Externalisation has become a defining feature of European migration governance, characterised by coercive measures and serious human rights risks. Despite growing criticism, the EU continues to expand its externalisation agenda. Following the adoption of the New Pact on Migration and Asylum in May 2024 (Pact), the EU has shifted its focus to returns. Returns are now the new frontier of externalisation.

The European Commission has advanced several proposals to strengthen return enforcement, including a new Returns Regulation (negotiations opened in March 2026) and new amendments to the Asylum Procedures Regulation (adopted in February 2026). This article analyses these initiatives as part of a coordinated effort to externalise EU returns, focusing on the expanded “safe third country” concept and the creation of “return hubs”. Although presented as “innovative” and “out-of-the-box,” these ideas are neither new nor untested. They also remain legally questionable and largely ineffective. Yet, such strategies persist because they serve a political purpose: signalling resolve to a growing nationalist and right-wing populist EU electorate, while simultaneously sending a message of deterrence to prospective migrants.

1. Exploring Returns in the Age of Externalisation

Externalisation has become a defining feature of contemporary European migration governance, relying on coercive measures and accompanied by serious human rights risks. While the Commissioner of Human Rights of the Council of Europe^[1] and the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants^[2] are turning their critical look towards this worrisome trend, the EU is nevertheless moving steadily in this direction. Shortly after the sweeping overhaul of EU administrative law on migration and asylum with the adoption of the new Pact in May 2024, including 10 new and amended instruments, the EU legislature has already resumed action, picking up its legislative activity with a new focal point: returns.

Returns of irregularly staying migrants have long featured on the EU’s migration agenda, but in recent months they have taken centre stage as the new frontier of externalisation. As early as 2004, the Council urged strong return measures, and by 2011, the Commission had made an ‘effective return policy’ a key objective of the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM), reaffirming the same goal in the 2015 European Agenda on Migration. In the new Pact, the Commission emphasised the goal of intensifying returns as an overriding priority, setting the ambitious target of 50,000 returnees per year in the period 2021-2027.^[3]

According to Eurostat data, only around 20% of expulsion orders result in actual returns.^[4] The EU Commission sees the low rate of enforcement as an ‘incentive for irregular migration’, arguing that it ‘erodes citizens’ trust in EU policy, while for many, increasing returns enforcement is essential for the functioning of EU migration management as a whole.^[5]

An earlier attempt in 2018 to amend the 2008 Returns Directive ultimately failed, with negotiations stagnating for years. The Commission then adopted its common ‘creative’ solution of re-introducing parts of the failed proposed amendments through the back door, scattering them over other instruments of the Pact and creating a complex system of derogations from the common return procedure.^[6] For instance, the Asylum Procedures Regulation joins the asylum rejection decision with the expulsion order, limiting the discretion of Member States to allow a failed asylum seeker to stay in the country (Art. 37), for instance, on humanitarian grounds. Moreover, a special procedure is introduced in the Return Border Procedure Regulation for those rejected at the EU’s external border, widely expanding detention and prioritising forced return over voluntary departure (Arts. 4 and 5).

The political dynamics in the pre-2024-election European Parliament, however, prevented the adoption of even more restrictive steps in this direction. As a result, the amendment of the Returns Directive was left out of the legislative package. A notably more right-leaning, and at times openly xenophobic, political majority emerged from the 2024 European Parliament elections, which opened the way for fresh negotiations and the search for ‘innovative’ ‘out-of-the-box’ solutions.^[7] As this rhetoric is increasingly becoming synonymous with externalisation in the language of European policy, the proposed solutions cover two different but interrelated fronts: the expansion of the notion of safe third country, and the establishment of return hubs.

To give legislative shape to these ideas, the Commission continued its tradition of complexity and fragmentation by introducing three new legislative proposals: a) a new Returns Regulation, b) an amendment to the 2024 Asylum Procedures Regulation regarding the establishment of a list of safe third countries, and c) an amendment to the 2024 Asylum Procedures Regulation modifying the safe third country concept (Safe Third Country Regulation).

Two important amendments to the Pact were speedily adopted in February 2026, creating an EU-wide list of safe countries of origin and revising the safe third country concept. The list designates Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, India, Kosovo, Morocco and Tunisia as safe countries of origin, as well as EU accession candidate countries under certain conditions. The use of the safe third country concept remains optional for the Member States, who may choose to apply it based on three options:

1. connection criterion: where a link exists between the asylum applicant and the designated safe third country
2. transit: where the applicant has passed through the safe third country prior to arriving in the EU; or
3. STC agreement: where a formal agreement or other arrangement has been concluded with a country considered safe.^[8]

The new rules will take effect on 12 June 2026, along with the rest of the Pact instruments.^[9]

The European Parliament endorsed on 26 March 2026 the opening of the negotiations with the Council on the new Returns Regulation.^[10]

While analyses of the proposals have already emerged separately, this is the first attempt to bring them together for a comprehensive understanding. This blog post seeks to make sense of this new EU focus on externalisation of returns by triangulating these developments. In particular, it examines how the (re)development of the safe third country concept serves as a vehicle for the externalisation of returns and explores the legal and political implications arising from this shift.

2. The Main Changes of the Four Instruments

At a special meeting on 9 February 2023, the European Council, in the context of discussions on returns and readmission, called for more frequent use of the concepts of safe third country and safe country of origin (see Box 1: Definitions). In May 2024, the Interior Ministers from 15 Member States demanded that the European Commission allow them to transfer those asylum applicants for whom a safe third country alternative is available to such countries and asked for the reassessment of the safe third country concept, including the removal of the connection criterion.^[11] As a result of this forceful political push, relevant legislative files resurfaced on the EU agenda.

Box 1: Definitions

2024 Asylum Procedures Regulation

Central among the new rules of the Pact is the focus of the new Asylum Procedures Regulation on the scope and application of the concept of safe third country. Based on the assumption that the applicant could have sought asylum in another country before reaching the EU, an application is rejected as inadmissible under EU law if the relevant country is considered safe. An admissible application can be considered on its merits, whereas an inadmissible one is rejected, and the applicant is subject to expulsion and return under the Returns Directive. The applicant is then implicitly expected to resubmit their application in the safe third country, which will presumably assess it properly.

A third country can be considered safe under the following criteria outlined in Art. 38 of the Asylum Procedures Directive (in force until June 2026):

1. the life and liberty of the applicant is not threatened on Refugee Convention grounds;
2. there is no risk of serious harm as defined in the Qualification Directive;
3. the principle of non-refoulement is respected;
4. the prohibition of removal, in violation of the right to freedom from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, is respected;
5. the possibility exists to request refugee status and receive protection in accordance with the Geneva Convention, and
6. there is a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned.

In the new Asylum Procedures Regulation, the fifth criterion has been revised, no longer requiring that a country be considered safe for a refugee to obtain refugee status. It suffices for them to be able to enjoy ‘effective protection’ (Arts. 57 and 59(1)). This may, at a minimum, consist of the chance to remain in the territory, having access to sufficient means of subsistence to maintain an adequate standard of living, healthcare and essential medical treatment, and education on the same terms as nationals until a durable solution is found. This amendment allows for the designation of countries that have not signed or ratified the Refugee Convention as safe, retroactively legitimising the highly controversial EU-Türkiye deal and opening the way for further agreements with non-signatory countries.

Moreover, the use of the safe third country concept remains optional for Member States. The safe third country concept is not applied uniformly across the Member States, as shown in figure 1 below. France, Iceland, Italy and Poland have not included the concept in national legislation, while Czechia, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Spain refer to it in national law but do not apply it in practice. Only six EU+ countries have adopted national lists of safe third countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Germany, Greece, Hungary and Switzerland).^[12]

Figure 1: The Implementation of the Safe Third Country Concept Across Member States

A second amendment provides that a country may be considered safe, with the exception of certain regions (geographical exception) or certain groups of people. Moreover, the Regulation introduces the design of an EU list of safe third countries, next to the already existing national lists. Furthermore, the mandatory revised border procedure, allowing for widespread detention, will also apply to safe third country cases. Finally, the Regulation provides that the EU may conclude an agreement with a non-EU country stipulating that individuals admitted under that Agreement will be protected in accordance with the relevant international standards, including the principle of non-refoulement. Based on this agreement, the third country will be presumed safe.

Proposed Recast of the Asylum Procedures Regulation (safe third country list)

The ink on the 2024 Asylum Procedures Regulation was barely dry when, on 16 April 2025, the Commission tabled, a proposal to amend it by establishing an EU list of safe countries of origin, including Bangladesh, Colombia, Egypt, Kosovo, India, Morocco and Tunisia. The change relevant to the topic of this article concerns greater flexibility for member states to exempt certain regions or groups of people from the designation of a third country as safe (Arts 59(2) and 61(2)).

Safe Third Country Regulation

On 20 May 2025, the Commission proposed yet another amendment to the 2024 Asylum Procedures Regulation, this time introducing new rules to facilitate the application of the safe third country concept. This was barely a surprise as the 2024 Asylum Procedures Regulation required the review of the application of the safe third country concept by June 2025, under more favourable political circumstances (Art. 77). Under the proposal, the connection criterion may be removed as a mandatory requirement under EU law or mere transit through a non-EU country may be considered as sufficient to establish connection with that country. What is more, the Regulation also allows Member States to conclude their own safe third country agreements with non-EU countries, under which the third country will examine the asylum applications of the people who would be sent there (Rwanda clause). Furthermore, when such an agreement is concluded, even the minimal requirement of transit is no longer required. As a result, an asylum seeker may be deported to a country anywhere in the world with which they have no connection whatsoever. This option will not apply to unaccompanied minors.

Moreover, any appeals by an individual to the application of the safe third country concept will no longer have an automatic suspensive effect, except for unaccompanied minors subject to the border procedure. This means that someone may be deported while their appeal is still pending, raising serious concerns regarding access to an effective remedy. It must be noted that although the suspensive effect will not be automatic, applicants may still request the temporary suspension of their removal proceedings until their appeal is decided.

Returns Regulation

The new proposal on return, presented in March 2025, focuses on further streamlining and harmonising rules and procedures across the Member States (note the progression from the minimum harmonisation approach of the Directive to the more binding Regulation) and on the externalisation of return. It adopts an overall coercive approach, weakening human rights safeguards, including stricter obligations for cooperation by third country nationals for their return with punitive consequences if they fail to do so, expansion of detention, and enhanced data sharing among EU Member States and third countries.^[13]

A cornerstone of the new proposal is the expansion of the definition of ‘countries of return’. It now includes not only the country of origin or transit, but also any other country that allows the returnee to enter and reside, any country with which an agreement or arrangement for return has been concluded (“return hubs”), or simply any third country that has been considered safe at the EU or at the domestic level when the asylum application was rejected as inadmissible (Art. 4). Practically, if this proposal is accepted, Member States will be able to deport failed applicants anywhere in the world to countries that may even be unknown to them. The Regulation sets certain standards and safeguards for the establishment of return hubs, including respect for human rights, but leaves their establishment to the responsibility of the individual Member States (Art. 17).

3. Safe Third Countries and Deportation Camps: A Blueprint for Externalised Returns

The above demonstrates how the EU is gradually building towards a system of externalisation of return, with the expansion of the safe third country concept paving the way. The Asylum Procedures Regulation has already made it possible for an application to be rejected as inadmissible without it ever being assessed on its merits because a country that is not party to the Refugee Convention can offer ‘effective protection’ or because only certain parts of its territory fulfil the safety requirements. Moreover, Member States can establish special safe third country agreements with non-EU states under which these countries can be considered safe for the return of applicants. In this case, safe third country requirements, including the connection criterion, must be respected.

The Recast Asylum Procedures Regulation and the Safe Third Country Regulation attempt to take the broadening of the concept several steps further, enhancing the discretion of Member States to apply exceptions and allowing the return of applicants to countries with which they have no genuine link but have merely transited through. In the case of a country with a Safe Third Country agreement with an EU Member State, transition through that country will no longer be required for the country to be considered safe. As a result, an asylum application can be rejected, and the applicant can be sent against their will to an unknown country anywhere in the world, where they will be allowed to lodge their asylum application.

What is more, the Commission attempts to defy common logic with the proposed Returns Regulation, which allows a failed asylum applicant, or any migrant with no right to stay in the EU, to be euphemistically ‘returned’ to a country they have never stayed or passed through, so that they can either apply for asylum or be deported onward to their country of origin.

In effect, these legislative developments constitute the legal basis for the externalisation of return. Under the new political dynamics, the Council and the Commission attempt to build the legislative basis for the creation of figurative deportation camps and the processing of asylum applications by countries outside of Europe with no relation whatsoever to the applicant. This can be done based on a Safe Third Country and a return hub agreement – possibly combined – concluded unilaterally by any of the 27 EU Member States with minimal oversight.

Unsurprisingly, civil society's reaction has been fierce opposition. In September 2025, a coalition of more than 200 organisations called on EU co-legislators to reject the new Returns Regulation, noting that it would make it possible ‘for the first time, to deport a person against their will to a non-EU country to which they have no personal connection, either through which they have only briefly transited or in which they have never set foot. Sending someone against their will to a country to which they have no link can in no way be considered reasonable, just or sustainable’. The organisations also note that the return hubs are ‘highly likely to become prison-like detention centres hosting those awaiting deportations outside of EU territory’.^[14]

4. A Recycled Strategy and a Political Campaign of Securitisation and Deterrence

Despite claims for innovative and out-of-the-box thinking, the proposed ideas on externalising returns are neither new nor untested. They are also far from being free from legal controversy, and it is questionable whether they can reasonably address the failures of past approaches.

The previous Parliament firmly opposed the abolition of the connection requirement in the Asylum Procedures Regulation, while the idea of empowering Frontex to coordinate returns from one third country to another (i.e. operating return hubs outside the EU) did not survive the trilateral negotiations for the 2019 European Border and Coast Guard Regulation.^[15] Likewise, the Commission had earlier considered and dismissed the creation of disembarkation centres in third countries for migrants rescued at sea, pointing out several serious practical and legal obstacles.^[16]

Recent bilateral experiments, such as the UK-Rwanda and the Italy-Albania agreements, have also faced crippling legal challenges and have been (partially) struck down by domestic and European courts.^[17] The European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) has also long poured cold water on the EU- Türkiye deal, repeatedly concluding that Türkiye does not meet the safety requirements, whether due to the refoulement of refugees to Syria (Akkad v Türkiye) or direct violations of the right to life and freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (J. A. and A. A. v Türkiye). Furthermore, the CJEU struck down the ‘geographical exception’ in 2024 in the case CV v Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky, when it held that a country cannot be designated as a safe country of origin if there are certain regions in its territory that do not meet the safety criteria. While courts have identified numerous issues with externalisation agreements, this does not mean that specific past failures automatically disqualify extraterritorial asylum processing models as illegal.

Return externalisation attempts that deal with ‘voluntary’ returns have also raised several concerns about the safety of partner countries. Niger was the first country to serve as a return hub under the Emergency Transit Mechanism operated by the UNHCR and the International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and financially supported by the EU.^[18] In this framework, more than 3,000 migrants were transferred from Libya to Niger in recent years, intended to be deported onward to their countries of origin. In the same period, Niger experienced escalating terrorist violence and deepening political instability, culminating in its collapse into military dictatorship in 2023, with growing numbers of fatalities and forced displacement.^[19]

Tunisia, another country presumed safe by the EU, following the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding with the EU in 2023, has engaged in voluntary return hub programs that encourage and facilitate the voluntary return of non-Tunisian nationals to their countries of origin, despite known human rights concerns regarding the treatment of migrants. In April 2024, the Tunisian National Guard was reported to have violently dismantled makeshift camps housing refugees and migrants, including the burning of thousands of tents and the displacement of thousands of individuals. Under such coercive conditions, migrants were pushed into the EU-IOM funded ‘voluntary’ return programs, an example which vividly highlights the risks of such unholy alliances.^[20]

Beyond the human rights risks, the proposed EU reforms lack evidence-based justifications regarding their effectiveness, necessity and proportionality. The Commission has chosen not to present impact assessments for the legislative proposals, which makes it difficult to assess what the measures could achieve and at what cost, whether legal, social or financial. As a matter of fact, the implementation of (especially forced) returns, although highly publicised, faces serious political, practical and financial hurdles, in addition to the legal ones. Obstacles to return go far beyond the cooperation of the migrants themselves, and include the refusal by countries to which individuals would be sent (countries of return) to readmit or issue travel documents, logistical challenges related to the high cost especially of charter flights, procedural bottlenecks, insufficient resources and capacity, lack of opportunities for integration over time influencing the sustainability of the return, as well as considerable political cost.^[21] In fact, the legality, feasibility and effectiveness of externalised return plans remain highly contested.

Despite their limited legal feasibility and evidence of effectiveness, such proposals serve an important political messaging function, targeting both EU citizens and prospective migrants. Such strategies function as political campaigns, firstly addressing a growingly nationalist and right-wing populist EU electorate, as the 2024 and 2025 elections in the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium, Portugal and Poland have shown, along with a broader right-wing populist shift following the 2024 US elections. Furthermore, they serve as a message of deterrence towards prospective migrants, echoing Denmark’s ‘negative asylum branding’ and Australia’s ‘No Way’ campaign.

While widely discussed in public debates, the EU's ambitions for return externalisation may ultimately remain unrealised due to the political, legal, and financial challenges they face. Nonetheless, their promotion signals a clear message of a less tolerant Europe, prepared to continue travelling the path of securitisation and deterrence at the expense of the rule of law and the Union’s core values.

Legislation and Case Law:

• Refugee Convention 1951
  https://www.unhcr.org/media/1951-refugee-convention-and-1967-protocol-relating-status-refugees
• Asylum Qualification Directive 2011
  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2011/95/oj/eng
• Asylum Procedures Directive 2013
  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2013/32/oj/eng
• European Council Conclusions, 9 February 2023 https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2023/02/09/european-council-conclusions-9-february-2023/
• Asylum Qualification Regulation 2024
  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2024/1347/oj/eng
• Asylum Procedures Regulation 2024

https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ:L_202401348#d1e4844-1-1

• Recast Asylum Procedures Regulation Proposal 2025
  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:ce9d2b1d-1ab3-11f0-b1a3-01aa75ed71a1.0001.02/DOC_1&format=PDF
• Safe Third Country Regulation Proposal 2025
  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A52025PC0259
• Return Regulation Proposal 2025
  https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex:52025PC0101
• ECtHR, Akkad v Türkiye, 2018
  https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-192744%22]}
• CJEU, CV v Ministerstvo vnitra České republiky, Odbor azylové a migrační politiky (C-406/22) of 4 October 2024
  https://caselaw.euaa.europa.eu/pages/viewcaselaw.aspx?CaseLawID=4573&returnurl=%2fPages%2fsearch.aspx
• ECtHR, J. A. and A. A. v Türkiye, 2024
  https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng#{%22itemid%22:[%22001-230708%22]}

Footnotes

1. Commissioner of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, Externalised Asylum and Migration Policies and Human Rights Law, (2025), https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://rm.coe.int/report-on-externalisation-of-migration-by-michael-o-flaherty-council-o/488028300a&ved=2ahUKEwic9pOy7-qTAxVG5gIHHbxZFLMQFnoECBoQAQ&usg=AOvVaw364j1ZzNlKSyElg4Z1dpOP. ↑

2. A/80/302: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, Gehad Madi - Externalization of migration governance and its effect on the human rights of migrants, 2025, https://www.ohchr.org/en/documents/thematic-reports/a80302-report-special-rapporteur-human-rights-migrants-gehad-madi. ↑

3. Gkliati M. The EU Returns Agency: The Commissions’ Ambitious Plans and Their Human Rights Implications. European Journal of Migration and Law. 2022;24(4):545-569. doi:10.1163/15718166-12340140. ↑

4. Returns of Irregular Migrants - Quarterly Statistics - Statistics Explained.; 2025. Accessed September 5, 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?oldid=578362. ↑

5. Parusel B. The EU’s new agenda for returning irregular migrants. SIEPS. June 2025. Accessed August 4, 2025. https://sieps.se/en/publications/2025/the-eu-s-new-agenda-for-returning-irregular-migrants/. ↑

6. Moraru M. The Impact of the 2024 CEAS Reform on the EU’s Return System: Amending the Return Directive Through the Backdoor. EU Immigration and Asylum Law and Policy. September 25, 2024. Accessed August 4, 2025. https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/the-impact-of-the-2024-ceas-reform-on-the-eus-return-system-amending-the-return-directive-through-the-backdoor/. ↑

7. Commission proposes a new Common European System for Returns. European Commission. March 11, 2025. Accessed August 6, 2025. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_25_724. ↑

8. See adopted text here: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-10-2026-0026_EN.html. ↑

9. Council of the EU, Council gives final greenlight to measures to make the EU’s asylum system more efficient and robust, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/23/council-gives-final-greenlight-to-measures-to-make-the-eu-s-asylum-system-more-efficient-and-robust/. ↑

10. European Parliament News: Returns regulation: MEPs ready to start negotiations, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260324IPR38908/returns-regulation-meps-ready-to-start-negotiations.↑

11. Nielsen N. 15 EU states want “outside the box” ideas to curtail migrant arrivals. EUObserver. May 16, 2024. Accessed August 7, 2025. https://euobserver.com/migration/ar3555bfa8. ↑

12. European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA). Overview of the Implementation of Safe Country Concepts.; 2025. Accessed August 10, 2025. https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&rct=j&opi=89978449&url=https://euaa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/publications/2025-07/2025_safe_country_concept_EN.pdf&ved=2ahUKEwjr-dXro8GPAxXnm_0HHZRmH4IQFnoECBgQAQ&usg=AOvVaw1XgLQAo4yiBWyMUCvYPLCc. ↑

13. Majcher I. The New EU “Common System for Returns” under the Return Regulation: Evidence-Lacking Lawmaking and Human Rights Concerns. EU Law Analysis. April 2, 2025. Accessed August 4, 2025. https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2025/04/the-new-eu-common-system-for-returns.html. ↑

14. Statewatch. (2025, September). EU deportation law must be rejected. https://www.statewatch.org/news/2025/september/eu-deportation-law-must-be-rejected/. ↑

15. Gkliati M. The new European Border and Coast Guard: Do increased powers come with enhanced accountability? EU Law Analysis. April 17, 2019. Accessed August 7, 2025. https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2019/04/the-new-european-border-and-coast-guard.html. ↑

16. European Commission. The Legal and Practical Feasibility of Disembarkation Options: Follow-up to the Informal Working Meeting of 24 June 2018. 2018;(June):1-5. ↑

17. Italy approves new decree to use Albanian migration centers as repatriation hubs. March 29, 2025. Accessed August 7, 2025. https://apnews.com/article/italy-albania-migrants-centers-deportation-eu-02ab436836d44d624f2cffb529a35163; The following cases challenging the Italy-Albania deal are still pending before the CJEU: C-414/25, Sedrata and Case C-706/25, Comeri; Briddick C, Costello C. Supreme Judgecraft: Non-Refoulement and the end of the UK-Rwanda ‘deal’? https://verfassungsblog.de/supreme-judgecraft/. ↑

18. Emergency Transit Mechanism (ETM) Flash Update - Niger. UNHCR. January 2025. Accessed September 5, 2025. https://reliefweb.int/report/niger/emergency-transit-mechanism-etm-flash-update-january-2025. ↑

19. Gkliati MKJ. Exporting Borders: Frontex and the Expansion of Fortress Europe in West Africa; 2025. https://www.tni.org/en/publication/exporting-borders-West-Africa. ↑

20. Deportation and readmission | Outsourcing Borders: Monitoring EU border externalisation policy. Statewatch. Accessed August 7, 2025. https://www.statewatch.org/outsourcing-borders-monitoring-eu-externalisation-policy/bulletin-7/deportation-and-readmission/. ↑

21. Lemberg-Pedersen M, Halpern OJ. Frontex and Exit Governance: Dataveillance, Civil Society and Markets for Border Control.; 2021. Accessed September 5, 2025. http://admigov.eu; Jones C, Kilpatrick J, Gkliati M. Statewatch Report, Deportation Union: Rights, Accountability, and the EU’s Push to Increased Forced Removals.; 2020. https://www.statewatch.org/deportation-union-rights-accountability-and-the-eu-s-push-to-increase-forced-removals/. ↑