Cathrine Talleraas, Senior Researcher at the Chr. Michelsen Institute (CMI)
This analysis delves into the web of actors and processes involved in implementing migration policy in Ghana. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with practitioners and bureaucrats, I uncover the political tensions that emerge at the intersection between externally driven policies and local realities. It becomes clear that institutional power hierarchies and funding structures influence the on-the-ground execution of policies, while this also leads to policy resistance. The analysis pinpoints three key challenges of migration policy implementation in Ghana, including incoherent narratives on policy and migration, exclusion of local stakeholders from policy design, and continuous mismatch between externalized policy objectives and local realities.
Unanswered puzzles on policy implementation
This analysis explores the intricacies of migration governance and policy implementation in Ghana, with a key focus on European externalization policies. By examining how local stakeholders execute external and national policy interventions, I uncover the challenges and dynamics at play in the actual, on-the-ground practices of Ghanaian migration governance.[1]
Since research on international migration governance finds a convergence of African migration policy strategies in line with European or “global” agendas,[2] a growing body of scholarship targets African and European-African policymaking processes, agendas, and narratives[3]. Critical research also scrutinizes the effects of such policy, including its often-lacking local impact or, alternatively, its aversive local consequences[4].
Yet, little attention has hitherto been given to implementation processes. I aim to contribute to filling this empirical gap by focusing on collaboration and implementation practices on the ground in Ghana. Here, most of the executed policies and projects targeting migration are led by, or funded by, the EU or other European actors. As previous research has pointed to implementation challenges in Ghanaian migration policies[5], it is relevant with a more in-depth examination of the role of different stakeholders in the local execution of these policy interventions.
Research design
The fieldwork for this analysis was conducted in Ghana in October and November 2022. Alongside Associate Professor Leander Kandilige, and with the support of two research assistants, I carried out fifty-two semi-structured interviews with individuals involved in Ghanaian migration governance, ranging from top-level policymakers to local-level practitioners. The data also includes informal conversations and ethnographic observations in various organizations and offices. While other collaborative output is published elsewhere[6], the findings herein are based on my own targeted analysis of 32 interviews – a subset of individuals involved in local-level implementation processes. This group includes local assembly members, as well as unit leaders and street-level staff from 20 governmental and non-governmental Ghanaian organizations, and from four international organizations. The individuals work in diverse areas with different migratory dynamics, including Sunyani, Tamale, Aflao, Elubo, Tema, and Accra, and a range of different migration-related areas, such as return and readmission, information provision, border control, vocational training, employment provision, and more. To maintain anonymity, small and place-specific units and organizations are described without naming them, and job titles have been removed where necessary.
Figure 1: A border-crossing gate at a checkpoint along the Ghana-Togo border (CC: Cathrine Talleraas)
Migration governance structure in Ghana
Migration governance in Ghana involves multiple actors and collaborative links, most of which have remained largely unchanged over the past two decades, although responsibilities have shifted between some of the key players. These include nine ministries, with the Ministry of the Interior playing a major role as it houses the Ghana Refugee Board and the Ghana Immigration Service (GIS). The Presidency also has two offices engaged in diaspora affairs and investment promotion. Additionally, three autonomous bodies—the National Population Council, the Ghana Statistical Service, and the University of Ghana-based Centre for Migration Studies—are involved in migration governance, often collaborating with ministerial units.
Despite numerous specialized actors, the division of responsibilities is not always clear-cut. A whole-of-society approach in recent years, driven by external initiatives, has also led to more input from non-state actors such as academic institutions, local chiefs, and NGOs. Similarly, international actors have become more heavily involved in policy development , as well as day-to-day management, working closely with Ghanaian national and local actors. Traditional international stakeholders include the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Labour Organization, and other UN agencies. Foreign Embassies, the EU, the International Centre for Migration Policy and Development (ICMPD) and the German development agency Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) have also become increasingly involved in migration governance since 2014. ICMPD provides technical assistance to the government and GIS, while GIZ focuses on increasing employment opportunities for returnees or prospective migrants[7].
However, the roles and actions of these organizations are often under-explored in research on African migration governance (Strange & Martins, 2019). As cooperation with international organizations may reinforce asymmetrical and postcolonial aspects of migration governance, it is essential to examine these actors’ influence on Ghanaian migration governance and implementation processes.
The funding hierarchies of implementation
In my discussions with interviewees across Ghanaian migration governance, it became clear that the many units form part of a complex web where partners hold unique positions of financial and managerial power. Relationships often hinge on financial flows: some units collaborate in more equal power relationships with corresponding managerial powers and/or own financial assets, while others operate across larger power gaps, with one actor making decisions and another executing actions reliant on the partner’s financial assets.
While financial hierarchies often mirror the international, national, and local scales, funding issues are also cross-cutting. Some organizations’ local-level units have large financial assets, while others depend on internal organizational funds or external funds. From the interviews, it was clear that funding power significantly affects the politics of, and challenges of, implementation. It shapes relationships between actors and influences local project strategies and priorities, ultimately impacting on-the-ground encounters and outcomes.
The figure below illustrates the key funding streams for the implementation processes in the parts of Ghanaian migration governance included in this study, as this was explained by interviewees. It is clear that most projects stem from external actors and programs, although the Government of Ghana is a primary funder of the GIS. The figure shows that funding and decision-making powers often intertwine. External states (including the EU) fund projects they execute themselves, or they provide funds directly to Ghanaian partners, or indirectly through international organizations, and in most cases often with clearly targeted objectives. Funds spent on projects by international organizations are sometimes redistributed to governmental or non-governmental Ghanaian partners.
Figure 2: The funding hierarchy of implementation.
Black boxes indicate units with their own funding, gray boxes indicate units dependent on external funding, and striped boxes indicate units funded both internally and externally. Black arrows represent funding direction. White arrows represent on-the-ground execution, showing that external states, international organizations, Ghanaian national government units, and Ghanaian NGOs are all involved as migration policy implementing actors (author’s own illustration).
Interviewees conveyed that funding streams and collaboration are often opaque, affecting actions carried out on the ground. Some mentioned that international organizations, like the IOM, more closely monitor projects compared to those funded directly from an external donor, e.g., through an embassy – that would be less concerned with the execution process. Local branches of international and foreign organizations were also seen to have more freedom in expenditure than local Ghanaian organizations, – a fact some tied to their larger internal funds and less dependency on other actors or donors.
The funding hierarchy mirrors institutional power hierarchies, and reveals that all Ghanaian local-level implementing actors in this study receive some form of foreign state funding. Interviewees in the NGO sector pointed to a tendency toward funding dependency, attributing it to unequal historical and geopolitical power structures. Yet, some also expressed frustration with inefficient bureaucratic structures or instability in Ghanaian government units working on migration, hoping that improved structures would enhance policy execution and, possibly, lead to greater independence from external actors.
Local NGOs noted increased competition due to the boom in international funds for migration governance projects. The leader of a large local NGO observed a decrease in professionalism as new actors entered the field without prior experience with migrants or migration. He argued that new actors copied established ones despite lacking experience, spreading funding across more actors and aggravating the economic situation of NGOs, especially when international funds decrease. Interviewees shared concerns and experiences of new funding challenges, believing that the global economic instability affects the EU and European states’ prioritization of migration governance in Africa.
Three spaces of contestation in implementation processes
In most of the interviews, both success stories and challenges concerning migration policy implementation were mentioned. Looking at these analytically, I identified three distinct areas of tension – primarily along the vertical scale of collaboration between top-level policymakers and bottom-level policy implementers. These areas are: 1) a coexistence of different migration and policy narratives, 2) a lack of local inclusion in decision-making processes, and, relatedly, 3) a lack of local groundedness and thus relevance of initiatives. These tensions not only affect local-level implementation experiences, but also the final policy outcomes.
1) Narratives: Local-level translation of policy concepts
When discussing their day-to-day work, stakeholders varied greatly in how they related to policy agendas. Some had strong insights into national migration policies and relevant legal frameworks, while others, especially low-level implementers, were unaware of national or international policy frameworks. Generally, most could specify the targets of their specific projects but did not always connect these to broader government or state agendas on migration.
The narratives I was given on migration policy were highly heterogeneous. Sometimes policy ideas aligned with overarching or formal agendas, but other times they diverged significantly. For example, the practitioners in a local NGO working on return, reintegration, and irregular migration often referred to the importance of decreasing irregular migration. They included both potential international and internal migrants in their activities, applying the concept of irregular migration to some types of internal migration, such as young women who moved to Accra to work as head porters, a practice known locally as kayayei. While logical to include these workers under “irregular migrants” for their safety, it added the burden of being perceived as illicit, though it also provided opportunities for training.
2) Inclusion: Executors are not involved in decision-making
As, largely externally supported, migration policies have increasingly adopted a whole-of-society approach, some local stakeholders have been invited to provide input in national processes, e.g. when drafting the key Ghanaian migration related national policies. Despite this, ownership and agreement with final policy agendas varied among stakeholders. Some local-level actors felt excluded, and many were unaware of national policies or their drafting processes. Those included in the drafting acknowledged the importance of their involvement, though many expressed that their participation had little impact on the final policies, and on their everyday work or project priorities.
For instance, a GIS regional commander noted his lack of involvement in policy negotiations: “You know, for me, I am at the implementation end and I don’t have any idea about what goes on at the negotiation table.” This sentiment was echoed by others who more strongly felt that top-down approaches could ignore valuable local insights. A local NGO leader observed, “[Funders] always make use of the top-down approach… we sometimes come up with very laudable suggestions which get ignored.”
3) Groundedness: Mismatch between policy design and local realities
Closely linked to the lack of inclusion in decision-making is the mismatch between project designs and their local relevance. Many practitioners highlighted that programs often failed to produce meaningful results. For example, those working on migration information provision stressed the need for employment opportunities rather than just risk awareness. Vocational training for returnees often lacked post-training support, such as premises and materials, which hindered practical implementation.
One interviewee involved with IOM mentioned that only a fraction of the 1,000 people trained received the promised support to start their own businesses, which lead to frustration among the group. A smaller NGO leader shared a similar story about a community irrigation project that failed to support returnees, due to the external consultant’s disregard for local advice. He noted, “That lack of cohesion is one of the things killing the projects here,” and expressed frustration with the focus on project fulfillment over practical outcomes.
Figure 3: A Frontex poster at a checkpoint along the Ghana-Togo border. (CC: Cathrine Talleraas)
Local-level consequences and alternatives
Given previous findings on the effects of externalization policies, it is not surprising that tensions in policy implementation, as here in the Ghanaian case, also impact targeted populations. This analysis shows that political tensions, such as scalar incoherence or disagreements on priorities, often lead to poor outcomes. Local-level interviewees frequently highlighted the lack of follow-up activities within migrant training programs, describing these projects as zero-sum games that benefited external funders without providing positive change for migrants.
The findings also underscore that institutional and funding politics significantly shape the experiences and outcomes of migration policy implementation. There are clear mismatches between overarching, often externally driven, policies and localized realities. To gather empirical evidence and nuanced understandings of specific processes, I advocate for more detailed studies of migration policy implementation both in Ghana and beyond. Understanding the interplay between local, national, and foreign agendas, and the practical implications of these interactions, is crucial when assessing the implications of European externalization policy.
Given the diversity in narratives and the mismatch between policy ideas and local realities in Ghana, it is important to consider if outcomes might have been different—making policies more relevant—if local implementers had more power to shape execution. While local-level inclusion in policy decision-making is commendable, policy design often remains ungrounded. Enhancing the role of local implementers in shaping and executing policies could lead to more relevant policies, and effective outcomes.
Footnotes
[1] The text is informed by findings from the journal article: Talleraas, C. (2024). The politics of migration policy implementation in Ghana. Governance, 1–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12848
[2] See e.g. Lavenex, S. (2016). Multilevelling EU external governance: the role of international organizations in the diffusion of EU migration policies. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 42:4, 554-570, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2015.1102047; Teye, J.K. (2022). Critical migration policy narratives from West Africa. International Migration, 60, 73– 84. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.13012
[3] See e.g. Adam, I., Trauner, F., Jegen, L., & Roos, C. (2020), West African interests in (EU) migration policy. Balancing domestic priorities with external incentives, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46:15, 3101-3118, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1750354; Lixi, L. (2019). The ambivalent drivers of migration governance relations between the EU and Tunisia. In Geddes, A., Espinoza, M. V., Abdou, L. H., & Brumat, L. (eds.), The Dynamics of Regional Migration Governance, pp. 91-108. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788119948.00011; Norman, K. P. (2020). Migration Diplomacy and Policy Liberalization in Morocco and Turkey. International Migration Review, 54:4, 1158–1183, https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918319895271; Triandafyllidou, A. (2020). Decentering the study of migration governance: a radical view. Geopolitics, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2020.1839052; Zanker, F. (2023). A typology of resistance: the ‘hot potato’ of European return in West Africa. Territory, Politics, Governance. https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2023.2198579
[4] Stutz, P. & Trauner, F. (2022). The EU’s “return rate” with third countries: Why EU readmission agreements do not make much difference. International Migration, 60, 154–172, https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12901; Zanker, F. (2019). Managing or restricting movement? Diverging approaches of African and European migration governance, Comparative Migration Research, 7:17 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0115-9; Deridder, M. & Pelckmans, L. (2020). West African engagements with the EU migration-development-security nexus, Anthropologie et développement, 51:2020. https://doi.org/10.4000/anthropodev.917; Gazzotti, L., Mouthaan, M., & Natter, K. (2022). Embracing complexity in ‘Southern’ migration governance, Territory, Politics & Governance, 11:4, https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2022.2039277; Vammen, I. M. V., Cold-Ravnkilde, S., & Lucht, H. (2022). Borderwork in the Expanded EU-African Borderlands, Geopolitics, 27:5, 1317-1330, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2022.2008734
[5] Adam, I., Trauner, F., Jegen, L., & Roos, C. (2020), West African interests in (EU) migration policy. Balancing domestic priorities with external incentives, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46:15, 3101-3118, https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2020.1750354; Arhin-Sam, K., Fakhry, A., & Rietig, V. (2021). Ghana as the EU’s Migration Partner: Actors, Interests, and Recommendations for European Policymakers. (DGAP Report, 7). Berlin: Forschungsinstitut der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik; Mouthaan, M. (2019). Unpacking domestic preferences in the policy-‘receiving’ state: the EU’s migration cooperation with Senegal and Ghana. Comparative Migration Studies, 7:35 https://doi.org/10.1186/s40878-019-0141-7
[6] Including a background report on Ghanaian migration governance: Kandilige, L., Teye, J., Talleraas, C. & Gopsill, A. (2023). National and International Migration Policy in Ghana. EFFEXT Background Paper, Bergen: Chr. Michelsen Institute. https://www.cmi.no/projects/2473-effext#publications
[7] GIZ (2022) Ghana. https://www.giz.de/en/worldwide/324.html; Walker, N. (2021). Government of Ghana and ICMPD sign Seat Agreement. Border Security Report. https://www.border-security-report.com/government-of-ghana-and-icmpd-sign-seat-agreement/