This paper considers some characteristics of externalization and manifestations of the politics of distancing by states and the EU. Externalization is not simply a set of policies. It is also a narrative of exclusion and part of a rhetoric that hardens borders. It is both agenda-setting and agenda-responsive. Harsh policies of externalization are accompanied by corrosive narratives of dehumanization. The case of Australia is provided as an example of externalization, and it is argued that Australia should not constitute a model for Europe. Finally, the paper presents some proposals on means to tackle externalization in the future.
Context
The movement of asylum-seekers and refugees is a global governance challenge, but it is also a test of the humanitarian principles, values and legitimacy of states and of regional bodies such as the European Union (EU). States, especially in the Global North, including the EU, are increasingly seeking external solutions to the movement of those seeking asylum. The externalization of refugee policy is carried out in several ways.
Firstly, states seek to deny access to their territory. Secondly, they endeavour to expel asylum-seekers from their territory to another state. This is effectuated by deals made between richer states (the reluctant hosts) and less wealthy states in the region. We observe this in Australia[1], where there is an offshoring responsibility of refugees and asylum seekers in neighbouring states, and in the EU’s deals with Turkey[2] and Libya and the recent memorandum with Tunisia[3].
Research on refugee externalization.
Refugee externalization policies are the subject of serious comparative and interdisciplinary research, as is evident in research networks.[4] Research on refugee externalization is important for a number of reasons[5].
Firstly, there is policy admiration, emulation, policy transfer and parallels of cruelty across several states in Europe – within the EU, the United Kingdom (UK) and Australia. The Australian case has been regarded as a putative model. [6] Secondly, these externalization approaches de-legitimise the rights of asylum-seekers and refugees. Thirdly, states undermine their own legitimacy and that of state action – as they no longer take legal and political responsibility for those who seek to cross their borders[7]. The policies of deterrence and of offshoring responsibilities transforms the governance of refugee protection. Fourthly, they deny access to timely processing of claims for protection and to health care and welfare. They also prevent access to: scrutiny of their practices by civil society and the media; to adequate oversight by the legislature; to experts and international observers and to accountability mechanisms for service providers, all in an approach marked by secrecy and lack of provision of adequate information. [8]
Externalization does not have a single definition. It includes strategies by states ‘beyond their territorial borders to obstruct, deter or otherwise avert the arrival of refugees, asylum seekers and other migrants who do not have prior authorization to enter their intended country of destination’ [9].
Externalization is not simply a policy or set of policies. It is also a narrative of exclusion and part of a rhetoric that hardens borders. It is both agenda-setting and agenda-responsive. A range of externalization policies is employed to control the access of arrivals to their territory by Australia, the EU and its member states, the UK and many other states, including the United States [10]. These polices operate beyond the state – and the EU – to disrupt migration pathways, preventing individuals from reaching or entering a state’s territory, yet they are carried out and financed by the state (such as Australia) or the EU.
They include offshoring and outsourcing of important legal and administrative responsibilities for refugee protection to third countries. While the offshoring state may choose to retain considerable control and oversight of these third counties, there is little or inadequate public knowledge or legislative scrutiny of the effect of these policies. Examples include the interdiction of sea vessels and deployment of third countries and non-state actors in preventative policies of detention, as well as deportation and border policing, as part of a militarization of externalization[11]. This externalization accompanies an established shift towards securitization, with refugees increasingly framed as a security risk.
It is framed in ways that range from societal insecurity to terrorist threat, with a narrative that state and society are rendered more secure by denying access to people seeking asylum. The approach thus enables states to externalize responsibility, obligations and duties, by partially placing these on third countries and blurring the lines of responsibility between the EU and its member states with partner states, and between states such as Australia with third countries.
The exercise and delegation of legal and political responsibility for refugees who are affected by externalization, in state and non-state actor settings, include the decision by states and regional organizations, which are financing such policies, to distance themselves from those states where refugees are being warehoused. There is a governance of distancing that allocates management of refugees and asylum seekers to third country or non-state actors – a governance that is dissociated from the state (or the EU) and external to its borders[12].
Australia’s approach to refugee externalization: the case of offshore detention
Refugees for some decades have been framed – by politicians of all major political parties in Australia – in negative terms, for example as queue-jumpers and illegals. Exclusionist and dehumanising terminology is a form of rhetorical externalising and distancing of the rights of asylum-seekers.
A chilling comment by a New York Times journalist was that the ‘world’s refugee crisis knows no more sinister exercise in cruelty than Australia’s island prisons’[13]. The Australian state, for two decades, has determined access to its territory by not only refusing admission, but also by locating people who are seeking asylum in another country – at a distance[14], with the detention and processing in offshore locations of asylum seekers, effectuated by agreements with dependent, host states in the region. The rewards to the host countries include financial aid and development assistance, set out in Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) between Australia and Nauru and Papua New Guinea.
There is distancing by abrogation of responsibility and liability with offshore processing and detention of refugees offshore. There is evidence of sustained mistreatment of refugees and asylum-seekers in offshore detention centres, characterised by what Loughnan calls active neglect, whereby states intend to produce suffering[15].
Since 1992, when Prime Minister Paul Keating’s government introduced legislation for mandatory detention for asylum seekers who arrived onshore without valid visas, while their refugee status was being determined[16], and with the exception of only a few years, this remains the policy of successive governments of both sides of politics.
Since the Tampa incident, when, on 26 August 2001, a Norwegian freighter ship captained by Captain Arne Rinnan, the ‘MV Tampa’ responded to distress calls and rescued 430 asylum seekers from a broken-down boat heading for Christmas Island, and when the Howard government refused the ship permission to disembark the asylum seekers in Australia, this approach to offshoring of responsibility has been maintained. Even though most of them ‘were overwhelmingly confirmed over time to be Convention refugees’, this led to a shift towards ‘the re-characterisation of asylum in Australia as an issue of national security’[17]. Politically, this was timely. Three days after the Tampa incident, on 29 August 2001, Prime Minister Howard tabled the Border Protection Bill 2001, to ‘put beyond doubt the domestic legal basis for actions taken in relation to foreign ships within the territorial sea of Australia’[18]. The Bill permitted an ‘officer’ to direct the master of a ship within the territorial sea to take it outside the territorial sea. It sought to make any actions taken within this Bill non-reviewable in any Australian court. The Bill was rejected in the Senate, although seven pieces of legislation were introduced soon after this[19].
Immediately after Tampa came the ‘Pacific Solution’. On 1 September 2001, Howard announced an agreement that those people rescued by the MV Tampa would be processed in third countries, marking a significant shift in Australia’s approach to dealing with asylum-seekers who arrived by boat. Distancing by placing them on non-Australian islands commenced, as Australia introduced ‘offshore processing’ in Nauru and Papua New Guinea.
This was followed by Howard’s statement that ‘we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in which they come’ on 2 November 2001, leading up to the federal election which was reprinted on thousands of election pamphlets. The former Liberal leader, John Hewson, accused Howard of playing the race card to achieve ‘a victory of prejudice over policy’[20].
The Labor government of Prime Minister Rudd dismantled the Pacific Solution, suspended offshore processing in 2008 and closed the centres. Over the next four years, the number of asylum seekers who arrived by boat increased considerably, as wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and persecution of Tamils in Sri Lanka resulted in the displacement of millions of people. About 610 asylum seekers died trying to reach Australia by boat. The response of the Labor government of Prime Minister Julia Gillard was to resume offshore processing and detention, in August 2012, a policy of successive governments since. On 19 July 2013, Rudd stated that ‘Any asylum seeker who arrives in Australia by boat will have no chance of being settled in Australia as a refugee’[21].
Since 19 July 2013, governments have stated that no refugees will ever be resettled in Australia from Nauru or PNG. In 2013, Liberal Prime Minister Tony Abbott remained committed to retain offshore processing, with slogans of ‘turning back the boats’ and Stop the Boats, under a policy known as Operation Sovereign Borders, slogans later copied by both Interior Minister Matteo Salvini in Italy and UK Prime Minister Rishi Sunak.
In October 2021, Australia agreed to cease offshore processing in Papua New Guinea, but maintained the policy of offshore detention set out in an MoU with Nauru to ‘establish an enduring regional processing capability’ on the island[22]. The Nauru centre has since been re-opened by the Labor[23] government led by Anthony Albanese. Since offshore processing began on 13 August 2012, Australian Governments have sent 4,245 people to Nauru or Papua New Guinea[24].
Distancing is also carried out via privatization. Australia introduced privatization of incarceration in offshore detention, to private firms[25]. However, Australia still has responsibilities under international and human rights law to protect asylum seekers and refugees, yet it has been difficult to challenge Australia’s policy of offshore processing domestically given that most of Australia’s obligations under international human rights and refugee law are not enshrined in federal legislation[26].
The politics of distancing of values and knowledge
There is also a type of distancing of values. Offshoring and outsourcing produce a values distance in the EU, its member states and in Australia. They are distancing themselves from the values of the liberal democratic state and from international obligations. This politics of distance involves the spatial or geographical distance of leaving the refugees offshore in detention centres. The denial of responsibility is evident in the act of abandoning offshore people seeking asylum. It is a means of distancing governments – and the polity and the media – from the human rights abuses taking place in third countries. It constitutes a denial of responsibility for refugees because they will not admit them, so there is a denial of access.
Another distancing is a distancing from access to information and scrutiny – a knowledge distance. Corrosive narratives often co-exist with the absence of adequate knowledge and scrutiny. A narrative of exclusion is perpetuated by many governments and often by media. It forms part of a rhetoric that hardens borders so that they are the sites of denial of access[27]. This in itself gains legitimacy through repetition by politicians and through a mediatization of securitization language and action.
Access to adequate knowledge is denied to the media, civil society and voters – as well as to refugees themselves, who are denied agency. This entails a distancing from media scrutiny and public scrutiny but also legislative scrutiny. This externalization accompanies a shift towards securitization, with refugees increasingly framed as a security risk. The narrative of externalization is one of risk, of security being threatened, framed in ways that range from societal insecurity to potential or actual terrorist threat, with a narrative that state and society are rendered more secure by the denial of access to the state, for people seeking asylum.
The political party system and externalization: corrosive narratives at work
Simplistic and reductionist rhetoric has been adopted by parties across the political spectrum. Corrosive narratives can win votes. Voters respond to narratives from political parties. Narratives can obscure the truth of the refugee experience. Many political parties in Australia and Europe have, for some decades, won votes with the promulgation of harsh policies. Callousness towards refugees is a vote winner. Many politicians in Europe and Australia appeal to concerns regarding societal security and protecting borders. A rhetoric of threat and fear is utilised in populist and non-populist narratives. They focus on refugees as outsiders and strangers, thereby promulgating narratives of threat and instability, of violence and of crime, terrorism and attacks. Politicians utilise highly effective dehumanising language about illegals, illegal maritime arrivals and queue jumpers.
Many Australians and Europeans have little direct knowledge of refugees. This can be partly attributed to the secrecy and lack of transparency surrounding detention policies, and the conditions under which asylum seekers have been held[28]. Pedersen and Hartley suggest many Australians received information via the media and have few direct connections with asylum-seekers. Inaccurate information leads to ‘false beliefs’ – the acceptance of incorrect information as being true.[29]
The decision by governments to distance themselves from a values-based approach creates a form of dissonance where they present the imperative to ‘save lives at sea’ that takes precedence over providing access to rights. Also, within Europe and Australia, there has been recourse to the familiar paradigm of border security, characterised by the language of exclusionism and national interest, of, for example, breaking a business model of people-smuggling[30]. As in Australia, the EU seeks to dismantle the business model of smuggling especially since 2015, when budgeting for Frontex’s joint operations was significantly increased[31].
Australia’s main political parties have been seen as engaging in a form of competitive cruelty. Most political parties in Australia – with the exception of the Greens – compete as to which can be most harsh. Boochani referred to ‘a competition on cruelty’ between these parties, where, he said, ‘refugees are used as political scapegoats to garner public support prior to an election”[32].
Australia should not be a model.
Australia’s policies have drawn criticism for violating international refugee, human rights and maritime law[33]. A key critique of Australia’s policy has been that, by maintaining its policy of mandatory detention, the government ‘breached several international conventions, been complicit in widespread physical, mental and sexual abuse of detainees’[34]. Australian governments have been accused of subjecting asylum seekers to torture, crimes against humanity and the intentional infliction of harm in operating its offshore processing centres[35].
The attempts of Australia – and the EU – to shift responsibility beyond their borders undermines their legitimacy as credible governance actors. It also renders as legitimate and acceptable that which had in the past been considered as unacceptable and unpalatable to liberal democracies.
Offshore processing is perhaps the most crucial example of a cautionary tale for Europe and other parts of the world. Firstly, the adoption of externalization through push-backs and offshore processing has resulted in harm to refugees. This has long constituted a serious harm to the welfare and wellbeing of refugees and asylum seekers, including harm to children. Indefinite detention has had a severe effect on the physical and mental health of individuals detained. Secondly, the policy has been costly. In addition to financial costs, there are physical and health and psychological harms to asylum seekers and refugees, all documented in detail[36]. Thirdly, the policy has failed to achieve its objectives. These policies do not fully prevent departures because asylum seekers find alternative and increasingly dangerous routes. They do not ‘save lives at sea’ and ‘break the business model’ of people smuggling networks[37]. Despite these failures, these policies are maintained for political reasons – for electoral success and they are not even intended to respond to real problems. This constitutes a strong motivation for some politicians to tell untruths. Fourthly, these policies undermine Australia’s and Europe’s global standing as liberal democratic states, with the decision to distance themselves from their responsibilities and legitimate governance responsibilities. Fifthly, the increasing policy convergence that is taking place among western governments on externalization risks eroding the international refugee system. If refugee protection norms are not upheld, then they risk becoming obsolete[38].
The politics of distance includes responsibility-divestment in abandonment of respect for human beings, in a distancing from values, from knowledge, obligation and accountability. The politics of distance constitutes an undermining of the state, of human rights and most especially of refugees.
Combatting externalization
Combatting refugee externalization policies constitutes a challenge. Refugees, scholars, some politicians and journalists, as well as civil society and activists are cognisant of this challenge. Solutions, setting out humanitarian policy and pathways to responsibility, have been elaborated for some years across many states.[39] A recalibration of policy, narratives and conduct by politicians and the media is required[40].
To put it starkly, politicians supporting externalization policies described in this paper need to stop acting only for their own electoral advantage. The media need to hold them to account. Those politicians who oppose externalization also need to step up and hold their colleagues to account, under legislative scrutiny and in the media. They must coalesce around oppositional narratives that challenge the practice of externalization and contest the undermining of refugee protection. They must show that politicians can be held to account for cruel and harsh policies.
Knowledge distancing can be combatted, with more knowledge and enhanced scrutiny of the harms of externalization. Those who oppose externalization (within and outside of parliaments) should call for regular debates in national parliaments and the European Parliament. The media reporting should be responsible and avoid sensationalist language. Policymakers should establish a national and expert panel (of refugees; experts; lawyers; advocates) to regularly report on truth, transparency and accountability in policy.
Public and legislative debate is required to discuss how externalization harms refugees; involves human rights abuses; is financially very costly and is a failed policy. The debate could include the legal accountability and transparency of EU agencies and Australian and European governments and their contracts with private firms, including oversight of offshore processing and other externalization arrangements.
Narrative distancing can be reversed, through a consistent contestation of rhetoric of exclusion and externalization. This contestation must commence with those people in governments and EU institutions who are already willing to take a leadership role, in countering false narratives and stereotypes that dominate much public debate.
Policymaking can be humane. The public services should ensure that policies and laws are enforced in ways that uphold the human rights of refugees. They and the media are encouraged to provide evidence that people seeking refuge can be a benefit to society. Politicians should undertake to adhere to a handbook to guide best practice in ethical policymaking, in order to better equip them with knowledge and analysis that is critical to accurate and informed policymaking. These include[41] compliance with international legal commitments and ensuring that people are not sent back to a real risk of persecution or other serious harm; the provision of humane, fair reception conditions; providing people a fair hearing and, importantly, the creation of additional safe, lawful pathways to protection.
The media should take a leadership role in actively contributing to investigative reporting of externalization and enacting a shift in rhetoric, drawing on best practice and consultation with refugees. The media should have a handbook of best practice, with an ethical code of conduct for journalists relating to refugee policy. The media and policymakers should explore avenues for contesting and challenging hate speech, racism and the proliferation of untruthful narratives about refugee movement, especially through social media and other online platforms.
Contesting refugee externalization requires deeper examination of the root causes, manifestations, trends and effects, and cooperation with other countries to externalize and distance policies and border control. Contestation includes calls for bodies such as Frontex to be abolished; for proposals to halt Australian and EU direct and indirect involvement in illegal pushbacks; and for the promotion of awareness on mobility (in)justice and its consequences.
Despite extensive advocacy, and research which provides compelling evidence of the harms enabled through externalization policies, states and the EU remain committed to harsh border policies. Changing narratives about refugees remains a fraught process unless there is a culture of political leadership that is dedicated to making a difference. The violence of externalization processes demands that states be held to account. One imperative is to address myths about the alleged value of offshore processing as a deterrent.
A situation worth striving for would include a commitment to public education regarding borders and migration, in order to redress misconceptions, so that the public is provided with the opportunity to learn more and is presented with alternatives.
It is imperative to hold states to account (including legally) for their failure to meet their obligations under the Refugee Convention. There is a need for enhanced monitoring of places of detention, especially through signatory status to the Optional Protocol to the Convention Against Torture, with stronger collaboration with civil society. There is a need for more recognition that people movement is a global issue requiring more comprehensive and transnational responses to manage movement in a fair, equitable and humane manner. It is essential that there be more representation of refugee voices in policy.
Finally, it is important to emphasise that Australia is not a model for refugee externalization policies, but a cautionary tale.
Footnotes
[1] UNHCR, 2022, Externalisation, UNHCR Representation in Australia, New Zealand and the Pacific, https://www.unhcr.org/au/publications/externalisation
[2] European Council, Council of the EU, 2016, EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016. https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/03/18/eu-turkey-statement/
[3] Strik, T., Robbesom, R. 2024, Compliance or Complicity? An Analysis of the EU‑Tunisia Deal in the Context of the Externalisation of Migration, Netherlands International Law Review 71:199–225
[4] See, for example, The Comparative Network on Refugee Externalisation Policies.The author was Director of this Jean Monnet Research Network, funded by the European Commission and the University of Melbourne. https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/school-of-social-and-political-sciences/our-research/comparative-network-on-refugee-externalisation-policies
[5] Murray, P, 2019, The externalisation of refugee policies in Australia and Europe: The need for a comparative interdisciplinary approach, CONREP blog, https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/school-of-social-and-political-sciences/our-research/comparative-network-on-refugee-externalisation-policies/blog/the-externalisation-of-refugee-policies-in-australia-and-europe
[6] Matera, M. Tubakovic, T., Murray, P., 2023, Is Australia a Model for the UK? A Critical Assessment of Parallels of Cruelty in Refugee Externalization Policies, Journal of Refugee Studies, 36 (2) 271-293.
[7] Murray, P. and Longo M. 2018, Europe’s wicked legitimacy crisis: The case of refugees, Journal of European Integration, 40 (4) 411-425. A. Dastyari, A. Nethery, A. Hirsch, eds. 2023, Refugee Externalisation Policies. Responsibility, Legitimacy and Accountability, London Routledge
[8] Nethery, A. 2019, Secrecy and abuse in Australia’s immigration detention systems, Asylum Insight, https://www.asyluminsight.com/c-amy-nethery#.XdjDvJMzY00
[9] Crisp, J. 2019, Externalization and the erosion of refugee protection, CONREP blog, https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/school-of-social-and-political-sciences/our-research/comparative-network-on-refugee-externalisation-policies/blog/externalization-and-the-erosion-of-refugee-protection
[10] FitzGerald, D. S. 2020, Remote control of migration: theorising territoriality, shared coercion, and deterrence, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies, 46:1, 4-22.
[11] A. Dastyari, A. Nethery, A. Hirsch, eds. 2023, Refugee Externalisation Policies. Responsibility, Legitimacy and Accountability, London Routledge.
[12] See, for example, Moreno-Lax, V and Pedersen, M 2019, ‘Border-induced displacement: The ethical and legal implications of distance-creation through externalization’ Questions of International Law, vol. 56, 5-33.
[13] Cohen, R., 2016, Broken Men in Paradise, New York Times, 9 December. https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/09/opinion/sunday/australia-refugee-prisons-manus-island.html
[14] Murray, P. 2023, The Externalisation of Refugee Policies: the politics of distancing, in A. Dastyari, A. Nethery, A. Hirsch, eds. Refugee Externalisation Policies. Responsibility, Legitimacy and Accountability, London Routledge, 45-66.
[15] Loughnan, C., 2019, Regional deterrence and ‘non-genuine’ refugees: The punitive legacy of the 1989 Comprehensive Plan of Action, Asian and Pacific Migration Journal, Vol. 28(2) 155–182
[16] Asylum Insight (2021), Evolution of Asylum Policy in Australia, https://www.asyluminsight.com/evolutionofasylumpolicy#.YV3DoC0Ro_U
[17] Crock, M., 2019, Refugee Protection in Australia: Policies and Practice, Revue européenne des migrations internationales, vol. 35 – n°1 et 2, 243.
[18] York, B., 2003, Australia and Refugees, 1901-2002: An Annotated Chronology Based on Official Sources. https://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Parliamentary_Departments/Parliamentary_Library/Publications_Archive/online/Refugeess7
[19] Mathew, P., 2002, Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa, The American Journal of International Law, 96 (3) 661-676
[20] Barkham, P., 2001, Australia votes on how tightly to close the door. Illegal migration is at the heart of Australia’s cliffhanger general election today, The Guardian, 11 November 2001https://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/nov/10/immigration.uk,
[21] ABC News, 19 July 2013, Asylum seekers arriving in Australia by boat to be resettled in Papua New Guinea.
https://www.abc.net.au/news/2013-07-19/manus-island-detention-centre-to-be-expanded-under-rudd27s-asy/4830778
[22] Brancatisano E., 2021 Australia signs new agreement with Nauru to continue offshore processing of asylum seekers, SBS News, https://www.sbs.com.au/news/australia-signs-new-agreement-with-nauru-to-continue-offshore-processing-of-asylum-seekers/2583c6ec-63fd-4d5e-b550-8afa76c800d0 . Faa, Marion, 2021, Australia to stop processing asylum seekers in PNG but government’s refugee policy unchanged, ABC News, 6 October, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2021-10-06/australia-stop-processing-asylum-seekers-in-png-manus/100517926
[23] In Australia, the party’s name is Labor, not Labour.
[24] Refugee Council of Australia, 2024, Offshore processing statistics, 17 April. https://www.refugeecouncil.org.au/operation-sovereign-borders-offshore-detention-statistics/2/#:~:text=Australia%20has%20transferred%204%2C245%20people,refugee%20claims%20to%20be%20processed
[25] O’Flynn, J. 2014, Manus Island takes Australia to the edge of outsourcing, The Conversation, https://theconversation.com/manus-island-takes-australia-to-the-edge-of-outsourcing-23647. See also https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/oct/27/transfield-given-15bn-over-three-years-to-manage-nauru-and-manus-centres; https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2015/sep/25/detention-centre-operator-transfield-services-to-be-renamed-broadspectrum; https://www.sbs.com.au/news/fragment/transfield-wins-12bn-contract-manus-nauru-detention-centre-security;
[26] Kaldor Centre for International Refugee Law 2021, Who is legally responsible for offshore processing on Manus and Nauru? 10 August. https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/publication/offshore-processing-australia%E2%80%99s-responsibility-asylum-seekers-and-refugees-nauru-and. See also Dehm, S. 2019, Outsourcing, Responsibility and Refugee Claim-Making in Australia’s Offshore Detention Regime, in Siobhan McGuirk and Adrienne Pine (eds), Asylum for Sale: Profit and Protest in the Migration Industry, PM Press, Oakland, California, 47-66.
[27] Moreno-Lax, V, Ghezelbash, D and Klein, N 2019, ‘Between life, security and rights: Framing the interdiction of “boat migrants” in the Central Mediterranean and Australia’ Leiden Journal of International Law, 32, 715-740.
[28] Nethery , A. and Holman , R. 2016 Secrecy and human rights abuse in Australia’s offshore immigration detention centres, The International Journal of Human Rights, 20(7), 1018-1038
[29] Pedersen, A. and L. Hartley, 2017, ‘False Beliefs about Asylum Seekers to Australia: The Role of Confidence in Such Beliefs, Prejudice, and the Third Person Effect’, Journal of Pacific Rim Psychology, 11(5): 1–12.
[30] Parliament of Australia 2012, Transcript of joint press conference: Canberra: 28 June 2012: asylum seeker legislation; expert advisory panel, https://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/search/display/display.w3p;query=Id:%22media/pressrel/2048153%22. Department of Home Affairs 2020, Criminal justice, https://www.homeaffairs.gov.au/about-us/our-portfolios/criminal-justice/people-smuggling-human-trafficking/people-smuggling
[31] Achilli, L. and Sanchez, G., 2017.What does it mean to disrupt the business models of people smugglers? Policy Briefs, 2017/09, Migration Policy Centre, European University Institute, Florence, https://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/46165
[32] Boochani, B., 2021, The pattern is clear: Australia’s next election will be a competition on cruelty, The Guardian, 10 October. https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2021/oct/11/the-pattern-is-clear-australias-next-election-will-be-a-competition-on-cruelty?CMP=Share_iOSApp_Other
[33] Mathew, P., 2002, Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa, The American Journal of International Law, 96 (3) 661-676
[34] Minns, J, Bradley, K and Chagas-Bastos, FH 2018, ‘Australia’s Refugee Policy’, International Studies, 55(1), 1–21. 3
[35] Davidson, H., 2018, ‘I stopped these’: Scott Morrison keeps migrant boat trophy in office. https://www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2018/sep/19/i-stopped-these-scott-morrison-keeps-migrant-boat-trophy-in-office 19 September.
[36] Gleeson, M. and Yacoub, N, 2021, Cruel, costly and ineffective: The failure of offshore processing in Australia. https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/files/Policy_Brief_11_Offshore_Processing.pdf
[37] Gleeson, M. and Yacoub, N, 2021, Cruel, costly and ineffective: The failure of offshore processing in Australia. https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/files/Policy_Brief_11_Offshore_Processing.pdf
[38] Murray, P., Matera, M., Tubakovic, T, 2022. Parallels Of Cruelty to Refugees: Normalising the Unacceptable in Australia and the UK. Asylum Insight. https://www.asyluminsight.com/murray-matera-tubakovic
[39] Kaldor Centre 2022, Report Principles for Australian Refugee Policy. Comparative Network on Refugee Externalisation Policies (CONREP), 2022, Final Dissemination Report, August. https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0011/4362059/CONREP-DIssemination-Report-Final.pdf. Gleeson, M. and Yacoub, N, 2021, Cruel, costly and ineffective: The failure of offshore processing in Australia. https://www.kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/sites/kaldorcentre.unsw.edu.au/files/Policy_Brief_11_Offshore_Processing.pdf
[40] Loughnan, C. and Murray, P. 2022, “Combatting Corrosive Narratives about Refugees“, Policy Paper, Comparative Network on Refugee Externalisation. The University of Melbourne. https://arts.unimelb.edu.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0003/4231587/CONREP-Policy-Report-3_Narrative_Loughnan-and-Murray_final.pdf
[41] Kaldor Centre, 2022, Principles for Australian Refugee Policy, https://www.unsw.edu.au/kaldor-centre/our-resources/legal-and-policy-resources/kaldor-centre-principles-for-australian-refugee-policy#:~:text=The%20Kaldor%20Centre%20Principles%20for,develop%20a%20better%20refugee%20policy.