Christiane Fröhlich, Senior Research Fellow, German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), and Lea Müller-Funk, Senior Researcher, Department for Migration and Globalisation, University for Continuing Education Krems
European discourses on migration have historically been dominated by a crisis narrative, often centred around the influx of non-EU migrants. This Eurocentric perspective has led to policies focusing on externalising border control through agreements with neighbouring non-EU countries, such as the EU-Turkey Deal in 2016 and proposed ‘disembarkation platforms’ in North Africa in 2018. This paper examines how such policies are perceived in Turkey and Tunisia, based on media analysis. In Turkey, the EU-Turkey Deal is criticized but it is also seen as a strategic opportunity amidst domestic political and economic challenges, while in Tunisia, the perceived migration crisis is framed as a European political issue, with Tunisia resisting EU pressure to host disembarkation centres. The analysis highlights that European migration crises are narrated differently in neighbouring regions, influenced by local political dynamics and strategic interests. This divergence in perceptions underscores the need for the EU to consider the viewpoints of non-EU states in its migration governance efforts.
Introduction
European discourses on (im)migration have long been dominated by a ‘crisis narrative’. So-called ‘mixed’ migration – migrants who are not necessarily or exclusively migrating for reasons specified in the Refugee Convention, but who can nonetheless be categorized as forced migrants – has led to the widespread perception in European discourses that the immigration of large numbers of non-European Union (EU) citizens needs to be perceived as ‘critical’. Given that most of such migration movements stay within the Global South, this perception is extremely Eurocentric, illustrated by many academic studies focusing on Northern perceptions of migration and its governance. Knowledge of non-European perceptions of crisis, in contrast, is comparatively scarce. How do non-EU states, which are often bound to the EU through EU neighbourhood policies and agreements, see migration movements that are perceived as ‘critical’ within the EU? Where and in which form does the notion of ‘crisis’ enter the discussion and how do such states see EU externalisation efforts?
When the number of people moving in the direction of Europe started to increase in 2015, one of the EU’s responses was a move towards securitisation, declaring war on ‘criminal gangs’ of smugglers and traffickers, reportedly responsible for the surge in refugee deaths.[1] This sort of crisis vocabulary has helped legitimise EU policies such as cooperation with fragile, often undemocratic regimes in the EU neighbourhood, and the subsequently progressing externalisation of the European border. The ‘EU-Turkey Deal’ in March 2016 and the ‘EU-Migration Deal’ in June 2018 are emblematic in this regard. Both follow the same logic: establishing funds to contribute to ‘better migration management’ outside the EU and soliciting non-European actors to protect and uphold European borders, thus externalising migration governance.
The EU-Migration Deal 2018, for example, includes the attempt to establish so-called ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Niger and Tunisia. These platforms have been presented as the way to manage the ‘migration crisis’ and ‘mixed migratory flows’ towards the EU. In the EU-Turkey statement, which has become known as the ‘EU-Turkey Deal’, the EU committed to paying Ankara 6 billion Euros to accept back every ‘irregular migrant’ crossing from Turkey to the Greek islands starting on March 20, 2016, and to curb all future ‘illegal migration’ from Turkey to the EU (press release European Council, 18 March 2016). In turn, the EU agreed to resettle one Syrian refugee from Turkey for every Syrian being returned to Turkey from Greece. The agreement also includes clauses to accelerate the visa liberalization roadmap, to upgrade the Customs Union, and to re-energize Turkey’s accession process.
How have these policy developments been perceived in the countries that have been solicited for such externalization policies? Taking two distinct European migration crisis moments as case studies – first, the negotiations about and implementation of the EU-Turkey agreement, and, second, the discussions around the establishment of ‘disembarkation platforms’ in the context of the EU-Migration Deal 2018 in Tunisia –, we describe how elite actors in the European neighbourhood give meaning to European perceived migration crises. The paper offers a media analysis of key moments of European migration crises in leading newspapers in Turkey[2] and Tunisia.[3] The analysis demonstrates that European migration crises are narrated differently in the European neighbourhood, and that migration as a policy issue is either silenced or used strategically for political means on the domestic and regional levels.
“No readmission without Schengen”: The EU-Turkey Deal from a Turkish perspective
Turkey has developed from a country of origin and transit to a host state only quite recently, resulting in major political, social and cultural challenges. According to the UNHCR, Turkey currently hosts the largest number of refugees worldwide, including 3.7 million registered Syrian refugees as well as almost 400.000 refugees and asylum seekers from other nationalities, especially Afghans, Iraqis, and Iranians. While most Syrians have received temporary protection, most of the other nationalities are considered irregular (and illegal) immigrants.
Turkey follows a ‘policy of ambivalence’ regarding its Syrian inhabitants; and even more so concerning other refugees and forced migrants. The main tool of Turkish refugee and asylum governance is Law No. 6458 on Foreigners and International Protection (LFIP), which was ratified in April 2013. Turkey has also signed the Refugee Convention but adheres to its original geographical limitation, i.e. only applying it to asylum seekers from Europe. As a result, Syrians, while legally more protected than other migrant groups, still only receive temporary protection.
For the first few years of the Syrian crisis, Turkey followed an open-door policy. Having said that, Turkey does not have a coherent strategy towards refugees; on the contrary, there is a major implementation gap between national policies and actions on the ground. This is due to complex demographics, deep political polarization, and perceived security threats connected to the issue of (irregular) immigration.
The main drivers of Turkey’s migration governance have been the European Union’s attempts to control migration through externalization, Turkish security concerns about immigration and the growing number of irregular migrants on Turkish territory.[4] Turkey has strong ties to different individual EU Member States, most notably Germany, which hosts the largest Turkish community outside of Turkey. It has also been in ascension negotiations with the EU since October 2005, after being recognised as a candidate for full EU membership in December 1999. Combined with its role as the key host state for Syrian refugees, it is not surprising that Turkey became a target of EU externalisation efforts when ‘irregular’ immigration to the EU began to increase considerably in 2015. The ‘EU-Turkey Deal’ of March 2016 needs to be understood within this context.
The media coverage of the events leading up to the EU-Turkey Statement in national print media is characterised by three aspects. Firstly, domestic political events dominated the headlines much more than migration. While crisis narratives were quite prevalent, they focused mainly on other issues. By far the most attention was paid to domestic political division, with terrorist attacks on Turkish soil by Kurdish actors and the Islamic State taking most of the spotlight (often mentioning Turkish “martyrs”). Inter-party conflicts were also covered extensively. Another topic presented as critical was the continuously deteriorating Turkish economy, including rising unemployment. In this context, it was mentioned repeatedly that Turkey had already spent 8 billion USD on Syrian refugees, while the international community only pledged 410 million USD.[5] The importance of burden-sharing was frequently underlined.[6] Opposition voices also reported critically on media repression, nepotism and bribery by/within the AKP government, with a focus on the detention of journalists.[7] Other domestic events, like the general election of November 1, 2015, and the newly formed government, also received more reporting than migration issues.
Secondly, the violent conflict in neighbouring Syria received a lot of attention. However, rather than on migration as such, reporting focused on Turkey’s role in the conflict, on actions of other involved actors like Russia and the US, and Turkey’s strong will to find a political solution together with external actors like the EU. When migration was mentioned, media voices highlighted that a solution to the conflict in Syria was a prerequisite for solving the issue[8]; a task which in turn requires international cooperation to be achieved.[9] Media articles also focused on the ‘sensitivity’ of the issue of migration and displacement in the EU and the world[10], and on migrants leaving Turkey for Europe[11], rather than on refugees in Turkey. When they were mentioned, Syrian refugees in Turkey were referred to as “Syrian guests” or “Syrian brothers”.[12]
Finally, articles covering the process leading up to the EU-Turkey Statement, while sometimes using the term ‘migration crisis’ or ‘refugee crisis’, make a strong case for the crisis being located in Europe, not in Turkey. In consequence, the authors point out that a refugee agreement was the EU’s priority, not Turkey’s[13], and therefore the responsibility to act stayed with the EU. Several articles also underlined that the European crisis was being used by populist and right-wing actors for their political gain.[14] One author asked critically, “How can you perceive people who escaped from war as economic [migrants]?”[15], and Ahmet Davutoğlu is quoted saying that “These innocent people (…) are just like us”.[16] The EU was severely criticised for not letting refugees choose freely where they want to live, thereby creating problems for the states where they are forced to stay, both in Europe and elsewhere.[17]
Of the three reasons why Turkey agreed to the EU-Turkey deal – reopening the EU ascension negotiations, financial aid of 6 billion EUR, and visa liberalisations –, the prospect of visa liberalisations for Turkish citizens travelling to the EU received most attention, both as a prospect and as part of threats to terminate the agreement.[18] The issue that was most frequently discussed as an obstacle to visa liberalisation was the EU’s insistence on Turkey adjusting its terrorism laws.[19] In this context, one author critically asks whether it was the refugees or the PKK which were causing more trouble for the EU.[20]
Some articles were openly critical of the EU-Turkey deal, calling it “shameful”[21], a “sugar-coated cyanide pill”[22], or stating that Turkey “cannot become Europe’s concentration camps”[23]. Also, some articles voiced fears that the agreement could lead to faster naturalisation of refugees in Turkey (mültecilerin vatandaşlığa), which could give them new political weight. One author feared that in this case, the voting balance in Turkey could be affected; especially the approach of the government to settle refugees in areas with a large Kurdish population was highlighted in this context.[24] While some parallels were drawn between the Greek and the Turkish approach to Syrian refugees, with both “opening their door to innocent Syrians who fled the barbaric regime in Syria”[25], overall, the EU’s approach was heavily criticized, with some authors pointing out that only the refugee crisis made the EU remember Turkey[26], and that the EU was paying Turkey to “relieve its own conscience”.[27]
The critical view of European migration governance was somewhat echoed in the reporting of the events of late February/early March 2020, when Turkey decided to stop adhering to the EU-Turkey Deal and opened its borders for transit migration towards Europe. Between February 28 and March 7, 2020, all three news outlets reserved a lot of space on their frontpages for this issue, with headlines like “Humanity died”[28], “The world only watches this drama”[29], “Limits of humanity”[30], or even drawing comparisons between “Nazi camps” and the treatment of refugees on the borders of the EU.[31]
‘The Maghreb says no to Europe’: Tunisian perceptions of ‘disembarkation platforms’
Tunisia, on the other hand, has been a prototypical emigration country with more than a million Tunisians living abroad. However, it has also witnessed a substantial growth in immigration over the past years – especially of Sub-Saharan immigrants and Libyan citizens –, but also tens of thousands of Tunisian labour migrants returning from neighbouring Libya since 2011 due to the Libyan conflict.
Tunisian migration policies have been shaped by repeated interactions with the EU and its Member States, where most Tunisian migrants live. These interactions have been characterised by a focus on security and operability in dealing with border controls and on the swift and ‘cost-effective’ removal of undesirable migrants and denied asylum-seekers.[32] EU member states, in particular Italy, want the Tunisian security forces to intercept boats with irregular migrants who embarked on their journey from Libyan territory.[33] Yet, the consecutive Tunisian governments have never passively adhered to this script. Rather, Tunisia’s positioning towards migration has been driven by a strategic alignment on which the regime could capitalise for its own political survival when needed. The former Ben Ali administration, for example, responded to the norms and principles set by the EU by boasting its own credentials at the international level.[34]
Immigration policy in Tunisia today is thus mostly security-driven. At the same time, immigration has remained silenced in the public sphere until Tunisian president Kais Saied’s fundamental break with how Tunisian politics has historically dealt with immigration in 2022.[35] The immigration law of 2004 cemented the criminalisation of ‘illegal’ migration, even if it was applied inconsistently over the years and across Tunisian territory.[36] While Tunisia ratified the Refugee Convention and the 1969 Protocol, it has no national refugee status determination procedure in place: The country cooperates with UNHCR on refugee matters, but there is no legal reference to a residence permit for refugees.
Domestically, the official discourse has historically rarely presented ‘illegal migration’ as a key security issue because emigration, whether authorised or not, has been viewed as a safety valve to relieve pressure on youth unemployment and social discontent. Security also remains the main paradigm in Tunisia after the Arab uprisings without any fundamental policy change after 2011.[37] With the tone generally hardening towards foreigners, Libyans, at the same time, continue to be tolerated by Tunisian authorities regardless of their status. However, since the democratic opening in 2011, the Tunisian government(s) can no longer react to external pressures on migration issues without facing civil society’s empowered advocacy. Some argue therefore that Tunisian immigration policies today are driven by both a securitarian and a humanitarian logic.[38]
The Valletta Summit on Migration prepared the way for the EU-Migration Deal in 2018. The Valletta Summit brought together European and African Heads of State and Government in Malta in November 2015 in an effort “to strengthen cooperation in migration management” across the major African migration routes to Europe, especially in countries in the Sahel, the Lake Chad region, North Africa and the Horn of Africa. The resulting political declaration mirrors the securitising logic of the action plan, its objectives including the prevention of irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking, and close cooperation on return and readmission, besides cooperation on legal migration. The summit also established the Emergency Trust Fund for Africa of 1.8 billion Euros to “help foster stability in the regions and to contribute to better migration management”. Tunisia has been one of the main beneficiaries of the funds released since 2015.[39]
The EU-Migration Deal 2018 had a similar logic. Following the European Council meeting on 28 June 2018, EU leaders agreed on strengthening external border controls with more funding to Turkey and countries in North Africa and the Sahel to help prevent migrants from leaving for Europe, exploring the possibility of ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ in countries such as Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco, Niger and Tunisia to process migrants outside the EU, and to boost investment in Africa to help achieve a ‘socio-economic transformation’ so that people no longer want to leave in pursuit of a better life elsewhere. 500 million euros were planned to be transferred to the EU Trust Fund for Africa. Regional disembarkation platforms were defined as centres which “should operate distinguishing individual situations, in full respect of international law and without creating a pull factor”.[40] The idea of these centres was subsequently clearly refused in the Maghreb, including Tunisia.
The media coverage of these two events in local print media reveals three key aspects. First, sports events and local political crises dominated the headlines much more than migration. On the one hand, the World Cup 2018 was one of the major issues in summer 2018. On the other hand, crisis narratives were extremely present. However, these were mostly linked to domestic politics and political reforms in a still post-revolutionary Tunisia. They included the ongoing tensions between the two major political parties Nidaa Tounès and Ennahdha (“the political crisis”), the victory of Souad Abderrahim from Ennahdha in the municipal elections in Tunis on 3 July 2018 as the first female mayor of Tunis, discussions about transitional justice and the reform of the judicial sector, the alarming situation of the economy and a major strike of the Tunisian General Labour Union, the increase of food prices and the reform of the media.
Second, the “Libyan Crisis” and the conflict in the neighbouring country were extremely present. Yet, the overall narrative about Libya was not so much linked to migration as such, but rather emphasised Tunisia’s mediating role in the conflict and its strong will to find a political solution. Media voices highlighted that it was paramount for Tunisia to continue its economic ties and agreements with Libya. The increase in the oil price following the conflict and oil smuggling between Libya and Tunisia were also repeatedly addressed. If migration and displacement were mentioned, media articles focused on the living conditions of Sub-Saharan Africans in Libya and migrants leaving Libya for Europe rather than Libyan refugees on Tunisian soil. This is striking as Tunisia became a host of Libyans who came to Tunisia shortly after the fall of al-Qaddafi because they feared reprisal for the role that their families or tribes played in supporting the former regime; Libyans without a particular political affiliation who fled throughout the 2012-2015 period because of insecurities and human rights violations; and a large group of people considered to be revolutionaries, including lawyers, activists, and media persons, who left because of the deteriorating security situation and the growth of armed groups.[41]
Third, the coverage of the two events was framed around the narrative that the migration crisis was a European political crisis rather than a Tunisian one. What was happening was not described as a migration crisis as such, but as a “crisis of migration management”, with Frontex and European policies creating the phenomenon of smuggling in the first place (“une politique de laisser-mourir”)[42]. Migration was described as a political priority in Europe used by populist and right-wing political parties having an interest to deepen the crisis to gain votes. Authors pointed out that African migration to Europe was not high in numbers – why waste so much energy on African migrants if there are not many? Some voices also suspected racism – “Why does Europe accept Syrians but not Africans?”.[43] However, some terms were also taken over from European political discourse, such as the “crisis of irregular migration”.[44]
The narrative focused on the fact that European leaders could only agree on a minimal consensus – the disembarkation platforms – as they were not able to create a common European asylum law. From a Tunisian perspective, the idea of these reception centres remained vague, counter-productive and not compatible with “Tunisian principles”. Tunisia positioned itself against any military solution to address migration. In some articles, migration was described as an integral part of being human.[45] The Emergency Trust Fund for Africa was clearly interpreted as Europe’s attempt to curb migration in exchange for financial aid. One author, however, also raised the question of how long Tunisia would be able to resist Europe given the financial aid that Europe could use to exert pressure.[46] Europe was described as having always hoped to send migrants back to the Maghreb, but now barricading itself and obsessing over its fear of foreigners.[47] Some authors suggested alternative policy options. These include a “new order”, which would truly address structural inequalities between North and South since Western countries only host a small minority of refugees despite their wealth[48], and which would facilitate, organise and manage migration rather than restrict it.[49] Another article mentioned that new regional migration solutions should be imagined given the current dynamics of South-South migration flows, including regional integration.[50]
Media articles also made a clear distinction between harragas – Tunisians migrating irregularly to Europe – and migrants on Tunisian soil, with articles being generally empathic with Tunisian migrants and their reasons for leaving. In one article, the causes for migration were linked to high unemployment, poverty, and inflation in Tunisia, as well as a development model in crisis, for which all governments post-2011 carry a responsibility.[51] Some articles also addressed the situation of migrants on Tunisian soil, emphasising simultaneously that the number of refugees in Tunisia was very low. Two articles pushed for a policy change concerning the national asylum law – “not to attract refugees but to regularize their situation”.[52] No article mentioned Libyan refugees or their rights in Tunisia.
Conclusions and implications for European migration governance efforts
The media analysis reveals striking similarities across media narratives in Tunisia and Turkey: First, domestic political crises, such as inter-party conflicts and unemployment, tend to overshadow political debates about migration. Second, while both countries host large numbers of refugees from their neighbouring countries, the focus of media narratives is on the – diplomatic or strategic – role of Turkey and Tunisia in the conflict rather than displacement. Third, elite actors make a strong case for the crisis being located in Europe, not in the European neighbourhood, and underline that refugees are being instrumentalized by populist and right-wing actors in Europe for their political gain.
There were also some important differences between Tunisian and Turkish media narratives, given the divergent degree of cooperation between the two countries with the EU. While Turkey decided to agree to the deal with the EU in return for visa liberalizations, financial aid, and the opening of new chapters in the EU ascension negotiations, Tunisia, together with other countries in the Maghreb, refused to cooperate with the EU when it comes to establishing “debarkation centres”, arguing that they were not compatible with “Tunisian principles”. The Turkish cooperation may partly be explained by the ruling AKP having suffered several political shocks prior to the agreement, including both the loss and the recovery of its parliamentary majority in 2015 and a progressively deteriorating Turkish economy. The deal may have seemed like a way to pacify a growing opposition. Tunisia’s rejection of a deal in turn may have been due to the state’s new self-perception as a democracy repositioning itself towards Europe as a political actor in the region. Also, on the domestic level potential bargains were presumably not profitable enough in a context where it was strategically more useful for Tunisia to silence the migration matter than to question Tunisia’s neutrality in the Libyan conflict. Some voices have also argued that Libyan refugees have massively contributed to the Tunisian economy in a context of economic crisis, which might also explain why Tunisian political actors have kept rather silent on the issue.
What does that mean for European migration governance and externalization efforts? For one, the EU needs to reflect carefully on the fact that a crisis only becomes one if it is narrated as such[53] and that the European crisis perception may diverge considerably from those in the European neighbourhood. Secondly, European perceptions of crisis are carefully received and critically evaluated in states outside of the EU, highlighting the need to better understand how the EU is perceived in potential partner states.
Footnotes
[1] Helen Hintjens, “Failed Securitisation Moves during the 2015 ‘Migration Crisis,’” International Migration, 57 (2019), 181–196.
[2] Cumhuriyet was the most prominent opposition voice in the Turkish mediascape until September 2018, when its leadership changed. Milliyet is considered regime-friendly and is taking the middle ground between quality press and boulevard. Sabah is Turkey’s most widely circulated newspaper, is regime-conform and publishes in Turkish, English and German. For the analysis, the first pages of the three dailies were studied for 15-18 October 2015, 24 November 2015, and 8 February-18 March 2016. In addition, 55 articles from the three outlets were studied in detail.
[3] Al Chourouk, the first daily in Arabic in tabloid format had a pro-government and Panarab line during Ben Ali’s presidency. La Presse de Tunisie, the first daily in French similarly followed a pro-government line before 2011 and experienced an opening post-2011. La Jeune Afrique, a French pan-African weekly magazine, has a focus on the Maghreb and francophone Africa. It was banned several times in Tunisia. Inkyfada, an online bilingual webzine in French and Arabic, was founded after 2011 with the objective to establish slow journalism in Tunisia. For the analysis, the first pages of the two dailies were studied during two time periods (11-14 November 2015 and 28 June-12 July 2018) and in total, 34 articles from four media outlets were analysed in detail.
[4] Gökalp Aras, N. Ela, and Zeynep Şahin Mencütek. 2018. “Evaluation of Irregular Migration Governance in Turkey from a Foreign Policy Perspective.” New Perspectives on Turkey 59 (November): 63–88
[5] Sabah, 18 October 2015 (the numbers vary in other outlets).
[6] Sabah, 19 October 2015; Cumhuriyet, 18 October 2015.
[7] Cumhuriyet, 8 February 2016 and 19 March 2016.
[8] Sabah, 18 October and 19 November 2015.
[9] Milliyet, 18 October 2015.
[10] Sabah, 18 October 2015, citing then prime minister Ahmet Davutoğlu.
[11] Sabah, 21 March 2016; Cumhuriyet, 7 June 2015.
[12] Milliyet, 9 February and 4 March 2016.
[13] Sabah, 9 May 2016.
[14] Sabah, 10 May 2016.
[15] Milliyet, 1 February 2016.
[16] Milliyet, 8 March 2016.
[17] Cumhuriyet, 25 September and 4 October 2015; Milliyet, 23 April 2016.
[18] Cumhuriyet, 15 October 2015, Sabah, 3 March 2016.
[19] Cumhuriyet, 15 June 2016; Milliyet, 19 October 2015.
[20] Sabah, 9 May 2016.
[21] Cumhuriyet, 18 March 2016.
[22] Cumhuriyet, 19 March 2016.
[23] Milliyet, 26 October 2015.
[24] Cumhuriyet, 19 March 2016.
[25] Sabah, 3 March 2016.
[26] Milliyet, 30 November 2015.
[27] Milliyet, 4 March 2016.
[28] Cumhuriyet, 3 March 2020.
[29] Cumhuriyet, 5 March 2020.
[30] Milliyet, 5 March 2020.
[31] Sabah, 7 March 2020.
[32] Jean-Pierre Cassarino. 2014. “Channelled Policy Transfers: EU-Tunisia Interactions on Migration Matters,” European Journal of Migration and Law, 16 (2014), 97–123
[33] Vasja Badalič. 2019. “Tunisia’s Role in the EU External Migration Policy: Crimmigration Law, Illegal Practices, and Their Impact on Human Rights,” Journal of International Migration and Integration, 20, 85–100
[34] Cassarino 2014, op.cit., 98.
[35] Katharina Natter. 2023. Authoritarianism and immigration policy: Tunisia shows it’s not that straightforward. The Loop – ECPR’s Political Science Blog.
[36] Hamza Meddeb. 2012. Courir Ou Mourir Course à El Khobza et Domination Au Quotidien Dans La Tunisie de Ben Ali. PhD thesis. Sciences Po Paris, 380-392.
[37] Katharina Natter. 2019. Political Regimes and Immigration Policymaking: The Contrasting Cases of Morocco and Tunisia. PhD thesis. University of Amsterdam.
[38] Camille Cassarini. 2020. “L’immigration Subsaharienne En Tunisie : De La Reconnaissance d’un Fait Social à La Création d’un Enjeu Gestionnaire.” Migrations Société 179(1): 43–57. Nick Dines, Nicola Montagna, and Elena Vacchelli. 2018. ‘Beyond Crisis Talk: Interrogating Migration and Crises in Europe’. Sociology 52 (3): 439–47.
[39] Cassarini 2020, op. cit., 51.
[40] European Council conclusions, 28 June 2018 – Consilium (europa.eu), last accessed on July 30, 2024.
[41] Mohamed Afif Jaidi and Marwan Tashani. 2015. “Libyan Refugees in Tunisia Lead a Precarious Existence,” Legal Agenda; Marwan Tashani. 2016. “Dual Citizens in Libya: A New Tool of Political Isolation?,” Legal Agenda.
[42] La Presse de Tunisie, 30 June 2018.
[43] La Jeune Afrique, 13 November 2015.
[44] La Presse de Tunisia, 15 November 2015.
[45] Al Chourouk, 2 July 2018.
[46] La Jeune Afrique, 27 July 2018.
[47] La Jeune Afrique, 13 November 2015.
[48] Inkyfada, 20 August 2015.
[49] Al Chourouk, 2 July 2018.
[50] La Presse de Tunisie, 7 July 2018.
[51] La Presse de Tunisie, 30 June 2018.
[52] La Presse de Tunisie, 2 July 2018.
[53] Munck, Ronaldo. 2007. “Globalisation, Labour and the ‘Polanyi Problem.” In The Future of Organised Labour: Global Perspectives. Edited by Craig Phelan. Bern: Peter Lang, 139.