This article focuses on the link between EU externalisation policies and the concept of migrant instrumentalisation, used by several Member States as a rationale for suspending the right to seek asylum and authorising pushbacks. The instrumentalisation concept gained significant prominence during the EU-Belarus border crisis and has ultimately found its way into EU law as part of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. This contribution shows that declared “migrant instrumentalisation” has become a tool allowing the governments to pursue two interrelated aims: first, to deal with inconvenient and unpredictable neighbours who are unwilling to protect “Fortress Europe” by acting as a barrier for irregular arrivals into the EU and, second, to exclude unwanted foreigners from fundamental rights protection even if they have managed to reach the EU’s territory.
Context: Authorising pushbacks during the EU-Belarus border crisis
Over the past three years, the concept of migrant instrumentalisation has gained unprecedented prominence in the European political and legislative agenda – predominantly in the context of the EU-Belarus border crisis. The origins of the current situation date back to summer 2021 when Belarus started actively issuing visas to nationals of Middle Eastern and African countries and, in cooperation with local travel agents, coordinating their travel to Minsk. The Belarusian authorities also stopped preventing irregular border crossings into the EU and, as widely reported, frequently facilitated such practices or even forced foreign nationals to cross the border.[1]
In response to the rising numbers of irregular border crossings, three EU Member States bordering Belarus – Latvia, Lithuania and Poland – introduced radical changes to their domestic legislation by severely restricting the right to seek asylum and openly authorising pushbacks. Such measures openly violate EU and international human rights law, particularly where it concerns access to the asylum procedure and compliance with the non-derogable principle of non-refoulement, which prohibits returning someone to a state where they may face persecution and/or inhuman or degrading treatment.[2]
Lithuania was the first Member State that adopted a set of measures effectively excluding irregular entrants from fundamental rights protection. In July 2021, the Lithuanian authorities declared an “extraordinary situation” due to a “mass influx” of foreigners[3] and passed a resolution stating that “the states hostile towards Lithuania are waging hybrid aggression” against the country by organising “flows of third-country nationals illegally crossing the state border”.[4] A few weeks later, Lithuania amended its Law on the Legal Status of Foreigners to provide that, in the event of a declared extraordinary situation, asylum applications from persons who have entered Lithuania irregularly in places outside official border crossing points shall not be accepted.[5]
The Lithuanian example was swiftly followed by the neighbouring Latvia that went even further and introduced a blanket prohibition of the right to claim asylum for anyone attempting to irregularly enter the country from Belarus, including at official border crossing points.[6] A similar approach was adopted in Poland. Although the respective Polish legislation does not explicitly deny irregular entrants their right to claim asylum, it nevertheless allows border guards to disregard such applications.[7]
The adoption of the domestic measures described above has led to violations of human rights that go far beyond the mere deprivation of the right to seek asylum. The relevant changes have effectively given carte blanche to border violence and turned the EU’s border with Belarus into a highly securitised exclusion zone where protection seekers are exposed to numerous types of inhuman and degrading treatment (e.g., forced to remain in the forest for up to seven months)[8] and where deaths, disappearances and amputated limbs have become an everyday reality.[9]
The concept of ‘migrant instrumentalisation’ – from domestic to EU level
Three years on since the start of the crisis, the situation at the EU’s border with Belarus remains largely unchanged. All three Member States involved continue to carry out systematic pushbacks – despite the extensive criticism by multiple international bodies and organisations.[10]
The rationale, relied on by the respective governments for excluding the racialised “other” from human rights protection, has continuously been the so-called “migrant instrumentalisation” or “weaponisation” by the Belarusian and Russian regimes that allegedly wage a “hybrid attack” against the EU, a narrative that has further intensified following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.[11] Under EU and international refugee law, however, such concepts cannot be relied on to justify pushback practices and deny someone their right to seek asylum. This has been confirmed by the seminal ruling, delivered by the CJEU in June 2022 which specifically addressed the situation at the EU’s border with Belarus. In its judgment, the Court declared that Lithuanian legislation effectively depriving a non-EU national of an opportunity to apply for asylum solely because they had crossed the border irregularly is incompatible with the Asylum Procedures Directive – even in the event of declared emergency due to a “mass influx of aliens”.[12]
The judgment, however, has been ignored by the relevant governments. In April 2023, Lithuania further cemented pushback practices in its domestic law,[13] a move that was followed by the neighbouring Latvia.[14] More recently, the instrumentalisation discourse has also been taken up by Finland that, first, amended its domestic law[15] and then temporarily closed its land border crossing points with Russia – as a reaction to increasing numbers of foreign nationals attempting to cross from that country to apply for asylum in Finland.[16] Moreover, Finland did not stop at that point and ultimately passed legislation allowing the authorities to turn away people seeking asylum – in other words, to exercise pushbacks – at the border with Russia.[17]
Likewise, Poland has signalled no intention to alter its approach even after the October 2023 parliamentary elections, when the conservative populist Law and Justice (PiS) party lost power and was subsequently replaced by a liberal coalition. Moreover, after an incident when a Polish soldier was stabbed by a foreigner who attempted to cross from Belarus, Poland’s new government reintroduced an exclusion zone restricting access to the border area for people without authorisation, including journalists and volunteers.[18]
A distinctive feature of the EU-Belarus border crisis has been tacit and explicit acceptance of the Member State policies at the EU level. The migrant instrumentalisation discourse has been endorsed by the European Commission that succumbed to the pressure of national governments and de facto gave a green light to pushbacks by failing to initiate any infringement procedure against the Member States involved, despite clear-cut violations of fundamental rights.[19]
Moreover, in late 2021, following the call of the European Council, the Commission also presented a set of proposals codifying the instrumentalisation concept into EU asylum law.[20] While the proposals failed to secure a majority in the EU Council in December 2022[21] the migrant instrumentalisation concept has ultimately found its way into EU law as part of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum. More specifically, it has been incorporated in the new Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation (2024/1359), which will apply from 1 July 2026. In the event of declared migrant instrumentalisation, the Regulation allows Member States to derogate from the EU’s asylum standards by extending registration period for asylum applications, the extensive use of border procedures and de facto detention of protection seekers. Whilst formally these measures do not allow to suspend the right to seek asylum or exercise pushbacks, the level of procedural safeguards, offered by the Regulation, is exceptionally low.
Protection seekers as “hybrid warfare” and a security threat
The governments’ fears, underpinning the instrumentalisation narrative, center on two main issues that are closely intertwined. The first, and arguably most significant, fear is related to the perceived loss of control over migration. All three Member States involved are mainly emigration, not immigration countries, where the number of asylum-seekers has traditionally been low. For example, over the period from 2018 to 2020 Latvia registered less than 200 asylum applications per year.[22] In 2020, 315 people applied for asylum in Lithuania, whereby less than 2,800 people submitted their claims in Poland, a country with a population of around 37 million.[23]
Against this background, the rise of irregular border crossings from Belarus is viewed by the governments as a significant threat – particularly given the strong anti-immigrant sentiments in the respective Member States.[24] In the public discourse, the situation at the Belarus border is typically described as a “crisis”, caused by the “mass influx” of aliens, even though the number of people who attempt to cross from Belarus is much lower than the number of arrivals in Europe via the Mediterranean route.[25] Second, the fear of losing control has been intensified by the fact that the transiting state is exactly Belarus, a country that is viewed as a Russian ally and a threat to the national security of its EU neighbours, particularly following the Russian invasion of Ukraine.
As a consequence, the increase of irregular arrivals from Belarus has become a highly politicised issue that is primarily viewed by the governments through national security, and not asylum or human rights lens. People seeking to cross into the EU are framed as “hybrid warfare”, portrayed as “economic migrants” and not “real refugees” as opposed to those fleeing Ukraine, or, in the best-case scenario, described as passive “pawns” used by the Belarusian and Russian regimes in a political game.[26]
Externalisation behind “instrumentalisation”
Such discourses are deeply problematic for a variety of reasons. First, by focusing on (perceived) actions of the third state and depriving the individuals involved of any agency, the instrumentalisation concept seeks to divert attention from EU policies, designed to deter the nationals of refugee-producing countries from entering Europe. While it may be the case that a third state uses people on the move as a leverage to exercise political pressure on the EU, this is only possible because of the global passport inequality, the EU’s externalisation and containment policies, and the consequent absence of legal routes to seek protection. These, and not the actions of the Belarusian authorities, are the main reasons of why people undertake dangerous and irregular routes to seek protection in Europe, with the Belarus route being no exception. In the majority of cases, for a Syrian or Afghan national – i.e., precisely those who are most likely to qualify for international protection – obtaining a visa for Europe is nearly impossible.
As part of my socio-legal research into the EU-Belarus border crisis, I have conducted extensive fieldwork in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania, where I interviewed legal practitioners, humanitarian aid volunteers and over 40 non-EU nationals affected.[27] The findings of my research suggest that people who attempt to irregularly cross into the EU from Belarus make up a heterogeneous group and frequently belong to categories with relatively high asylum-recognition rates. Examples include Afghans fleeing the Taliban, Syrians fleeing compulsory military service, Iranians fleeing political persecution, and Yazidis, an Iraq-based ethno-religious minority that was persecuted by ISIS and has since been living in protracted displacement for nearly a decade.
Nada (name changed), a young Yazidi woman who spent nearly four months at the Latvia-Belarus border and was forced to return to an IDP tent camp in the Kurdistan region of Iraq without her asylum claim being registered, told me over a video call:
“We had been living in the forest for nearly four months. I did not want to live anymore and wanted to kill myself. Ultimately they [the Latvian authorities] offered me to return to Iraq and I agreed. I begged the Latvian border guards not to force me go back as I am threatened in Iraq as a Yazidi woman, but they told me I needed to sign the return papers [an IOM voluntary return declaration] anyway.
I now live in a Yazidi displacement camp in the town of Zakho close to the border with Turkey. I previously lived in the city of Shingal[28] and was forced to flee after it was taken over by ISIS. During that time I was captured by an ISIS militant who raped me and forced to live with him for three months before I managed to escape. I was a virgin and am now considered spoiled [crying]. I now live in a tent and do not feel safe. I am afraid someone will come and abduct me again.”
Moreover, many of my interviewees chose the Belarus route because it was perceived as safer, following previous, unsuccessful attempts to enter the EU via other routes. Farooq (name changed), a protection seeker who was equally returned to Iraq after having spent 2.5 months at the Latvia-Belarus border, described his experiences as follows:
“I am a Kurd from Mosul. I wanted to become a refugee in Europe because I have been threatened by some groups in Iraq. They want to kill me. In 2018, I tried to go to Europe via Turkey but Turkish border guards beat me up, put me in jail for ten days and returned [me] back to Iraq. In 2020, I went to Greece but Greek commandos caught me near Saloniki and sent me back to Turkey. And Turkey again sent me back to Iraq. This time I tried to go to Latvia – I paid $1,800 to get to Minsk. Now I am back but I will keep trying to move to Europe – anywhere safe.”
The concept of migrant instrumentalisation and realities on the ground
By invoking the instrumentalisation argument, the Member State governments have arbitrarily deprived non-EU nationals of their most fundamental rights based on an overly simplified and highly politicised term. The latter observation equally applies to the new Crisis and Force Majeure Regulation. According to the regulation, “a situation of instrumentalisation” occurs where
“a third country or a hostile non-state actor encourages or facilitates the movement of third-country nationals or stateless persons to the external borders or to a Member State, with the aim of destabilising the Union or a Member State, and where such actions are liable to put at risk essential functions of a Member State, including the maintenance of law and order or the safeguard of its national security” (Article 1(4)(b)).
This formulation, however, is overly broad and does not capture the complexities of the situation on the ground. Following pressure by the EU, foreign airline companies or governments introduced travel restrictions on nationals of certain Middle Eastern countries. Already in November 2021, for instance, the Turkish authorities denied Syrian, Yemeni and Iraqi nationals from boarding flights to Minsk.[29] In addition, several hundreds of Iraqi nationals were returned from Belarus to Iraq on so-called “repatriation flights”.[30]
The conducted interviews suggest that, starting from 2022, most of the non-EU nationals arriving at the EU’s external border hold Russian, not Belarus, visas that are issued for a variety of purposes. People are typically brought to the EU’s border with Belarus by intermediaries of diverse backgrounds who are non-state actors. Many people had also previously resided in Russia for prolonged periods of time (either regularly or irregularly, including with expired visas) before deciding to seek protection in the EU due to the lack of safety, human rights violations, risk of being expelled or forced to fight in the war in Ukraine, or deteriorating political and economic conditions in Russia. Further, there are individuals who arrived at the Belarus border by land via Russia and Central Asian countries (e.g., from Afghanistan), had never been issued Belarusian or Russian visas or had any other connection with the Belarusian or Russian authorities. Establishing an instrumentalisation element would thus seemingly necessitate an individualised assessment of each case on the basis of unknown criteria, an impossible task to undertake.
“Migrant Instrumentalisation” – a remedy for failed externalisation
On a more general level, the basic premise underlying the instrumentalisation concept is that Belarus and Russia – alongside with other countries bordering the EU – are obliged to protect “Fortress Europe” by preventing, and certainly not facilitating, irregular border crossings into the EU. Further, one of the main problems with the instrumentalisation definition is the uncertainty of what “encouraging or facilitating” the movement of foreign nationals to the external borders means in practice. Given the Belarusian example, it presumably includes issuing visas to individuals who cannot otherwise obtain a visa for entry into the EU (or, alternatively, introducing a visa-free regime with such states). Yet, this fails to respect the sovereign right of the states to regulate the entry and stay of foreign nationals on their territory, which includes operating an independent visa policy.
Establishing the aim of destabilising the EU appeals equally challenging from the perspective of legal certainty, given that visas are officially issued for purposes such as tourism, study, work or private visits. Even if the real aim behind the third country’s liberal visa policy is to put pressure on the EU, this is a subjective and generalised evaluation. It indiscriminately implies that every holder of a Belarus (or Russian) visa who later decides to irregularly cross into the EU from Belarus has been instrumentalised, denying the people involved any agency. Moreover, as noted above, the measures addressing perceived instrumentalisation are blanket in nature and also target those who had never procured Belarus or Russian visas. Last but not least, there is no provision in international human rights law obliging the state to prevent protection seekers from crossing irregularly into the neighbouring country. To the contrary, under international law everyone has the right to leave any country. The respective right is recognised by multiple UN human rights instruments, including Article 13.2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
In essence, the instrumentalisation concept seeks to delegate the full responsibility for irregular arrivals to third states (such as Belarus and Russia) and make protection seekers pay the price for it. In other words, an individual can be denied their fundamental right to seek asylum on the sole basis that they have attempted to enter the EU via a particular third country – irrespective of how they have arrived in the respective state and their individual circumstances.
From the EU Member States’ perspective, instrumentalisation concept can be employed as a convenient tool allowing the governments to mitigate the consequences of failed externalisation and containment policies. By invoking the instrumentalisation rationale, Member States can now exclude foreign nationals from fundamental rights protection even where they have managed to reach the EU’s territory. This, in essence, allows the EU to regain control over the behaviour of third states – in the particular case, Belarus and Russia – with which it cannot conclude Turkey-like agreements[31] for geopolitical reasons. For the national authorities, instrumentalisation has become a tool for dealing with inconvenient and unpredictable enemy neighbours who do not wish to contribute to the EU’s policy of deterrence at all cost, designed to keep unwanted foreigners away from European soil.
Overall, the EU-Belarus border crisis has set an unprecedented example of how far EU Member States have been prepared (and were allowed) to go in their efforts to arbitrarily exclude the racialised “other” from their territory. The acceptance and endorsement of the instrumentalisation narrative has led to normalising massive human rights violations, authorising dehumanising narratives and practices and undermining the Rule of Law, which has resulted in unimaginable human suffering and opened up a new, particularly grim chapter in the history of EU asylum law and policies.
Footnotes
[1] See, e.g., Charlotte Bruneau, Joanna Plucinska and Yara Abi Nader, “Insight: How Minsk became a destination for migrants travelling as tourists” (Reuters, 16 November 2021), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-minsk-became-mecca-migrants-travelling-tourists-2021-11-15/; Christina Hebel and Christoph Reuter, “Wie Belarus zum Sprungbrett für Geflüchtete wurde” (Der Spiegel, 13 August 2021), https://www.spiegel.de/ausland/belarus-wie-alexander-lukaschenko-schutzsuchende-gezielt-in-die-eu-schleust-a-3a5952cb-0002-0001-0000-000178784949?context=issue; Amnesty International, “Belarus/EU: New evidence of brutal violence from Belarusian forces against asylum seekers and migrants facing pushbacks from the EU” (20 December 2021), https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/12/belarus-eu-new-evidence-of-brutal-violence-from-belarusian-forces-against-asylum-seekers-and-migrants-facing-pushbacks-from-the-eu/.
[2] The non-refoulement principle is protected under Article 33(1) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture and Article 19(2) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. In addition, the domestic legislation of the relevant Member States comes into tension with Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 to the ECHR, which prohibits the collective expulsion of aliens, and Article 18 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which guarantees every individual the right to seek asylum.
[3] The Government of the Republic of Lithuania. Nutarimas Nr.517 dėl valstybės lygio ekstremaliosios situacijos paskelbimo ir valstybės lygio ekstremaliosios situacijos operacijų vadovo paskyrimo [Resolution No 517 On the Declaration of the Extraordinary situation and the Appointment of the State Commander of National Emergency Operation] (2 July 2021, TAR, 03/07/2021, No 15235), https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/ad73a4c1dc0011eb866fe2e083228059?jfwid=-1cefbqu9c8.
[4] Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania. Resolution on Countering Hybrid Aggression (13 July 2021, No XIV-505), https://e-seimas.lrs.lt/portal/legalAct/lt/TAD/1a84e440e49c11eb866fe2e083228059?jfwid=tcgd2hdge.
[5] Įstatymo “Dėl užsieniečių teisinės padėties” Nr. IX-2206 67 straipsnio pakeitimo įstatymas [Law Amending Article 67 of Law No IX-2206 on the Legal Status of Foreigners] (10 August 2021, No XIV-515), https://www.infolex.lt/ta/707350#.
[6] Ministru kabineta rīkojums Nr. 518 “Par ārkārtējās situācijas izsludināšanu” [Cabinet Order No 518 Regarding the Declaration of Emergency Situation] (10 August 2021, Latvijas Vēstnesis, no. 152A), in the version in force until 5 April 2022, https://likumi.lv/ta/id/325266-par-arkartejas-situacijas-izsludinasanu. Following the decision of a domestic court of March 2022, the Order was amended to allow third-country nationals to submit claims for international protection at official border crossing points and the detention centre for foreigners in the Daugavpils city.
[7] Rozporządzenie Ministra Spraw Wewnętrznych i Administracji zmieniające rozporządzenie w sprawie czasowego zawieszenia lub ograniczenia ruchu granicznego na określonych przejściach granicznych [Regulation of the Minister of the Interior and Administration amending the ordinance on the temporary suspension or limitation of border traffic at certain border crossing points], Journal of Laws 2021, item 1536, https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/D2021000153601.pdf; Ustawa o zmianie ustawy o cudzoziemach oraz niektórych innych ustaw [Law amending the Act on Foreigners and other laws], Journal of Laws 2021, item 1918, https://dziennikustaw.gov.pl/D2021000191801.pdf. For an analysis see Grazyna Baranowska, “Pushbacks in Poland: Grounding the practice in domestic law in 2021,” Polish Yearbook of International Law, no. 41 (2022): 193–211, https://doi.org/10.24425/PYIL.2022.142346.
[8] Aleksandra Ancite-Jepifánova, “Seven Months in the Freezing Forest: Why events at the Latvian-Belarus border were long hidden from the public” (VerfBlog, 15 November 2022), https://verfassungsblog.de/seven-months-in-the-freezing-forest/.
[9] See, e.g., Marion MacGregor, “Deaths mount at Polish border as authorities defend migrant expulsions” (InfoMigrants, 21 February 2021), https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/46988/deaths-mount-at-polish-border-as-authorities-defend-migrant-expulsions; Emma Wallis, “Frostbite at the border: Third migrant loses limb” (InfoMigrants, 12 December 2022), https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/45343/frostbite-at-the-border-third-migrant-loses-limb;
Helsinki Foundation for Human Rights, “Disappearances at the Polish-Belarusian border – HFHR response” (23 November 2023), https://hfhr.pl/en/news/disappearances-at-the-polish-belarusian-border-hfhr-response.
[10] See, e.g., UNHCR, “UNHCR observations on the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of the Republic of Latvia on the Declaration of Emergency Situation (No 518)” (13 October 2021), https://www.refworld.org/legal/natlegcomments/unhcr/2021/en/124040; Amnesty International, “Latvia: Return Home or Never Leave the Woods. Refugees and Migrants Arbitrarily Detained, Beaten and Coerced Into “Voluntary” Returns” (2022), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur52/5913/2022/en/; Amnesty International, “Lithuania: Forced out or Locked up. Refugees and Migrants Abused and Abandoned” (2022), https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur53/5735/2022/en/; Council of Europe, “Letter to the Minister for the Interior of Latvia” (27 January 2023), https://www.coe.int/en/web/commissioner/-/latvian-authorities-should-put-an-end-to-pushbacks-and-safeguard-the-human-rights-of-people-seeking-protection-at-the-border-with-belarus.
[11] For an analysis see, e.g., Grazyna Baranowska, Begüm Başdaş and Natalie Welfens, “The Dangerous Politics of Framing: The Situation at the Polish-Belarusian Border” (Border Criminologies Blog, 25 November 2021), https://blogs.law.ox.ac.uk/research-subject-groups/centre-criminology/centreborder-criminologies/blog/2021/11/dangerous; Joanna Szylko-Kwas, “Two Crises – Framing Messages about the Crisis on the Polish-Belarusian Border,” Res Rhetorica, no. 10(4) (2023): 118-39, https://doi.org/10.29107/rr2023.4.7.
[12] Case C‑72/22 PPU M.A. v Valstybės sienos apsaugos tarnyba ECLI:EU:C:2022:505.
[13] Valstybės sienos ir jos apsaugos įstatymo Nr.VIII-1666 1, 2, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 26 straipsnių pakeitimo ir Įstatymo papildymo 23-1 straipsniu ir nauju IX skyriumi įstatymas [Law Amending Articles 1, 2, 4, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 18, 23, 26 of Law No VIII-1666 on the State Border and the Guard thereof and
supplementing the Law with Article 23-1 and Section IX] (25 April 2023, No XIV-1891), https://www.infolex.lt/ta/849616.
[14]Grozījums Latvijas Republikas valsts robežas likumā [Amendments to the Law on the State Border of the Republic of Latvia] (22 June 2023, Latvijas Vēstnesis, no. 125), https://likumi.lv/ta/id/343268-grozijums-latvijas-republikas-valsts-robezas-likuma; Grozījumi Valsts robežsardzes likumā [Amendments to the State Border Guard Law] (22 June 2023, Latvijas Vēstnesis, no. 125), https://likumi.lv/ta/id/343269-grozijumi-valsts-robezsardzes-likuma.
[15] Laki rajavartiolain muuttamisesta [Law on amending the Border Guard Act] ( 8 July 2022, 698/2022), https://finlex.fi/fi/laki/alkup/2022/20220698.
[16] Essi Lehto, “Finland to close all but northernmost border crossing with Russia” (Reuters, 23 November 2023), https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/finland-close-all-one-border-crossing-with-russia-pm-2023-11-22/.
[17] Jari Tanner, “Finnish lawmakers approve controversial law to turn away migrants at border with Russia” (Associated Press, 12 July 2024), https://apnews.com/article/finland-migrants-russia-92c3c414d60ba1f7097297f7dca62e78. For criticism, see Daria Krivonos and Anitta Kynsilehto, “Framing migration as hybrid warfare produces politics of exception” (raster.fi, 12 April 2024), https://raster.fi/2024/04/12/framing-migration-as-hybrid-warfare-produces-politics-of-exception/; Jaana Palander and Mehrnoosh Farzamfar, “Border Crisis as a Crisis of Law: National Security & Mobility Rights at the Eastern Border of Finland” (IACL-AIDC Blog, 11 July 2024), https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/2024-posts/2024/7/11/border-crisis-as-a-crisis-of-law-national-security-amp-mobility-rights-at-the-eastern-border-of-finland.
[18] Daniel Tilles, “Poland to reintroduce exclusion zone on Belarus border following stabbing of soldier by migrant” (Notes from Poland, 30 May 2024), https://notesfrompoland.com/2024/05/30/poland-reintroduces-exclusion-zone-on-belarus-border-following-stabbing-of-soldier-by-migrant/.
[19] For a discussion see Maciej Grześkowiak, “The ‘Guardian of the Treaties’ is No More? The European Commission and the 2021 Humanitarian Crisis on Poland–Belarus Border,” Refugee Survey Quarterly, no. 42(1) (2023): 81–102, https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdac025.
[20] Including a proposal for a Regulation addressing situations of instrumentalisation in the field of migration and asylum (COM/2021/890 final).
[21] ECRE, “ECRE Reaction: No Majority for Instrumentalisation Regulation” (8 December 2022), https://ecre.org/ecre-reaction-no-majority-for-instrumentalisation-regulation/.
[22]Office of Citizenship and Migration Affairs [Latvia], “Statistics on Asylum Seekers until 2023” (27 February 2024), https://www.pmlp.gov.lv/en/statistics-asylum-seekers-until-2023.
[23] European Parliament, “Asylum and Migration in the EU” (2022), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/infographic/asylum-migration/index_en.html#filter=2022.
[24] For instance, in the Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020, Poland, Latvia and Lithuania were ranked 44th, 47th and 48th, respectively, out of 52 participating countries which included all EU Member States, other European countries (including Serbia, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine), several Asian and South American countries, as well as Canada, Mexico, the US, Australia, and New Zealand. Giacomo Solano and Thomas Huddleston, “Migrant Integration Policy Index 2020” (CIDOB and MPG, 2020), https://www.migpolgroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/Solano-Giacomo-Huddleston-Thomas-2020-Migrant-Integration-Policy-Index-2020.pdf.
[25] In 2021, at the peak of the crisis, Polish border guards recorded fewer than 40,000 ‘attempts of illegal border crossings’ from Belarus, with the numbers having dropped sharply in 2022 and 2023. See Straż Graniczna [Polish Border Guard] (4 January 2022). W 2021 r. granicę polsko-białoruską próbowano nielegalnie przekroczyć 39 670 razy, w 2020 r. nielegalnych przekroczeń było 129, w 2019 r. – 20, w 2018 r. – 4 [Image attached] [Post]. X. https://x.com/Straz_Graniczna/status/1478327785903038469?t=k2VdF_GmykZQBEunvENA9g&s=19; Adriana Sas, “Number of attempts to illegally cross the Polish-Belarusian border in Poland from August 2021 to April 2024” (Statista, 28 May 2024), https://www.statista.com/statistics/1271292/poland-attempts-of-illegal-crossing-of-the-polish-belarusian-border/. Moreover, the number of recorded border crossing attempts does not represent the actual number of people crossing the border, as many are pushed back and forth multiple times. For the statistics on arrivals via the Mediterranean route, see Katharina Buchholz, “Number of Migrants Crossing the Mediterranean Picks up” (Statista, April 14, 2023), https://www.statista.com/chart/18753/migrants-arriving-across-the-mediterranean-in-europe/.
[26] See, e.g., Baranowska, Başdaş and Welfens (n 11); Szylko-Kwas (n 11). See also Karen Hargrave, Kseniya Homel and Lenka Dražanová, “Public narratives and attitudes towards refugees and other migrants: Poland country profile” (ODI Working Paper, January 2023), https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/ODI-Public_narratives_Poland_country_study-revMay23.pdf.
[27] For the preliminary findings, see Aleksandra Ancite-Jepifánova, “Trapped in a Lawless Zone: Forgotten Refugees at the Latvia-Belarus Border” (VerfBlog, 2 May 2022), https://verfassungsblog.de/trapped-in-a-lawless-zone/; Aleksandra Ancite-Jepifánova, “Legalising Refoulement: Pushbacks and Forcible ‘Voluntary’ Returns from the Latvian-Belarus Border” (Refugee Law Initiative Blog, 22 August 2022), https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2022/08/22/legalising-refoulement-pushbacks-and-forcible-voluntary-returns-from-the-latvian-belarus-border/; Ancite-Jepifánova (n 8); Aleksandra Ancite-Jepifánova, “Migrant Instrumentalisation: Facts and Fictions: Realities On the Ground at the EU-Belarus Border” (VerfBlog, 21 September 2023), https://verfassungsblog.de/migrant-instrumentalisation-facts-and-fictions/.
[28] Also known as Sinjar.
[29] Andrew Roth and Lisa O’Carroll, “Turkey bans citizens from Syria, Yemen and Iraq from flying to Minsk” (The Guardian, 12 November 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/12/turkey-bans-citizens-syria-yemen-iraq-from-flying-minsk.
[30] Emma Wallis, “More migrants flown back to Iraq from Belarus” (InfoMigrants, 6 December 2021), https://www.infomigrants.net/en/post/37025/more-migrants-flown-back-to-iraq-from-belarus.
[31] For a general discussion see, e.g., Ermioni Xanthopoulou, “Mapping EU Externalisation Devices through a Critical Eye”, European Journal of Migration and Law, no. 26(1) (2024): 108-135, https://doi.org/10.1163/15718166-12340170.