while hundreds of thousands of civilians in the mineral-rich region were displaced, and regional tensions flared both the Danish and British governments were silent.
This Rwandan controversy is emblematic of Western countries´ recurring difficulties with finding so-called “host countries”. This is connected to how the political vision of externalisation draws on colonial logics, and specifically on how territories of containment are identifiable as imaginations of imperially annexed spaces where to colonial subjects used to be transferred.[7] The Guantanamo Base saluted as a model by European decision-makers in the 1990s was only made possible due to colonial annexation by the US during the Spanish-American war between 1898-1903. Similarly, Liberia and Sierra Leone represent early 19th century examples of the current externalisation logic. “Slave trade refugees” rescued from slaving vessels along the Middle Passage were deemed unwelcome in the highly racialized American and British empires.[8] Accordingly, they were instead deported to these so-called abolitionist-imperial African colonies. Later, during World War II, under its Middle East Relief and Refugee Management (MERRA) policy, the British empire forcibly transferred refugees to camps in colonial territories across the Middle East and Africa, including to present-day Congo and Rwanda. A historical, postcolonial perspective on the current externalisation policies can therefore point out that their underlying logic is akin to recycled imperial conceptions of displacement policies on racialized subjects and territories.[9] The influence of this imperial logic of displacement points to a main reason why recent European externalisation attempts have collapsed, namely the pervasive difficulties in finding so-called “host states”. From a postcolonial perspective, European policy-makers appear unable to acknowledge the policy´s imperial logic and the fact that targeted “host states” have become decolonized, sovereign states that seek to liberate themselves from, or capitalize on, postcolonial power relations.
Footnotes
[1] See also: Bialasiewicz, L. 2012. Off-shoring and Out-sourcing the Borders of Europe: Libya and EU Border Work in the Mediterranean. Geopolitics, 17(4), pp. 843-866; Moreno-Lax, V. (2017) Accessing Asylum in Europe: Extraterritorial Border Controls and Refugee Rights under EU Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
[2] Lemberg-Pedersen, M., Whyte, Z. & Chemlali, A. (2021) ‘Denmark´s new externalization law: motives and consequences’. Forced Migration Review 68, pp. 36-39.
[3] Lemberg-Pedersen, M. (2023) “They must be escorted back nicely”. Disclaimed responsibility and renewed plans for externalising asylum in Denmark and the United Kingdom. Danish Foreign Policy Review 2023: 83-115.
[4] Noll, Gregor (2003) Visions of the Exceptional. European Journal of Migration and Law: 5(3): 303-341.
[5] Noll, Gregor (2005) Seeking Asylum at Embassies: A Right to Entry under International Law? International Journal of Refugee Law, 17(3): 542-573.
[6] Cobarrubias, S., Cuttitta, P., Casas-Cortés, M., Lemberg-Pedersen, M., El Qadim, N., Isleyen, B., Fine, S., Giusa, C. and Heller, C. (2023) Interventions on the concept of externalisation in migration and border studies. Political Geography, 105: 102911. Doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2023.102911.
[7] Cf. Mayblin, L. (2017) Asylum After Empire. Colonial Legacies in the Politics of Asylum Seeking, London: Rowman and Littlefield International; Lemberg-Pedersen, M. (2019) Manufacturing displacement. Externalization and postcoloniality in European migration control: Global Affairs 5(3): 247-271.
[8] Adderley, L.R. an Fett, S. (2022) Slave Trade Refugees and Imperal Agenda: The Resettlement of „Liberated Africans“ into British West Indian Regiments and Liberian Militias, 1808-60. In Lemberg-Pedersen, M., Fett, S.M., Mayblin, L., Sahraoui, N., and Stambøl, E.M. (eds) Postcoloniality and Forced Migration. Mobility, Control, Agency. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
[9] Lemberg-Pedersen, M., Pincock, K., Boeyink, C. and Adderley, L.R. (2024) Colonialism, Postcoloniality and the Study of Forced Migration. Migration and Society, 7.