Bernd Parusel, Senior Researcher, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS)

The recently adopted reform of the Common European Asylum System marks the end of a laborious legislative process over several years, but also has also given renewed political impetus to actions in what is often called the “external dimension” of EU migration policy. This essay critically reviews how this dimension of the EU’s migration and asylum policy has evolved over recent years and what main activities and ideas it today comprises, such as deal-making with countries outside the union; initiatives to externalise asylum; proposals to replace asylum systems with resettlement programmes; and the use of conditionality and levers to persuade other countries to sign up to the EU’s migration policy objectives. It finds that these policy approaches, not least ideas to externalise asylum procedures, are unlikely to achieve their intended goals and risk damaging the global refugee protection framework as well as the EU’s reputation in neighbouring world regions.

The Migration and Asylum Pact: An end – but also a starting point

The ink had barely dried under the European Union’s “New Pact on Migration and Asylum”, which was signed into law by the Council of the EU on 14 May 2024, when ministers from 15 Member States sent a letter to the European Commission, on 16 May, requesting more action to prevent irregular migration to the EU. Among other demands, they asked for a “possibility to transfer those asylum applicants for whom a safe third country alternative is available to such countries”. [1]

The migration and asylum Pact, which had been proposed by the Commission in autumn 2020, is an intricate package of legal acts covering, and connecting, many areas of the EU’s common migration and asylum policy. It also introduces some innovations, such as a mandatory “screening” of asylum seekers arriving at the EU’s external borders; fast-track asylum and return procedures in closed centres; rules for border crossing and asylum processing in various “crisis” situations; and a new “solidarity mechanism” for responsibility-sharing between the EU member states.[2] The Pact has received criticism because it means a shift towards a tougher policy against people on the move. Whether it will act as a deterrent and – as many policymakers want – reduce the number of people arriving irregularly to apply for asylum, is unclear.

More external migration control, including ideas to shift the reception and processing of asylum seekers to countries outside the bloc, has also been in the cards for quite some time. While the Pact mainly reforms the EU’s internal systems, it also puts external action into law, with the new Asylum and Migration Management Regulation stating that to “strengthen cooperation with third countries on asylum and migration, including readmission and addressing the root causes and drivers of irregular migration and forced displacement, it is necessary to promote and build tailor-made and mutually beneficial partnerships with those countries”.[3] And even before the Pact was adopted, the EU launched new activities in what is usually called the “external dimension” of EU migration policy. These included cooperation and “cash for migration control” deals with countries of origin and transit outside the Union, involving large sums of money. The European Commission President stated that the Pact is not the end of reflection on the policy tools at the EU’s disposal and that the Commission would support “innovative strategies to prevent irregular migration by tackling asylum applications further from the EU external border”.[4]

This essay explores, in an introductory but also critical fashion, how the EU’s external migration policy has evolved over recent years, what activities it today comprises, and what may lay ahead. It also asks whether this policy is realistic, whether it is likely solve any problems, and what effects it may have. The author finds that recent external policy approaches, not least ideas to offshore or externalise asylum procedures, are unlikely to achieve their intended goals and risk damaging not only the global refugee protection framework but also the EU’s reputation in neighbouring world regions.

The piece starts with a short historical recapitulation of the external dimension of EU migration policy. It then discusses specific aspects of this policy, namely deal-making with third countries, initiatives to externalise asylum, replacing asylum systems with resettlement or admission programmes, and the use of conditionality in relations to other countries. It concludes by highlighting the possible negative consequences of these approaches.

The “external dimension” of EU migration policy: a brief recapitulation

That the migration and asylum policy of the EU has an external dimension is neither new or revolutionary as it goes without saying that refugee and migration flows to the EU are affected by the situation in people’s countries of origin and countries surrounding the EU. But at various times, often in times of increasing irregular migration and perceptions of migration crises, politicians have launched far-reaching proposals to stop or reduce the number of people who seek protection in the EU through measures outside the EU.

As early as 2005, the EU Heads of State and Government noted that migration issues had become increasingly important, and that the public was concerned about migration. The European Commission presented a “Global Approach to Migration” (GAM), which was further developed in 2007 and 2008 and eventually resulted in a framework for the EU’s cooperation with other countries. The GAM aimed to build “comprehensive partnerships with countries of origin and transit”, and the EU intended to strike a balance between three migration policy objectives: promoting mobility and legal migration; optimizing the migration-development nexus; and preventing and combating irregular immigration.

The Arab Spring and the migratory flows it triggered put external action back high on the EU’s agenda in 2011 and beyond. The EU started bilateral dialogues on migration, mobility and security with Tunisia and Morocco, and the GAM was revised to become the GAMM (with two m’s), the “Global Approach to Migration and Mobility”. This programme now had four priorities: to improve the organisation of legal migration and facilitate mobility; prevent and reduce irregular migration in an effective yet humane way; strengthen synergies between migration and development; and strengthen international protection systems and the external dimension of asylum law.[5]

Following the arrival of large numbers of asylum seekers in the EU in 2015-2016, the EU moved towards tougher measures. Controversial agreements were made with countries outside the Union. The probably most prominent one so far is an informal statement with Türkiye which aimed at preventing asylum seekers from countries such as Syria and Afghanistan from travelling via Türkiye to Greece and from there to the rest of the EU.[6] The EU also started supporting the coast guard in Libya to prevent migrants and refugees from crossing the Mediterranean towards Malta and Italy.[7] Significant sums of money were channelled through a new emergency fund to projects in African countries in an attempt to address the “root causes” of forced displacement and irregular migration and to combat people smugglers.[8] One of the main recipients of EU funds was Niger; a state in the interior of West Africa that had been identified as a major transit hub for irregular migration from sub-Saharan Africa to North Africa and Europe.[9]

EU leaders also often talked about the importance of opening legal pathways to Europe to create alternatives to irregular and dangerous travel, but targeted legal immigration projects mostly remained small-scale, stalled after a while or did not materialise at all. A possibility for non-EU nationals to apply for visas to travel safely to the EU and apply for asylum, instead having to use dangerous irregular routes, was never introduced although the European Parliament asked for such a system of “humanitarian visas”. The number of quota refugees, i.e. people selected for resettlement in countries of first refuge and transferred to the EU, increased for a while but then decreased again.[10]

Europe’s “doorkeepers” abroad

The EU’s agreement with Türkiye, is controversial in many ways. The cooperation contributed to people from Syria and Afghanistan, among other places, being prevented from moving on to Greece. Those who still managed to get there were often denied protection, but sending them back to Türkiye did not fully work in practice. The result was long stays of vulnerable people in substandard reception centres on Greek islands (like the notorious Moria camp on Lesvos) and asylum seekers trying to leave Greece for other EU countries through the Balkans. If one is to see anything positive about the Türkiye deal from a protection point of view, it is that the EU took over a number of Syrian refugees staying in Türkiye via resettlement, and that EU money helped organizations in Türkiye provide reception and integration services for refugees.

Despite the fact that the arrangement with Türkiye must be seen as questionable, the EU continued to work in the same direction, and this has recently been intensified. In June 2023, talks were held with Tunisia on an agreement on cooperation, financial support and migration management. In previous months, there had been an increase in irregular arrivals via Tunisia of persons seeking protection in the EU, which was of particular concern to the right-wing government in Italy. A Memorandum of Understanding on a “Strategic Partnership” was signed on 16 July 2023. It rests on five pillars: macroeconomic stability, economy and trade, green transition, people-to-people contacts (e.g., through cultural, scientific and technological training and exchange programs), and migration and mobility. On migration, the parties underlined an intention to develop a “holistic approach” to address the causes of irregular migration, including by promoting sustainable development in disadvantaged areas. A common priority is the fight against irregular migration and against smugglers.[11]

However, the Tunisian side did not seem entirely convinced, with the President stating that Tunisia did not intend to act as a border guard for the EU. In Europe, the agreement was heavily criticised by experts, human rights organisations and the European Parliament, partly because it was seen as supporting Tunisia’s increasingly autocratic government, which had taken extreme measures against refugees and migrants in the country, partly because it was seen as ineffective or counterproductive in terms of the intended effect of reducing dangerous journeys. The agreement had also been reached without parliamentary involvement and some governments in the EU felt left out. However, the European Commission stated that the agreement should be seen as a blueprint for similar deals with other countries in North Africa and the Middle East. Some of these (with Mauritania, Egypt and Lebanon) were negotiated and signed in the first half of 2024.

Offshoring asylum: an emerging trend?

The fact that the deal with Tunisia – at least initially – did not lead to a rapid reduction in the dangerous journeys of asylum seekers across the Mediterranean might be one reason why Italy quickly went ahead with a another – perhaps even more radical – idea: to send asylum seekers, which the Italian Coast Guard picks up in the Mediterranean, to Albania instead of taking them ashore in Italy. Rome and Tirana announced in early November 2023 that they had agreed on a deal that would allow Italy to use and operate two reception facilities on Albanian territory for at least five years. At any given time, up to 3,000 people would be able to stay there while their asylum applications were being examined. At the time of writing, this arrangement is the most tangible and concrete asylum outsourcing project that any EU country has concluded so far although it is not yet operational.

The Italy-Albania deal differs in important respects from other strategies in Europe, such as the United Kingdom’s agreement with Rwanda or similar plans that Denmark had discussed with a number of third countries. In the UK, the goal is a pure deportation policy – asylum seekers who cross the English Channel to the UK should simply be sent to Rwanda, and Rwanda should take care of their asylum procedures, reception, integration and everything else that follows. Italy’s deal, by contrast, is based on the idea that Italian authorities handle the entire procedure and that Italian law applies even if people are geographically on Albanian soil. In addition to managing the asylum process, Italy would provide necessary services inside these facilities. Albania would mainly ensure safety outside and around them. Even after the asylum examination is carried out, people shall be under Italy’s responsibility.

Whether extraterritorial solutions of this kind are legal under international law is questionable. The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom ruled in November 2023 that asylum seekers may not be sent to Rwanda because that would violate the asylum law principle of non-refoulement. The UK would not be able to guarantee that Rwanda would not send people seeking protection back to the countries from which they have fled and where they would face political persecution or other circumstances that would give them a right to protection elsewhere.

In the Italian case, experts’ objections relate to international maritime law and EU law, among other things. People rescued from distress at sea must normally be taken to the nearest place of safety. In most cases, given the geographical situation and the main Mediterranean migration routes, this would ports in Southern Italy and not places further up the coast of Albania. The current EU Asylum rules require Member States to process asylum requests on their territory, and this also applies under the reformed rules of the Migration and Asylum Pact even if the Pact opens up for more third countries to be designated as “safe” and for asylum procedures under a “fiction of non-entry”. Other arguments that have been put forward are that arbitrary or automatic detention of persons seeking protection is prohibited under international law and that the fundamental rights of asylum seekers cannot be upheld in locked reception centres outside EU territory.[12]

More generally, it can also be said that the various asylum offshoring proposals currently being discussed in Europe risk violating general principles of asylum law. An important one, often emphasized by the UN Refugee Agency UNHCR, is that cooperation between states on asylum seekers is acceptable – even desirable – when the goal and the result is enhanced protection for people on the move and responsibility-sharing. By contrast, avoiding and shifting responsibilities undermines the idea of international protection.[13]

Despite these tensions, and inspired by Italy or the UK, several EU governments have launched various types of outsourcing or offshoring ideas. In Germany, there is a discussion about possible “third-country solutions”. In Sweden, the government has been looking into the possibility of setting up “return hubs” in third countries for people who have had their asylum applications rejected but cannot be returned to their countries of origin. At present, however, offshoring proposals in Europe have not yet let to many concrete results, which is presumably due to legal and practical problems but also to the fact that non-EU countries (with Rwanda and Albania as possible exceptions at the time of writing) have not been interested in helping the EU with one-sided migration control measures.

Levers, incentives and conditionality

Although this may sound cynical, the question for the EU then becomes how to possibly motivate third countries to sign up to the EU’s migration policy goals. For some time now, there have been discussions about different types of means of pressure, or levers, to be put on other states so that they stop people who want to flee to the EU and take back asylum seekers and other migrants who are not allowed to stay in EU countries. These discussions include visa rules, aid and trade. For example, the EU can make it more difficult for people from countries that do not cooperate with the EU on migration to obtain visas, reduce or stop development aid, or threaten with trade restrictions. Diplomatic outreach to countries can be another tool, and it has been said that legal migration opportunities could be created for people that Europe wants, such as certain workers or students, in exchange for efforts in countries of origin and transit to prevent irregular migration.[14]

Measures of this kind have been discussed for a long time, but it is difficult to see that any significant progress has been made or will be made any time soon. Transit and origin countries are not a homogeneous group, which means that if pressure is to be exerted at all, the measures may need to be adapted to the specific circumstances of each individual country of origin and transit. Not all countries react in the same way to threats from the EU about visa restrictions, and in many parts of the world it is already very difficult for people to obtain EU visas. Making trade preferences or development aid conditional on the obedience of third countries to the EU’s migration policy objectives might work if a country is truly dependent on this, but if remittances sent home by refugees and migrants in the EU are a more important source of income, a reduction in official aid may not be the most powerful lever.

Some measures in the external dimension could also be completely ineffective, if not counterproductive, to the objective of reducing migration. If people are to have better living conditions in their countries of origin so that they do not feel they have to migrate, reducing aid or trade may not be the best way forward. Many third countries may also perceive the EU’s pressure strategies as one-sided, paternalistic or as expressions of neo-colonial attitudes. Third country governments generally have no interest in their citizens risking their lives on dangerous irregular journeys to Europe, but they tend to expect the EU to offer safe and legal alternatives, to treat their citizens humanely and fairly, to support their integration and to allow them to send money (so-called remittances) back to relatives in their home country – instead of taking them into detention and forcibly removing them. Unilateral pressure thus does not buy goodwill, at least not in the longer run, and there is an imbalance between the migration policy interests of many third countries on the one hand and those of the EU on the other. EU proposals that are perceived as unfair can lead to frustration and reluctance among third countries rather than to a willingness to cooperate, and this risks eroding the trust and sense of partnership that would be needed to create conditions that would help bringing the world closer to a responsible and human migration and asylum framework.

Resettlement quotas instead of asylum systems?

Time and again, politicians in Europe have also argued that the right of individuals to seek asylum on EU territory should be abolished and replaced with an – often unspecified – selection system, such as resettlement or a humanitarian admission programme. This would mean that European countries would choose which and how many refugees they receive, and from where, rather than having to deal with those who make their way to Europe on their own. Those who float this idea often also argue that externalisation would prevent risky irregular journeys, make it possible for European countries to focus on the most vulnerable individuals, and that societies in Europe might be more willing to offer refugees protection if they were able to choose the beneficiaries.[15]

Critics of the current asylum system have of course a point when they argue that the EU’s common asylum system has shortcomings and is hypocritical. Because of visa requirements, carrier sanctions, various types of deterrence strategies, physical barriers and pushbacks, it has become almost impossible for many people to reach the territory of the EU Member States in safe, legal and orderly ways to apply for asylum there. Many rely on smugglers, often risking their lives on dangerous journeys, and depending on where in Europe they arrive, they face huge variations in protection prospects, types of asylum procedures and reception conditions.[16] But while resettlement and similar humanitarian admission schemes are well-established and important elements of refugee protection worldwide, including in Europe, they are fundamentally different from territorial asylum systems based on the Refugee Convention, and it is difficult to imagine that one system could make the other redundant.

Firstly, from a political perspective, there are few indications to suggest that resettling more refugees means there will be fewer asylum seekers or that the political appetite for resettlement would grow when the number of asylum seekers decreases. After the migration ‘crisis’ of 2015–16, the number of new asylum seekers in Europe decreased drastically, not least because of harsher deterrence measures at the EU’s external borders, migration deals with neighbouring countries and, perhaps, more hostile policies within Member States. But this did not lead to more refugees being accepted in Europa via resettlement – at least not in the longer run. Even if some EU countries increased their quotas, often temporarily, the number of resettled refugees they have been accepting still falls far short of the number of people who request asylum within Europe or at the EU’s external borders and are granted protection. In 2023 for example, almost 410,000 asylum seekers were granted a protection status in the EU, while only around 14,000 people were taken in under resettlement.[17] Refugees cannot count on being resettled as governments are free to step up and scale down resettlement programmes as they please and their choices seldom correlate with the evolution of the need for resettlement.

Secondly, the idea that public support for refugees would increase if national governments could select which individuals, and how many, they want to accept is presumptuous. European countries cannot claim to know which are the most serious refugee situations in the world let alone which individuals have the greatest need to be offered a safe haven in Europe. Also, some conflict areas with acute refugee crises can be too dangerous for European officials to access in order to carry out their resettlement selections, and it is highly uncertain that they would find those individuals who face the most serious threats. Furthermore, asylum is not only for people fleeing from armed conflicts or other situations that are visible and reported on in the media; refugee protection is primarily intended for individuals facing political persecution, and where and how this happens is often hidden from our eyes.

Politicians also sometimes complain that most asylum seekers who arrive in Europe are men and that we need a new system that focuses on women, children and other vulnerable groups. However, the unbalanced gender distribution among asylum seekers in Europe is not a result of the Refugee Convention but of attempts to evade it by deterring asylum seekers and making Europe inaccessible. If available pathways were safer or if there were opportunities to apply for protection or humanitarian visas from abroad, the proportion of women, children or elderly people would almost certainly increase, and if EU policymakers were serious about the gender balance, they would offer wider possibilities for family reunification in the EU. Resettlement is an important tool in this sense as well, precisely because it is serves as a complementary pathway where receiving countries for example can accept entire families – but we cannot base the entire protection system on which individuals are pitied most by EU governments.

Thirdly, it is not clear why abandoning the right to asylum in Europe would stop irregular crossings and deaths at sea. Europe struggles to return rejected asylum applicants to their countries of origin. This means that even if people who arrive on irregular routes would have no right to apply for, or receive, asylum, European countries might still not be able to remove them. As long as there is still a chance, however small, to remain in Europe, with or without access to a legal status, some people might still risk their lives to get there.

These considerations show that much of the discussion about externalisation in the EU today is suffering from misconceptions and unfounded assumptions.

Negative consequences all around

A final question to be asked is why various measures, often quite crude and radical ones, have recently be booming in the EU again despite warnings from researchers and experts about potential risks. It is likely the result of two factors: first; after the Covid-19 pandemic, the EU has once again experienced an increased number of arrivals of asylum seekers, and this trend has coincided with capacity problems in reception systems in several EU member states and tougher economic conditions. This raises fears of new “migration crises”, fears that in many parts of Europe are amplified and exploited by populist forces that present seemingly simple solutions to complicated problems. Second; there seems to be a growing realisation that the implementation of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum will take time and might in the end not reduce the number of people fleeing to Europe as much as some policymakers want. Those in the EU who want fewer asylum seekers are therefore looking beyond the Pact and push for measures to stop migration before people on the move reach the EU’s borders.

It is important to note that cooperation between the EU and non-EU countries must not be bad. It can be beneficial if done the right way; for example, if it leads to fewer people having to flee; if safe and legal pathways to protection are opened so that people do not have to risk their lives on irregular journeys; and if the result of bilateral and multilateral cooperation is a sharing of responsibilities that strengthens protection. However, the EU’s strategy today is not primarily about that, but rather about trying to lower the number of incoming asylum seekers at almost any cost and as quickly as possible.

Considering that most people displaced worldwide are in the Global South, often in the vicinity of countries suffering from conflict or war, it is unfair if Europe tries to place more responsibilities on communities and regions already struggling with severe crises and major refugee situations. Many countries and governments in these regions are aware of this unfairness, so if the EU continues on this path, there a risk that it will end up with only autocracies and dubious regimes left to work with. If it becomes dependent on them, which it already is to a high degree, such regimes can gain power over European politics by threatening with migratory flows.

In sum, the current orientation of the EU’s external migration policies is to a large degree built on wishful thinking and questionable assumptions. There is also a high risk that it undermines the global protection system and damages the EU’s reputation and influence in the world.

Footnotes

[1] Nikolaj Nielsen: “15 EU states want ‘outside the box’ ideas to curtail migrant arrivals”, EU Observer, 16 May 2024.

[2] For analyses of the various policies covered by the pact, see Odysseus Network (2024): “EU Asylum and Migration Legislation after the Pact”. EU Migration Law Blog, Special Collection. https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/special-collection-on-the-eu-asylum-and-migration-legislation-after-the-pact/.

[3] Recital 5, Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 May 2024 on asylum and migration management, amending Regulations (EU) 2021/1147 and (EU) 2021/1060 and repealing Regulation (EU) No 604/2013, OJ L, 2024/1351, 22 May 2024. See also Article 5 on “External components of the comprehensive approach”.

[4] Letter by Ursula von der Leyen to EU heads of state or government, European Commission, 25 June 2024.

[5] European Commission (2011): A Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, COM (2011) 743 final, 18 November 2011.

[6] Kyilah Terry (2021): The EU-Turkey Deal, Five Years On: A Frayed and Controversial but Enduring Blueprint. Feature, Migration Policy Institute, 8 April 2021.

[7] Zakariya El Zaidy (2019): EU migration policy towards Libya. A policy of conflicting interests. Policy Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung; Eugenio Cusumano / Marianne Riddervold (2023): “Failing through: European migration governance across the central Mediterranean”. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 49 (12), 3024-3042.

[8] David Kipp (2018): From Exception to Rule – the EU Trust Fund for Africa. SWP Research Paper 13, German Institute for International and Security Affairs.

[9] Tessa Coggio (2021): Europe’s Tackling of ‘Root Causes’ of African Migration Has a Mixed Record. Feature, Migration Policy Institute, 6 May 2021.

[10] Bernd Parusel (2021): “Why resettlement quotas cannot replace asylum systems”. Forced Migration Review 68, 10-12.

[11] Annick Pijnenburg (2023): ”Team Europe’s Deal. What’s Wrong with the EU-Tunisia Migration Agreement?” Verfassungsblog, 21 August 2023; Catherine Woollard (2023): “Editorial: The EU’s Dodgy Deal with Tunisia is a Classic of the Genre: Undemocratic, Unlawful and Unlikely to Work”. ECRE News, 26 July 2023.

[12] Lorenzo Piccoli (2023): ”Offshoring Asylum the Italian Way”. Verfassungsblog, 14 November 2023.

[13] UNHCR (2023): “Transfer arrangements of asylum seekers and refugees must respect international refugee law”. Press release, 7 November 2023.

[14] Viktoria Rietig and Marie Walter-Franke (2023): Conditionality in Migration Cooperation, Five Ideas for Future Use Beyond Carrots, Sticks, and Delusions. German Council on Foreign Relations, DGAP Report 6.

[15] Bernd Parusel (2021): “Why resettlement quotas cannot replace asylum systems”. Forced Migration Review 68, 10-12.

[16] Bernd Parusel and Jan Schneider (2017): Reforming the Common European Asylum System – Responsibility-sharing and the harmonisation of asylum outcomes. Stockholm: Swedish Migration Studies Delegation, Delmi Report 2017:9.

[17] Eurostat (2024): “Asylum decisions, annual statistics”. Statistics explained, 5 June 2024.