Ngozi L. Uzomah, Researcher at the Population, Environment and Development Research Group, University of Nigeria ^*

The EU’s externalization policy on border management and migration control in Africa is increasingly relying on technology. This paper explores the impact of various technological interventions, including the Migration Information Data Analysis System in Nigeria, risk analysis cells in Niger, and biometric registration of migrants in Mauritania on people’s movement. The study finds that these measures infringe upon migrants’ rights and disrupt their mobility patterns. Specifically, the biometric registration in Mauritania hinders the northward movement of primarily young male migrants who are mainly from Senegal, Gambia, Nigeria, Guinea Conakry and Mali. Data collected from them are shared on EU digital platforms among IOM, Europol and FRONTEX which could potentially be used to facilitate their deportation as they approach Europe’s borders. By emphasizing the significance of this research on population geography, the paper argues that EU-funded technological projects for border management infringe on the historical cross-border mobility in North and West Africa, which is vital for socioeconomic exchanges and escaping conflict. These restrictive practices reflect the hegemonic relationship between Europe and Africa that reinforces colonial-era violence at Africa’s borders.

Introduction

The EU’s externalization policy aims to reduce Europe-bound migration by providing development funds to African countries for enforcing strict border controls[1] within their territories. While these funds benefit governments, they can harm ordinary people migrating for socioeconomic and political reasons. The EU’s ability to regulate migration in Africa has improved over the past decade due to advanced technology that enables seamless biometric data collection.[2]

Currently, the EU is deploying technologies like the Migration Information Data Analysis System (MIDAS) in Nigeria and biometric exercises in Mauritania, which impact mobility across Africa. Data from these projects is shared among IOM, Europol, and FRONTEX, raising concerns about using it to criminalize migration.[3] The use of these technologies as externalization policy reinforces violence at Africa’s border space.

This article explores how these technological projects affect cross-border mobility, infringe on migrants’ rights, and influence northward movements. It moves beyond the binary view of Europe-bound versus intra-African migration, linking migrant experiences to technological border management along migration routes.

The research is structured into six sections: the introduction, framing of the EU externalization policy, a conceptual framework related to Fanon’s postcolonialism, materials and methods, results and discussion, and a conclusion summarizing the findings.

Framing of EU Externalization Policy

In response to the 2015 migration crisis, the EU merged its development policy with the EU/Sahel strategy, initially aimed at combating insecurity in the Sahel region of Africa.[4] This externalization shifts the EU’s migration problem to Africa, presenting it as a technocratic challenge that requires expertise and developmental aid. The EU’s externalization policy emphasizes capacity building which entices African governments to cooperate in exchange for institutional support. Following, the 2015 Valetta summit led to the establishment of the EU Trust Fund (EUTF) to strengthen border management in Africa, thereby blending stability promotion with addressing root causes of migration. However, the use of EUTF to fund unaccountable technological projects have been linked to discrimination and bias.[5]

Despite historical patterns of cross-border mobility in Africa, the EU’s externalization policy focuses on restrictive border management that prioritizes European migration containment goals over the interest of African countries.[6] This neocolonial framework leads to conflicts between European and African migration policies[7] which reinforces colonial-era injustices at Africa’s border space.

Conceptual Framework

This research conceptualizes the EU’s externalization policy as a modern extension of colonial instruments used to control the mobility of colonial subjects. The borders of the countries understudy are remnants of European empires, and their current migration patterns reflect colonial and postcolonial realities. Drawing from Fanon’s theory, which views colonization as inherently violent[8], this framework links externalization to a power imbalance that perpetuates colonial systems, making Africa’s borders restrictive and violent.

Frowd[9] argues that EU migration control projects rely on technology and data sharing, pressuring African governments to participate through undemocratic means like threats of visa denials and withholding development aid. This reflects a colonial framework of domination countries.[10] The EU uses technology to enhance border surveillance, often compromising human rights and local ways of life in Africa.[11] This dynamic mirrors colonial power imbalances, perpetuating restrictive border practices that echo historical violence. While framed as partnerships, these projects obscure the unequal power relations, allowing the EU to reinforce dominance over African partners while avoiding accountability for past injustices.[12] Ironically, African governments leverage migration threats to extract development aid, with senior officials implementing EU externalization projects that contribute to violence at internal Africa’s borders.[13]

Materials and Methods

This research focused on two major migration routes between North and West Africa: from the Nigerian border town of Jibia to Zinder and Agadez in Niger connecting the Central Mediterranean migration route and from Nouakchott through Nouadhibou in Mauritania to Dakhla in Western Sahara (Morocco) on the Atlantic migration route. Data collection occurred over 52 days, from August 29 to October 20, 2022, with varying durations spent at each location. A qualitative approach using semi-structured interviews was employed, targeting 60 migrants (30 from each route) aged 18 and above, along with 18 residents, motorists, traders, public servants, academics and members of the media and CSOs. Additionally, 52 instant interactions were conducted with porters, shopkeepers, smugglers, migrants, motorists, border officials, and cross-border traders from Libya, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Mauritania, Syria, Chad, Yemen, Morocco, and Western Sahara. Non-participatory observation was used to understand border processes without influencing behavior. Ethical challenges included ensuring informed consent and anonymizing participants. After transcribing interviews, Delve software was used for qualitative analysis, employing inductive coding to identify recurring themes. The researcher’s experience as a cross-border trader informed the study, highlighting the impacts of border management technologies in the region.

Results and Discussion

Migrant Data Collection and Risk Analysis

Historically, the region of Damergu linked markets from Tripoli to Lagos, facilitating trade across the Sahara.[14] In the 1900s, migration was influenced by forced labor and conflicts, prompting many Nigeriens to seek opportunities in Nigeria. Post-colonial migrations have continued, but current limited legal pathways push Nigerian migrants towards dangerous routes to Europe, often through organized networks through the country’s porous borders like the one in Jibia.

At the Jibia border between northwestern Nigeria and south-central Niger, the MIDAS border management information system processes travelers’ passports, purportedly to enhance their safety in a region marked by insecurity, including kidnapping, terrorism, and banditry.[15] MIDAS collects, stores, processes, and analyzes travelers’ biometric and biographic information in real-time to monitor migration patterns, detect fraudulent documents, and identify individuals on global watchlists.[16] However, there are ethical and practical concerns surrounding this technology. Developed by the IOM and primarily funded by the EU and its member states, MIDAS is deployed in a context where migration is viewed as a problem. Additionally, the EU’s common security and defense policy for the Sahel emphasizes the need to use MIDAS in monitoring migration flows linked to EU external borders in North and West Africa.[17]

Previously, Nigerian immigration officers occasionally allowed migrants without travel documents to pass through, but the implementation of MIDAS has led to increased scrutiny, resulting in the detention and deportation of migrants, particularly non-Nigerians. This raises concerns that MIDAS may further restrict entry for individuals fleeing conflict, as evidenced by interactions with displaced Cameroonians escaping the war in Anglophone Cameroon. Consequently, the protection of migrants’ human rights, regardless of nationality or migration status at international borders[18], is being compromised. Additionally, the movement of cross-border traders, who have traveled without documents for generations[19], may also be adversely affected.

With MIDAS now operational at 16 land and sea borders and five airports across Nigeria, the country has become the leading implementer of this technology.[20] However, given Nigeria’s economic challenges, the substantial funds allocated for this costly technology could be better invested in development initiatives to address the root causes of desperate emigration. MIDAS is also present at various borders in the region, including Assamaka (Niger-Algeria), Gogui (Mali-Mauritania), Sona (Mali-Burkina Faso), and Kantchari (Burkina Faso-Niger).[21] The interoperability and synchronization of data collected through MIDAS by state agents across these borders could lead to increased delays and denials for migrants attempting to cross. This containment technology, which lacks acceptance among ordinary Europeans, is being deployed for migration control in Africa, thereby externalizing the EU’s neocolonial framework onto Africa’s border landscape.[22]

Additionally, many travelers are unaware that the MIDAS will be applied to them until they undergo the procedure, which can create significant anxiety. There are worries that MIDAS may result in heightened bias-based profiling related to ethnicity, region, gender, and religion, as highlighted in an interview:

The rise in bias-based profiling and delays can exacerbate the anxiety with long-term health consequences, which represents a form of cruelty[23] and a violent act within Africa’s border landscape, as noted by Fanon. According to[24], the use of these new technologies to collect data on moving populations jeopardizes their lives and infringes on their privacy. Through the implementation of MIDAS, border officers act on behalf of oppressors, utilizing a technological initiative rooted in a neocolonial hegemonic partnership. Fanon argues that true resolution can only be achieved by fostering new national cultures that resist neocolonial dominance in Africa[25]. Such cultures would promote partnerships and agreements based on reciprocity and mutual benefit rather than exploitation and domination.

Moreover, migrants lacking proper documentation are often forced to pay unofficial fees to cross the border after being processed by MIDAS. The amount of these payments varies based on the migrant’s savvy and financial means. On the Niger side, there is an official fee of 1,500 Naira, which contributes to the revenue of the Nigerien government.

“From Jibia, people (migrants) travel to the city of Zinder in Niger in taxis. Apart from the transportation fare of about 3,000 Naira (USD5), those crossing without travel documents pay 500 Naira to Nigerian border officers.”[26]

Migrants travel by bus from Zinder, paying 12,000 CFA for a 9-hour ride to Agadez. These routes are crucial for cross-border mobility, allowing people to flee conflict and engage in socioeconomic activities across North and West Africa[27]. Migrants from various sub-Saharan countries transit through Agadez, contributing about €100 million to Niger’s local economy.[28]

Until the early 2010s, facilitators packed around 50 passengers into pickup trucks in Agadez, escorted by security forces in officially registered convoys. These movements were not criminalized and were seen as ways to achieve migration goals, with authorities informally taxing the process. However, EU intervention labeled these routes as sources of irregular migration to Europe[29], leading to increased scrutiny of Niger, particularly Agadez.

In 2016, Niger enacted Law No. 36/2015, criminalizing migrant transit, and in 2018, it established risk analysis cells to collect migrants’ biometrics.[30] This resulted in strict border controls, pushing northward movements underground and leading to the prosecution of facilitators as smugglers. Security forces stopped escorting convoys, causing drivers to abandon migrants, who are then left stranded in the desert, facing dehydration and threats from marauders. In 2022, the IOM reported 87 migrant deaths along trans-Saharan routes, with one in 100 of the 12,000 interviewed migrants witnessing a death during their journey. These challenges are echoed in numerous interviews:

“The issue of making life difficult for these migrants started when [the] EU got involved in migration matters here [in Agadez and Niger], more specifically in 2016. The strategy is to stop migrants from moving towards Europe. Many of them have depleted their money and have fallen victim to sexual exploitation because they can’t continue their journey. This law [No. 36/2015] is hampering the century-long circular migration…in Africa…”[31]

Due to the deteriorating situation in Libya, more migrants are now traveling from Agadez to Algeria, facing severe hardships along the way. Some CSOs have challenged the legality of Law No. 36/2015 in the ECOWAS Court of Justice[32], arguing that it has led to increasingly precarious conditions for migrants. This EU-inspired legislation not only deters those fleeing conflict but also undermines free movement protocols and heightens vulnerability to trafficking in Africa. The presence of international agencies like FRONTEX and IOM has increased, focusing on the collection and analysis of migrants’ biometric data through risk analysis cells. These cells monitor cross-border activities, such as illegal crossings and document fraud, in a region characterized by high informal mobility, challenging the historical patterns of movement within North and West Africa.

Cross-border traders dealing in animals, agricultural products, sandals, and textiles for centuries now face increased scrutiny from authorities. Their biometric data is collected multiple times during their journeys without clear explanations, causing delays and embarrassment. Officials state that these data are used for security analysis and policy recommendations by risk cells operated by local analysts trained by FRONTEX and IOM. However, this data sharing on EU digital platforms[33] raises concerns about potential breaches of data protection laws and migrant privacy, affecting their movements. Interactions with border officers and Nigerian migrants indicate that some migrants have been deported or pushed back to the Niger-Nigerian border after forensic analysis.

In Niger, the IOM provides camps for stranded migrants and those deported from Libya, Algeria, and Tunisia, facilitating their return home. However, many migrants distrust the IOM, preferring assistance from local pastors, imams, and civil society organizations. Migrant expressed skepticism about the IOM’s collaboration with the government and the EU, fearing it hinders their migration efforts. Despite the IOM’s support, migrants often face long waits outside camps before admission. Due to harsh environment of the desert, migrants struggle and die. The EU has funded the IOM’s program in Niger with €1 billion from 2014 to 2020, but there are concerns about potential misappropriation of these funds, as some local officials may be sending migrants to fictitious origin countries while those who need assistance remain in limbo outside the camps.

In 2023, a coup in Niger led to the abrogation of Law No. 36/2015 [34], disrupting the EU’s migration strategy. The political situation remains uncertain, and if the junta loses power, EU migration interests could resurface, potentially pushing migration back underground.

The trajectories of African migrants are complex. Moroccans typically transit through Western Sahara, Mauritania, Mali, and Niger to reach Libya or Europe, while Algerians travel through Niger to Libya. Many are intercepted by Nigerien authorities and deported after a risk analysis procedure. Sub-Saharan African migrants in Mauritania may also transit through Algeria and Tunisia but risk arrest and deportation to Niger, even after presenting their biometric residency cards.

Biometric Exercise in Mauritania and Northward Movement

The Mauritanian Ministry of the Interior initiated a biometric exercise to regularize the residency of migrants living in the country for over three months. This program, run by the National Agency for the Population Register, aims to provide free residency cards to participants. However, this effort is part of a broader FRONTEX strategy to curb irregular migration in Mauritania and Senegal, leading to concerns about the securitization of borders.

The biometric data collection began in Nouakchott and expanded to other regions, with initial skepticism from migrants turning into participation as they sought residency cards. Insider critiques suggest that the exercise is an attempt to register migrants to know their origin countries and enable their easier deportation in the future, especially before they reach the EU external borders.[35]

Despite the promise of residency cards, the process remains complicated. Previous enrollment efforts have left many undocumented, and migrants still face significant challenges in obtaining these cards. The immigration office has expanded its resources following EU funding, but many migrants express distrust toward the authorities, fearing misuse of their biometric data.

The exercise, originally set to end on October 25, 2022, was extended to accommodate more applicants. However, those lacking residency cards often face deportation or fines, although enforcement is rarely strict. In Nouakchott, the exercise was conducted daily, except on Fridays when Muslims do not work. The Security Department urged migrants to register before the end of the specified date and those who do not correct their legal status risk deportation by the Department or return to the previous system of paying to get residency cards. The amount paid for the residency cards varies and obtaining them requires connections.

“About five months ago I paid 1,800 Mauritanian Ouguiya (MRU) [USD47] to get my resident permit. The last guy I know paid 2,000 MRU for a broker to organise it for him. I also know a Syrian who paid 3,000 MRU to a government official for it. This amount is about half the average wage for an unskilled full-time labourer in Mauritania.”[36]

Undocumented migrants leaving Mauritania for Western Sahara or Algeria now rely on informal travel methods like hitchhiking, avoiding public transport due to identity checks. At the Nouadhibou border, cooperation among Mauritanian authorities, the Guarda Civil, and FRONTEX has increased to manage migrant movements toward Europe. In Western Sahara, Moroccan authorities also control migration, with occasional assistance from the Polisario independence movement. Many migrants opt for risky boat travel to the Canary Islands, as it involves fewer security checks than land routes to Algeria. Experts warn that new agreements between Morocco and the EU to enhance border security will likely tighten controls, which will further restrict access to safety for those fleeing difficult conditions in Africa.

Conclusion

The EU’s externalisation policy, which provides developmental aid to African nations for strict border controls, creates life-threatening conditions for migrants. Reports indicate that many suffer dehydration and death in the Sahara due to these policies, which are supported by EU-funded technologies rooted in colonial legacies.

Using Fanon’s postcolonial theory, this paper argues that the EU’s externalisation is a neocolonial effort that reinforces a hegemonic relationship with Africa, leading to restrictive border practices. The deployment of MIDAS in Nigeria intensifies bias-based profiling, while biometric data collection in Mauritania infringes on the movement of migrants, particularly young men aged 18 and 46 from Senegal, Gambia, Mali, Nigeria and Guinea Conakry moving northwards towards Europe. Niger’s Law No. 36 of 2015 and associated risk analysis cells further hinder cross-border mobility Data from these technological initiatives are shared among IOM, Europol, and FRONTEX potentially used for detaining and deporting migrants.

While the EU and African governments may find benefits in such technologies, they compromise the historical cross-border mobility which is crucial for socioeconomic activities and escaping conflict between West and North Africa. As the EU gets favourable deals, with African countries on the ‘European migration route’, the use of technology to contain northward movements will continue to shape the geopolitics of border management in Africa, unless new national cultures that are resistant to neocolonial dominance emerge.

This study’s methodology that covers migration routes and engages directly with migrants offers a unique perspective on EU externalisation landscape. By combining firsthand observation with migrant experiences, it provides valuable insights for policymakers regarding the impacts of border management with digital technology. This approach could be expanded to assess the broader implications of externalisation on migrants’ rights and livelihoods.

Footnotes

* This piece was adapted from my article titled ‘European Union Border Technology in Africa: Experiences en Route,’ published in Population, Space and Place in August 2024, https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2824.

[1] Lambert, L. (2020). Who is doing asylum in Niger? State bureaucrats’ perspectives and strategies on the externalization of refugee protection. Anthropologie & Développement, 51, 85–101.

[2] Fakhry, A. (2023, August 16).  More than borders: Effects of EU interventions on migration in the Sahel. Institute for Security Studies. https://issafrica.s3.amazonaws.com/site/uploads/WAR-43.pdf.

[3] Zhong, Y. & Carrapico, H. (2024). Frontex goes global: A two-level experimentalist governance analysis of Frontex’s international action and its role within the externalisation of EU borders. Contemporary European Politics, 2(1), 1-17.

[4] Zaun, N. & Nantermoz, O. (2023) Depoliticising EU migration policies: the EUTF Africa and the politicisation of development aid. Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 49(12), 2986-3004.

[5] Molnar, P. (2022). Territorial and digital borders and migrant vulnerability under a pandemic crisis. In: Triandafyllidou, A. (eds) Migration and Pandemics. IMISCOE Research Series. Springer, Cham.

[6] Aradua, C. & Canzutti, L. (2022). Asylum, borders, and the politics of violence: From suspicion to cruelty. Global Studies Quarterly, 2(2), ksab041.

[7] Bisong, A. (2022). Migration partnership framework and the externalization of European Union’s (EU) migration policy in West Africa: The case of Mali and Niger, In G. Rayp et al. (eds.), Regional Integration and Migration Governance in the Global South. United Nations University Series on Regionalism 20. Springer Nature, Switzerland.

[8] Fanon, F. (2004). The wretched of the earth: Frantz Fanon; translated from the French by Richard Philcox; introductions by Jean-Paul Sartre and Homi K. Bhabha. Grove Press.

[9] Frowd, P. M. (2022). Borderwork creep in West Africa’s Sahel. Geopolitics, 27(5), 1331-1351.

[10] Aradua, C. & Canzutti, L. (2022). Asylum, borders, and the politics of violence: From suspicion to cruelty. Global Studies Quarterly, 2(2), ksab041.

[11] Molnar, P. (2021, March 31). Moria 2.0: The EU’s sandbox for surveillance technologies. Euractiv.

[12] Gardner, B. & Krabill, R. (2017). Against the romance of study abroad. https://africasacountry.com/2017/07/against-the-romance-of-study-abroad.

[13] Ould Moctar, H. (2020). The proximity of the past in Mauritania. EU border externalisation and its colonial antecedents. Anthropologie & Développement, 51, 51–67.

[14] Baier, S. (1977). Trans-Saharan trade and the Sahel: Damergu, 1870-1930. The Journal of African History, 18(1), 37–60.

[15] Abdullahi, A. (2019). Rural banditry, regional security, and integration in West Africa. Journal of Social and Political Sciences, 2(3), 644-654.

[16] IOM (2022). MIDAS. International Organization for Migration. https://www.iom.int/midas

[17] EU (2022, January 4). Why it is important to better manage border security in the G5 Sahel countries. [Strategic communications]. EU Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell for Sahel. https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eu-racc-sahel/why-it-important-better-manage-border-security-g5-sahel-countries_en?s=4439.

[18] UNHCR (n.d.). Recommended principles and guidelines on human rights at international borders. https://www.ohchr.org/sites/default/files/Documents/Issues/Migration/OHCHR_Recommended_Principles_Guidelines.pdf.

[19] Uzomah, N. L. & Madu, I. A. (2020). Factors of migration of ECOWAS citizens into Nigeria: A principal component analysis approach. International Journal of Migration and Border Studies, 6(3), 234.

[20] Abeku, T. (2023, February 23). IOM, NIS floats reference centre to boost border management security. The Guardian. https://guardian.ng/news/iom-nis-floats-reference-center-to-boost-border-management-security/; Daily Trust (2019, November 12). Immigration deploys technology to capture passengers’ details at five airports. https://dailytrust.com/immigration-deploys-technology-to-capture-passengers-details-at-five-airports/.

[21] Doevenspeck, M., Donko, K. & Beisel, U. (2022, January 7). Migration controls at the Burkina Faso-Niger borderland reveal European attitudes to African livelihoods. LSE. https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/africaatlse/2022/01/07/migration-controls-at-the-burkina-faso-niger-borderland-reveal-european-attitudes-to-african-livelihoods/; IOM (2015, November 10). Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso Seek to Coordinate Border Management. https://www.iom.int/news/niger-mali-and-burkina-faso-seek-coordinate-border-management; IOM (2016a). IOM Mauritania. https://www.iom.int/sites/g/files/tmzbdl486/files/mission_newsletter/file/IOM-Mauritania-Newsletter-Mar-May2016-EN.pdf; IOM (2016b, October21). Migration Information and Data Analysis System (MIDAS) Goes Online in Burkina Faso. https://www.iom.int/news/migration-information-and-data-analysis-system-midas-goes-online-burkina-faso; Zandonini, G. (2019, June 6). Biometrics: The new frontier of EU migration policy in Niger. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/06/06/biometrics-new-frontier-eu-migration-policy-niger.

[22] Popoviciu, A. (2023, July 26). How Europe Outsourced Border Enforcement to Africa. THESETIMES.  https://inthesetimes.com/article/europe-militarize-africa-senegal-borders-anti-migration-surveillance.

[23] Aradua, C. & Canzutti, L. (2022). Asylum, borders, and the politics of violence: From suspicion to cruelty. Global Studies Quarterly, 2(2), ksab041.

[24] Molnar, P. (2022). Territorial and digital borders and migrant vulnerability under a pandemic crisis. In: Triandafyllidou, A. (eds) Migration and Pandemics. IMISCOE Research Series. Springer, Cham.

[25] Davis, Z. (n. d.). The Wretched of the Earth. The Wretched of the Earth. https://www.writlarge.fm/episodes/wretched

[26] Instant interaction with a Nigerien border officer in Jibia on 29/08/2022.

[27] Xchange (2019). Agadez: Voices from a Historical Transit Hub. Xchange, Valletta. http://xchange.org/reports/NigerReport2019.html.

[28] Vogt, R. (2020). Niger: The other EU-financed migrant hub of Africa. Border Criminologies. https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2020/05/niger-other-eu.

[29] Brachet, J. (2018). Manufacturing smugglers: From irregular to clandestine mobility in the Sahara. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 676(1), 16-35.

[30] Riehle, C. (2019, February 18). Risk Analysis Cell in Niger. European Criminal Law Associations’ Forum. https://eucrim.eu/news/risk-analysis-cell-niger/.

[31] Interview with a resident in Agadez on 07/09/2022.

[32] ASGI & Sciabaca&Oruka. (2022, September 9). Press conference, Niger: Complaint lodged against the Law criminalising the transit of migrants. https://sciabacaoruka.asgi.it/en/press-conference-niger-complaint-lodged-against-the-lawcriminalising-the-transit-of-migrants/.

[33] Zandonini, G. (2019, June 6). Biometrics: The new frontier of EU migration policy in Niger. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2019/06/06/biometrics-new-frontier-eu-migration-policy-niger.

[34] Golovko, K. & Willeme, L. (2024, July 19). Niger’s Repeal of the 2015/36 Anti-Smuggling Law. CLINGENDAEL. https://www.clingendael.org/publication/nigers-repeal-201536-anti-smuggling-law.

[35] Popoviciu, A. (2023, July 26). How Europe Outsourced Border Enforcement to Africa. THESETIMES.  https://inthesetimes.com/article/europe-militarize-africa-senegal-borders-anti-migration-surveillance

[36] Interview with a migrant from Togo in Nouadhibou on 16/10/2022.