Zeynep Şahin-Mencütek, Senior Researcher, Bonn International Centre for Conflict Studies

The EU’s strong push for cooperation with third countries to facilitate the return of ‘irregularized’ migrants has some effects on transit countries, leading to an increased emphasis on coerced returns from there to origin countries. This influence operates in at least three ways. First, the financial support provided by the EU for border management is also used by these countries for pushbacks and entry restrictions at their land borders. Second, these countries are gradually working to establish their own assisted return mechanisms. Third, the countries targeted by the EU’s external policies may not necessarily feel compelled to legitimize the coercive returns, as they face significant domestic pressure and have become transit-turned-immigration countries. They are also aware of the deliberate silence and disengagement of the international community when it comes to excessive techniques used for migration control. All of these factors contribute to making migrants more vulnerable to worsening conditions during their journeys, a series of human rights violations, and the choice of riskier migration routes, making them more “deportable” from various moving and waiting sites. Two target countries of the EU’s external policies, namely Tunisia and Turkey, are exemplars to explore in this context, particularly with observations of coercive returns of Afghans from Turkey and Sub-Saharans from Tunisia.

Introduction

As the EU and its Member States realized the inadequacy of the existing institutions and processes to stop migrants from reaching the EU’s shores; unfortunately, exceptional and restrictive border policies became widespread and normalized despite raising serious concerns about human rights and international law. The policies range from border surveillance, accelerated asylum procedures in border areas, deportation and pushbacks, to the accommodation in a Third Country after or before arrival at the border of the destination country (e.g. Italy-Albania deal 2023) and direct return of rejected asylum seekers after accelerated procedures to transit countries (EU-Turkey deal 2016).[1]

One important part of externalizing asylum is the interception of migrants before they reach Europe. Many of these migrants can be identified as “‘irregularized humanitarian migrants’, who left their country of citizenship in hopes of finding protection abroad but do not, or no longer, hold a permanent legal status”.[2] If intercepted on borders or during staying without a legal status, they are under risk of coercion to return somewhere. In general terms, return refers to “everything to do with people ‘going back where they came from’ – departing a country they have migrated to and returning to a country they migrated from, which may or may not be their home country/country of origin.”[3]  The returns that most matters for the EU member states are the returns of rejected asylum seekers and ‘irregular’ migrants. However, the implementation of actual returns is a challenging policy endeavour because it requires the cooperation of the migrants and the country to which the person will be returned, as well as compliance with human rights. But, coercion is not rare in actual returns implementation.

To reflect on coercion in return practices and to challenge the voluntary-forced return dichotomy, Anna Triandafyllidou and I propose a typology of return forms that will help disentangle how returns are implemented.[4] We define three mechanisms of return governance: pushing, imposing, and incentivising. All three mechanisms involve formal and informal policy instruments and practices (see Table 1 below); what differentiates them is the level of coercion and how informality is strategically deployed to achieve the desired outcome. In our categorization, pushing returns refers to enforcing returns of refugees and migrants “back over a border – generally immediately after they crossed it – without consideration of their circumstances and without any possibility to apply for asylum or to put forward arguments against the measures taken” (ECCHR 2020). Imposing returns means officially enforcing an order to leave that has to be obeyed by the ‘irregular’ migrants or refused asylum seekers. In contrast, their stay in the country of asylum or transit is deemed ‘illegal’. Migrants may be coerced to return or persuaded even if unwilling to do so. Imposing returns may occur through formal readmission or expulsion of a given migrant and their family. However, imposing return may also involve a mass voluntary repatriation of people who lack protected status and are deemed irregular migrants. Incentivising returns refers to persuading refused asylum seekers or migrants without regularised status to ‘voluntarily’ return by offering some financial assistance. Some practices, such as dehumanizing migrants by restricting their access to fundamental rights or by closing camps, are used both for imposing and incentivising returns. Hence, there might be some overlaps and blurriness among mechanisms.

Table 1: Types of Return Governance and related formal and informal practices[5]

Not only coercion but also cooperation and coordination are inherent features of return policies. The EU and its member states engage in various policy experiments as ‘third country solutions’. Along with these, tailor-made technical cooperation agreements, known as migration deals (e.g., the EU-Turkey statement in March 2016), are among the EU’s policy instruments, further extending externalization limits.

As Laube notes, “the externalization of border controls has several side effects.” [6] First,  it opens up a new space for migration diplomacy for countries identified as transit states. Transit countries are situated along migration routes, such as Turkey, Libya, Tunisia, and Morocco; these countries are also destinations for migrants. Their respective governments are involved in the issue of mobility regulation as a foreign policy tool and develop blackmailing and backscratching practices regarding policies on admission, onward migration, and return of migrants, including those who are in need of protection, like Syrian refugees.[7] Second, overemphasis on and considerable funding for return and reintegration by the destination countries of Europe and implementing agencies contribute to the emergence of the sector of reintegration in origin countries, as observed in Kosovo[8]  and Iraq[9]. Third, externalization also has a significant impact on the development of migration and asylum policies at the national level. However, these policies may not meet protection standards and are therefore not always responsible for assessing and granting protection, but rather prioritize providing temporary accommodation and the rush for immature repatriation.[10] It should also be noted these same countries are origin countries for refugees and migrants, thence their policies and stability have some consequences for migration to Europe.

Countries near Europe are facing challenges with unauthorized migration, particularly from individuals with varying motivations, often falling under the category of ‘irregularized humanitarian migrants and transit migrants. In cases of hosting prolonged refugee situations (e.g., Turkey and Lebanon), there is frustration with the lack of international efforts to facilitate resettlement in third countries. Despite this, these countries do not intend to accommodate migrants or provide them with the necessary protection permanently. A growing negative public and institutional attitudes and hostility towards these arrivals, while migrants are staying longer is observable. As a result, immigration has become increasingly politicized in the domestic and international affairs of these countries. Moreover, many Afghans in Turkey and Sub-Saharan Africans in Tunisia, Morocco, and Libya are stuck in these countries as transit migrants, because they are unable to move on to Europe due to increasing border controls and related pushbacks despite several attempts.

The recent trend under the pressure of a high number of arrivals, strict border controls of the EU and a quest for cooperation over coerced returns, the same countries develop their own externalization, deterrence, and control techniques including ‘coercive returns’ (pushbacks and deportations, large scale arrest operations as well as irregularization and criminalization).  Their policies can be identified as a spillover of EU’s externalization or side effects. Regarding returns, the phenomenon can be also called chain coercive return governance.

It can be hypothesized that  the direct and indirect impact of externalization on transit countries’ adoption of coerced returns (pushing, imposing, and incentivising returns) emerges through (at least three) mechanisms.

1) The EU’s externalization provides target transit countries with substantial financial support under the guise of integrated border management to tackle irregular migration and fortify the institutional capacity of national border agencies. However, the same border control infrastructure used for pullbacks or restricting exits to European shores is also employed for pushbacks and entry restrictions on these countries’ land borders.

2) These countries gradually seek to establish their own assisted return mechanisms in addition to IOM programming. Some funding and program testing have already taken place in this regard. However, national assisted return mechanisms seem to be more easily manipulated due to a lack of adequate monitoring or standards.[11]

3) The countries targeted by the EU’s externalization may not necessarily feel compelled to legitimize the imposed returns, as they are facing significant pressure and are becoming permanent transit points. EU or human rights groups’ criticism of these actions is not taken seriously due to the already degraded EU responsibility, which has shifted to these countries. Also, the EU often prefers silence or disengagement as a strategy; it “opts for non-engagement with actual situations of contested returns so as to maintain partnerships for externalisation.”[12]

It is possible to bring pieces of some evidence to confirm these hypotheses from two target countries of externalization, namely Tunisia and Turkey. Traditionally, as emigrant countries, both are also countries of transit and destination. They are the last stops of the main migratory routes to the EU, The Central Mediterranean and Eastern Mediterranean routes, making them the main target of externalization of asylum. In the last few years, there are also mentions of coercive returns of Afghans from Turkey and Sub-Saharans from Tunisia.

Returns from Turkey to Afghanistan

The EU-Turkey Statement of 2016 is a prominent example of the testing new instruments in the EU’s externalization of asylum, allowing for the immediate return of migrants arriving on Greek islands from Turkey. Turkey is designated as a ‘safe third country,’ but this designation is controversial due to Turkey’s geographical limitation to the 1951 Geneva Convention, reported violations of the non-refoulement principle, and human rights issues. The 2016 deal increased border restrictions and discouraged some migrants from using the Turkey-Greece route. However, the side effects of the EU’s externalization are evident in several areas. Firstly, it increased Turkey’s negotiating power with the EU over migration issues and served as a blueprint for a similar arrangement. “The release of the March 2016 EU–Turkey Statement (European Council 2016) moved Turkey’s cooperation with the EU on border controls closer to the centre of bilateral affairs.”[13]

The EU provided Turkey with financial and technical incentives to strengthen its law enforcement staff and to reinforce border surveillance. This support was aimed at improving the integrated border management system on both land and sea border points to manage arrivals and exits more restrictively. Turkey constructed a wall on its Iranian border in 2018-2019. The wall was extended along the southern and eastern borders, and in 2021, trenches and wire fences were added.[14] Increasing arrivals through the Iranian border has led to restrictive measures, including pushbacks on this border. Some rights-based groups and researchers, including Human Rights Watch notes that  Turkey is routinely pushing tens of thousands of Afghans back at its land border with Iran.[15]

Besides the rise in pushbacks, since the summer of 2018, Turkey has also been increasingly focusing on imposing returns on ‘irregularized’ migrants, and arbitrary detention and deportation practices targeting mainly single Afghan men, with little or no examination of their claims for international protection. In 2022, Turkey’s migration agency’s statistics show that Afghans were the highest number of people apprehended for irregular migration, with 115,775 Afghan nationals out of a total of 285,027 apprehended individuals. The number of apprehended Afghans was 68,687 in 2023, keeping them always the highest on the list.[16] Hence, the deportation of Afghans is of importance to Turkish authorities. There has not yet been a readmission agreement between Turkey and Afghanistan; however, a large number of imposed returns happened from Turkey to Afghanistan, even under the Taliban regime.  According to the official statement by Turkey’s migration agency, Turkey has deported 109,816 irregular migrants in 2022. Turkish officials are proud of this rate as they expressed this in terms of a “record” and compared it with EU’s countries’ performances by noting that “while EU country’s deportation rate is around 10 per cent… Our rate is around 70 per cent”.[17] The majority of the deported irregular migrants from Turkey are Afghans, according to the media accounts. In 2023, 10,260 Afghan migrants were returned to Afghanistan by 20 charter airlines operating from various provinces in Turkey.[18]

Regarding incentivising returns, it can be noted that the Turkish branch of the IOM used to provide assisted voluntary return and reintegration (AVRR) programs to Afghans who requested ‘voluntary return’ after being apprehended trying to exit illegally to Greece. Previously, some 2,344 Afghans benefited from this program.[19]  However, based on interviews with policymakers, the IOM programme was described as “smaller in scale than Türkiye’s needs, slow, and expensive in light of the large number of irregular migrants.”[20] In response, Turkey’s migration agency established a National Assisted Voluntary Return Mechanism (NAVR).[21] The International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), which is a European intergovernmental organization with observer status at the UN, provides technical and funding support. With the assistance of the ICMPD, Turkey and Afghanistan have prepared a readmission agreement but not yet signed. Additionally, the NAVR scheme was tested with the ‘voluntary’ return of 41 Afghans in April 2021 and it continues as of mid-2024. Technical infrastructure replicating European models was established to process return applications by Turkish authorities. The next planned step is to train return counselors, similar to those in EU countries. Meanwhile, deportations from Turkey to Afghanistan continues in large numbers.

Returns from Tunisia

Tunisia serves as a transit country for Sub-Saharan migrants who arrive after crossing through Libya and Algeria and aim to access Italy. Additionally, Tunisia has become a destination country of migrants in relation to the liberal visa requirements for nationals of many Sub-Saharan countries. [22]

In the last years, Tunisia has been expected to play a huge role in stopping migration towards the EU. Meanwhile, Tunisia develops its “national strategy to counter irregular immigration, based on coordination with others – including EU nations and international organization”. [23] In practice, the Tunisian authorities engage in several border control measures to prevent exits. Tunisian authorities have reported “foiling 1,786 irregular maritime border crossing operations and intercepting 47,030 migrants between January 1 and October 31, 2023. Among these migrants, 11,681 were Tunisians, 44,673 were Sub-Saharan migrants, 654 were Syrians, and 811 were Sudanese.”[24] “According to the National Guard, from the beginning of the year (2024) until the end of April, over 21,000 sub-Saharan migrants were stopped from entering the country.”[25] Not only is Tunisia preventing migrants from departing for Europe, it is also trying to stop them from accessing its territory. The Tunisian authorities pushed back Sub-Saharan migrants into the desert border areas while attempting to enter the country:[26] It is noted that

“According to testimonies collected by the NGO, at least a hundred candidates for emigration including children and perhaps asylum seekers were mass expelled to Libyan and Algerian land borders in September 2023. They were left without water or food in harsh climatic conditions that many NGOs described as constituting a real torture. As a result, at least 27 migrants were found dead.”[27]

Besides border controls and pushbacks for halting exits and entries, Tunisia also aims to impose return of transit migrants into their origin countries or elsewhere according to Tunisian media sources. The initial step for return imposition is the criminalization and detention of ‘irregular migrants’. Examples of criminalization and scapegoating via political rhetoric are not rare in Tunisia. For example, President Kais Saied claimed that “hordes” of undocumented migrants were causing crime and posing a demographic threat to the predominantly Arab North African country.[28] Hundreds of migrants lost their jobs and housing following his remarks.[29]  Legal and judicial infrastructure for the criminalization of immigrants is ready, because “with regard to Tunisian law, in particular Law No. 68-7 of March 8, 1968 relating to the condition of Foreigners in Tunisia, migrants who were rescued at sea, intercepted at maritime or land borders and also migrants intercepted inside the Tunisian territory are in an irregular situation” and subject to expulsion.[30] For example in May 2024, “the Sousse court sentenced 50 irregular migrants from various countries in sub-Saharan Africa to eight months in prison for “illegal crossing of borders and illegal stays in the [national] territory”.[31] Due to the limited number of detention centers in Tunisia, only a small percentage of foreigners who are illegally staying in the country are placed under movement restrictions and detained in these centers. However, no category of foreigners in an irregular situation is exempt from detention. The maximum detention period for illegal residents is not fixed. They are detained until they can afford the financial resources to pay the penalty for illegal overstay as well as their return flight. Some may be offered a voluntary return facilitated by the IOM or their embassies.

The second step for imposed returns is to coordinate with origin countries which would accept returns. To this end, Tunisia  looks to sign several agreements with other African countries to be able to send ‘irregular’ migrants back.[32] Secretary of State to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Mounir Ben Rjiba, said that “the number of requests for voluntary repatriation is steadily increasing. Expulsions are increasing as are operations to counter attempts at irregular migration.”[33] Since 2023, Tunisian authorities have also looked for new incentives for convincing migrants to ‘voluntarily return’, such as “exempting from payment of fines for exceeding the authorized duration of stay in the context of a voluntary return and to facilitate voluntary departure operations for those who wish it within the framework of an organization and in prior coordination with the embassies and diplomatic missions of African countries in Tunisia.”[34]

Conclusion

Despite being presented by the EU and international actors as a humanitarian and voluntary response to assist rejected asylum seekers or stranded migrants by repatriating them to their home countries, in reality, they veil and depoliticize EU return governance.[35] While collective expulsions are prohibited under international law, deporting migrants, refugees, and asylum seekers without an individual and objective exam of their situations may expose them to human rights violations.

Besides, the externalization of asylum influences transit countries’ return policies in several ways. The EU provides substantial financial support to transit countries for integrated border management aimed at irregular migrants. However, this support is also used for pushbacks and entry restrictions. The targeted countries are developing their own assisted return mechanisms, blurring the line between voluntary and forced returns due to a lack of monitoring. The human rights groups’ criticism of these actions is often disregarded, and the EU frequently opts for silence or disengagement to maintain partnerships for externalization. It is not an exaggeration to claim that the EU’s obsession with returning migrants spills over to closer geographies, but it has the potential to worsen the conditions of people migrating by using irregular means. What is more, these policies may not necessarily deter these people, as their aspirations and hope for a dignified life persist.

Footnotes

[1] https://externalizingasylum.info/de/drittstaatenloesung-weg-vom-prinzip-hoffnung-hin-zur-huckepack-strategie/

[2] Marieke van Houte, Zeynep Kaşlı, Arjen Leerkes, 2023. Introduction: Irregularized Humanitarian Migrants—Policies, Rationales, and the Search for More Durable Solutions, Journal of Refugee Studies, 36 (3): 315–336.

[3] https://www.returnmigration.eu/gapsblog/mind-the-gap.

[4] See Triandafyllidou, A., & Mencutek, Z.S. 2024 Messy Governance of Return Migration: Formal Policies, Informal Practices and Migrants’ Navigation.”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2024.2371209.

[5] See Triandafyllidou, A., & Mencutek, Z.S. 2024 forthcoming. “Messy Governance of Return Migration: Formal Policies, Informal Practices and Migrants’ Navigation.”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, DOI: 10.1080/1369183X.2024.2371209

[6] Laube, L. (2021). Diplomatic Side-Effects of the EU’s Externalization of Border Control and the Emerging Role of “Transit States” in Migration Diplomacy. Historical Social Research, 46(3), 78-105. https://doi.org/10.12759/ hsr.46.2021.3.78-105

[7] Şahin-Mencütek, Z., & Tsourapas, G. (2023). When Do States Repatriate Refugees? Evidence from the Middle East. Journal of Global Security Studies, 8(1), ogac031.

[8] Vollmer, R., & Sahin-Mencutek, Z. (2023). Experimentation and Extraction in Reintegration Governance: the case of Kosovo. sozialpolitik. ch, (2/2023), 2-2.

[9] Mielke, K. (2023). Finding one’s place in chaos: returnees’ reintegration experiences in Northern Iraq. BICC Working Paper.

[10] Şahin-Mencütek, Z., Gökalp-Aras, N. E., Kaya, A., & Rottmann, S. B. (2023). Syrian refugees in Turkey: Between reception and integration (p. 160). Springer Nature.

[11] Mencutek, Z. S. (2022). The Institutionalization of “Voluntary” Returns in Turkey. Migration and Society, 5(1), 43-58.

[12] Fakhoury, T., & Stel, N. (2023). EU engagement with contested refugee returns in Lebanon: The aftermath of resilience. Geopolitics, 28(3), 1007-1032, p. 1007.

[13]https://library.oapen.org/viewer/web/viewer.html?file=/bitstream/handle/20.500.12657/54473/9780367149659_10.4324_9780429054136-30.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. p. 503.

[14] https://asylumineurope.org/reports/country/turkiye/asylum-procedure/access-procedure-and-registration/access-territory-and-push-backs/

[15] https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/11/18/turkey-pushes-afghans-back-iran-border.

[16] https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-istatistikler

[17] https://www.goc.gov.tr/11-ayda-yaklasik-110-bin-duzensiz-gocmen-sinir-disi-edildi

[18] Göç İdaresi Başkanlığı (2023) ‘Düzensiz göçle mücadelemiz ve sınır dışı işlerimiz sürüyor’ available at X (twitter) : https://twitter.com/Gocidaresi/status/1646144658907582469

[19] EC 2020. Brussels, SWD(2020) 355, Türkiye 2020 report. 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/Türkiye_report_2020.pdf. Accessed 10.02.202

[20] Mencutek, Z. S. (2022). The Institutionalization of “Voluntary” Returns in Turkey. Migration and Society, 5(1), 43-58.

[21] EC. 2020. Brussels, SWD(2020) 355, Türkiye 2020 report. Accessed January 10, 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/Türkiye_report_2020.pdf.

[22] For more information on Tunisia’s migration policies see https://www.mignex.org/sites/default/files/2023-02/mbp-d053-migration-relevant-policies-in-tunisia-v2-2023-02-22.pdf

[23] https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/57187/tunisia-to-sign-accords-with-african-nations-for-repatriation-of-migrants.

[24] https://www.returnmigration.eu/gapsblog/migration-in-tunisia-status-quo-and-the-legal-point-of-view.

[25] https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/57187/tunisia-to-sign-accords-with-african-nations-for-repatriation-of-migrants.

[26] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/eu-migrant-north-africa-mediterranean/.

[27] https://www.returnmigration.eu/gapsblog/migration-in-tunisia-status-quo-and-the-legal-point-of-view

[28] https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20230222-tunisian-president-says-influx-of-sub-sahara-african-migrants-must-end.

[29] Ibid.

[30] https://www.returnmigration.eu/gapsblog/migration-in-tunisia-status-quo-and-the-legal-point-of-view

[31] https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/57187/tunisia-to-sign-accords-with-african-nations-for-repatriation-of-migrants.

[32] Ibid.

[33] Ibid.

[34] Tunisia: Ivory Coast, Guinea repatriate citizens amid migrant crackdown, https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/47193/tunisia-ivory-coast-guinea-repatriate-citizens-amid-migrant-crackdown

[35] Savio Vammen, I. M., Cold-Ravnkilde, S., & Lucht, H. (2021). Borderwork in the Expanded EU-African Borderlands. Geopolitics, 27(5), 1317–1330.