This post focuses on the attempt made by the Trump Administration to deport unwanted foreigners, generally convicted of crimes in the US, to various African countries because they cannot be sent back to their countries of origin, being at risk of persecution by their domestic authorities. Through a legal and political analysis of the current situation, I argue that deporting foreigners to Africa will not only infringe on their human rights but also undermine their wellbeing. This process, however, does not take place without something in return for the African countries concerned. For hosting convicted foreigners, they generally expect significant sums of money or, alternatively, the current American Government may exempt them from the strict border controls implemented by said Administration. Although several African countries are involved in such deals, this blog focuses on what is happening in Cameroon, Eswatini, Ghana and Rwanda, the last having been the first country to formally accept Washington, DC's offer to host “unwanted” foreigners in the US.

Introduction: the Growing will to Deport Unwanted Foreigners to Third Countries

In the last decade, a number of countries from the “Global North” have adopted policies aimed at persuading several countries from the “Global South” to accept foreigners they consider “unwanted” (for various reasons). Most of the time, I am talking about asylum-seekers (or rejected asylum-seekers), but also foreign criminals who, for various reasons, cannot be returned to their country of origin, may be subject to these measures. There have been many attempts to do this to date, from Denmark^[1] to Italy,^[2] from the Netherlands^[3] to the United Kingdom (UK).^[4] Other countries, like Sweden, are offering financial incentives to migrants to encourage them to return home.^[5]

The recently elected United States of America (US) Administration is following suit. This piece examines the growing attempts by the US Administration to send unwelcome foreigners (mostly criminals convicted of various crimes) to Africa, and specifically to Rwanda. It will focus on the legal implications of this situation. Analysing the failed UK-Rwanda deal will also examine the latest developments, acknowledging evolving events. Additionally, the US has concluded deals to send unwanted foreigners to other African countries, such as Eswatini^[6] and South Sudan^[7] (though the latter has denied that a formal deal to deport people from Washington to Juba was in place).^[8] Yet, for reasons of space, I have chosen to focus only on the multifaceted relationships between the US and several selected countries, including Rwanda. Rwanda has, in fact, been the first African country to accept deported people from Washington.

The African Geopolitical Situation

In recent years, Western countries seem to have lost their momentum in Africa, even though, for decades, African nationals have found in Europe and, mostly, in their colonizing countries, the main country of migration and asylum. Still in 2023, in France, almost half of immigrants were born in Africa.^[9] Not so long ago, the Diario de Noticias (a Portuguese weekly newspaper) titled one of its articles: “Portugal, país euro-africano” (“Portugal, Euro-African country”) to highlight the considerable African presence in the country.^[10] According to the UK 2021 census, one of the largest increases since the previous census (2011) was seen in the number of people identifying as “Black, Black British, Black Welsh, or African” (2.5%, 1.5 million in 2021, up from 1.8%, 990,000 in 2011).^[11] Old and new governments in Africa are shifting their focus to other directions, with deals that also concern migration. For example, the number of Africans in China has been growing due to increased economic ties and educational opportunities, particularly since the 2000s, with a significant portion of migrants being traders and students.^[12] In this regard, the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), established in 2000, has been a key platform for cementing relations and fostering increased migration alongside trade and development.^[13]

In this scenario, on 1 January 2024, Egypt and Ethiopia joined South Africa in the BRICS^[14] group.^[15] Chinese,^[16] Qatari,^[17] Russian^[18], Saudi^[19] and Turkish^[20] (to name only a few countries with interests on the continent) investments in Africa are on the rise. The ties between Russia and Africa are strengthening through regular summits, such as the “Russia-Africa Summit”, which is a high-profile, large-scale event aimed at strengthening comprehensive and equal cooperation between Russia and African nations across various fields, including politics, security, economics, science, technology, and culture.^[21] The first summit took place in Sochi in 2019,^[22] and the second was held in St. Petersburg in 2023^[23] with the participation of representatives of 49 African States.^[24] As mentioned above, Saudi Arabia is also expanding its investments and influence in Africa. Specifically, it has announced a USD 41 billion investment plan in various sectors in South Africa, including natural resources, food security, and renewable energy, by 2030.^[25] This expansion is part of Saudi Arabia’s broader strategy to diversify its economy beyond oil and strengthen its position on the African continent. Since 2021, Qatar has expanded its investments in the energy sector in Zambia and South Africa. It acquired a 50% stake in an 800MW renewable energy project in South Africa and invested $200m in Airtel Mobile Commerce, the mobile money division of Airtel Africa.^[26] In 2024, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) became the largest backer of new business projects in Africa, raising hopes of a rush of much-needed money for green energy.^[27]

This glance shows that the “Western World”, with former colonial powers at its head, is no longer the only actor to have set deep roots in the continent. Former colonial states seem to have lost power in Africa to new state actors. An example of what was just affirmed is in the progressive (although uninvited) disengagement that France is having on the continent.^[28] Although none of the initiatives/agreements mentioned in this paragraph explicitly address intra- and/or extra-African migration or the control of African borders, they are nonetheless significant for displacement for two reasons. The first aspect is that new frontiers are open for Africans. In this framework, for example, Russian universities are increasingly opening their doors to African students^[29] while Zhejiang Province is home to the fastest-growing African population in China.^[30] The second aspect is that, according to the African Union in its African Common Position on Migration and Development of 2006, the higher the investments in Africa, the more Africans will be employed in gainful activities and, therefore, the number of Africans wishing to leave the continent should, in principle, decrease.^[31] This intuitive assumption has, however, been challenged by studies showing that higher levels of economic and human development in African countries are initially associated with higher emigration rates, which decrease with growing prosperity and development.^[32]

United States Deporting Unwanted Foreigners to Rwanda: Legal and Policy Aspects

This geopolitical and economic situation has repercussions for the displacement of Africans. According to the most recent statistics, the US has been among the top three investors in the continent in 2024.^[33] This year, however, the newly elected President of the country, Donald Trump, decided to cut funds to the US Agency for International Development (USAID), with funding being terminated in nine African countries in March 2025: Comoros, Eswatini, Gambia, Guinea, Mauritania, Morocco, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Tunisia.^[34] USAID officially closed its doors on 30 June 2025, and it is predicted that these aid cuts could cause more than 14 million additional deaths by 2030.^[35]

Nevertheless, the Trump Administration has found a new way to negotiate with African countries, allowing them to continue receiving aid from Washington. This entails African countries receiving and hosting foreigners considered “undesired” in the US. Negotiations for such deals started early, immediately after Trump became President, and they are underway. The first African counterpart for this kind of deals has been Rwanda. In early May 2025, Rwandan Foreign Minister Olivier Nduhungirehe said on local television that his country was in the early stages of talks to receive immigrants deported from the US.^[36] The first group of seven foreigners arrived in Rwanda in mid-August. Three of the individuals have expressed a desire to return to their home countries, while four wished to stay and build lives in Rwanda. Officials offered no information on the nationalities of the seven deportees.^[37] On 5 August, Rwandan authorities affirmed that they would accept up to 250 people from the US. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, according to the Rwandan Government, it agreed to the deal with the US because “nearly every Rwandan family has experienced the hardships of displacement”.^[38]

Yet, Rwanda has, in recent years, positioned itself as a destination country for foreigners that Western countries would like to remove, notwithstanding concerns by human rights groups that Rwanda does not respect some of the most fundamental human rights and, for example, cannot be considered a safe third country for asylum seekers and refugees. In this regard, written evidence submitted by Human Rights Watch (HRW) to the UK Government on 28 December 2023, inter alia, stated as follows, “On 1 October, 2023, secretly recorded comments by Rwanda’s High Commissioner to the UK, Johnston Busingye, in response to a question about the police shooting and killing of the refugees [in 2018], illustrated the Rwandan authorities’ contempt for the loss of life: ‘Yes, it might have happened, but so what?’” (paragraph 9). At paragraph 11 of the same submission, “[O]ne refugee who was accused of sharing information with Human Rights Watch about the Kiziba refugee camp killings was convicted and sentenced to 15 years in prison. The communications with Human Rights Watch were used as evidence against him in his trial”. Finally, at paragraph 15, “[I]t is […] more telling that since that brutal fatal crackdown [in 2018], to the best of Human Rights Watch’s knowledge, no attempts have been made by refugees to organize protests. On the contrary, impunity for security forces, the National Human Rights Commission’s report covering up the abuse […], and the prosecution and jailing of dozens of refugees involved in the protest sent a very stark warning against any further attempts to organize protests”.^[39]

The 2022 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices by the US Department of State (under the Democratic Biden Administration), however, underscored that “[t]he [Rwandan] Government cooperated with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and other humanitarian organizations, in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons, refugees, returning refugees, and asylum seekers, as well as other persons of concern”.^[40] The same annual report, two years later (published in August 2025 under the Republican Trump Administration), highlighted that the Rwandan Government did not issue refugee status determinations to the majority of asylum seekers in 2024, thereby significantly affecting access to asylum. Additionally, during 2024, the Government, while hosting thousands of newly arrived Congolese asylum seekers at a transit centre, did not provide them with any legal asylum or a refugee status determination.^[41] This not very honourable situation has not prevented Mr Trump, however, from asking for assistance from the Government in Kigali to deport unwanted foreigners to the African state.

Along the same lines, on 29 June 2023, the UK Court of Appeal ruled that the UK-Rwanda Asylum Partnership Arrangement - under which the UK planned to expel to Rwanda asylum seekers who arrive irregularly in the UK - was unlawful.^[42] The court concluded that there was a real risk that asylum seekers sent to Rwanda would be returned to their home countries, where they faced a risk of persecution or other ill-treatment.^[43] The UK Government appealed the ruling, and in November 2023 the UK Supreme Court ruled that the deal was unlawful, highlighting Rwanda’s poor human rights record and serious defects in its asylum system. In detail, the Supreme Court drew attention to Rwanda’s poor human rights record, including threats to Rwandans living in the UK, alongside extrajudicial killings, deaths in custody, enforced disappearances, torture, and restrictions on media and political freedoms.

Additionally, the UNHCR also presented at least 100 allegations of refoulement, a practice that continued after the UK agreement was concluded.^[44] In April 2024, the UNHCR, which intervened in each stage of the court process opposing the deal since its conception,^[45] once again expressed its serious concerns should the asylum seekers in the UK be sent to Rwanda.^[46] The deal, which cost the UK hundreds of millions of pounds, eventually fell through on 7 July 2024, when Keir Starmer cancelled it after the Labour Party came into power following its election victory just two days earlier.^[47] Yet, the “saga” is not over, as on 30 January 2026 the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) announced the commencement of arbitration between the Republic of Rwanda and the UK under the failed “Asylum Partnership Agreement”. According to the PCA announcement, Rwanda commenced the proceedings by Notice of Arbitration dated 24 November 2025.^[48] Kigali’s Government declares it has brought the proceedings regarding three claims. Specifically, it accuses the UK of publicly setting out the financial terms of the deal, of failing to make payments worth £100m (the amount of compensation Kigali is seeking) and of refusing to arrange the resettlement of vulnerable refugees from Rwanda. Under the scheme, the UK would have resettled a number of refugees currently being hosted by Rwanda, including, for example, those with severe health problems.^[49] According to the case’s procedural timetable, the hearing was scheduled for 18 March, and the award is due in May.

Rwanda has also played an active role in one of the biggest displacement crises in the region by backing the 23 March (M23) rebel movement (against the Government in Kinshasa) in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), with the provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu alone holding millions of IDPs. The cause of the conflict stems from an interplay of ethnic tensions linked to the 1994 Rwandan genocide, political and corporate corruption, and the lingering effects of Western colonialism in Africa.^[50] To March 2026, however, the situation in the region seems far from having been peacefully settled, with an HRW report released on 1 April 2026 highlighting ongoing mass violations in and around the city of Uvira.^[51]

The First Attempt to Deport an Unwanted Foreigner to Rwanda (the Ameen Case)

The US, in what looked like a possible model for future deportations, already deported an Iraqi man, Omar Abdulsattar Ameen, to Kigali in April 2025.^[52] This happened although Ameen was granted US refugee status in 2014.^[53] In March 2022, Omar Ameen won a ruling from a federal immigration judge that barred the Government from sending him back to Iraq because of the possibility he could face torture there.^[54] Under Article III of the Convention against Torture (CAT),^[55] the US (which ratified CAT on 21 October 1994)^[56] cannot send someone to a country where she/he will be more likely to be tortured than not be tortured. Mr Ameen proved that he would be taken into custody and tortured upon his return to Iraq.^[57] Under US Law, torture is defined as the intentional infliction of severe physical or mental pain or suffering for obtaining information, or a confession, or to punish for an act or suspected act^[58] and in Iraq, torture is still practised in 2025, as highlighted by the US Embassy in Baghdad.^[59]

The March 2022 victory for Ameen came after a 21 April 2021 ruling by a Federal Magistrate judge in Sacramento, who ruled against the Government’s efforts to extradite him and ordered his immediate release.^[60] In 2018, federal authorities arrested Ameen based on an extradition request from the Iraqi Government, which claimed he murdered a police officer in Iraq in June 2014 as an Islamic State (ISIS) operative.^[61] The terror charges against Ameen were eventually dropped, but he was never released.^[62] On 7 April 2025, the US Supreme Court temporarily blocked the Trump Administration, which invoked a rarely used wartime law (The Alien Enemies Act of 1798)^[63] from deporting back home a group of Venezuelan migrants it accused of being gang members.^[64] Additionally, a court ruling^[65] by Judge Murphy, a Massachusetts District Judge, in April prohibited the Trump Administration from sending deportees to a third country without informing them of the destination and allowing them to be screened for any concerns they have about being harmed there.^[66] However, on 30 May, the US Supreme Court announced it would allow the Trump Administration to revoke the temporary legal status of hundreds of thousands of migrants living in the US, supporting President Trump’s drive to hasten deportations.^[67]

Against this backdrop, a US State Department cable was sent from the American Embassy in Kigali on 13 March, where Rwanda said it was willing to accept deportees from the US who are unable to be sent to their country of origin for fear of persecution. The cable also references a “wish list” of policy concessions provided by Rwanda and a request for a “a one-time payment of USD 100,000 to support social services, residency documents, and work permits”. In the same document, Rwanda also agreed to accept another ten “third country nationals” of various nationalities. According to the cable, Rwanda’s primary motivation for accepting Mr Ameen and other unwanted foreigners in the US who cannot be returned to their country of origin is to improve its relations with the US.^[68] Yet, this deal is not without challenges. Human rights organizations, most notably the UNHCR, have voiced serious concerns. They argue that deported migrants may face grave risks, including the possibility of being returned to their countries of origin, where they face persecution or violence. The UNHCR has warned that such arrangements could undermine international protection norms.^[69]

Attempts by the US Administration to Remove Foreigners to other African Countries

In this scenario, deportations from the US are occurring to various African countries, though not always smoothly. By way of example, I can mention two recent episodes. The first concerns eleven people detained in Ghana after being deported from the US, who have sued the Ghanaian Government. Their lawyer (Mr Vormawor) said the deportees had not violated any Ghanaian law, and their detention in a military camp was, therefore, illegal. The lawyer wanted the Government to appear in court and justify their placement in detention. Parliamentary opposition has demanded the immediate suspension of the deportation deal until Parliament ratifies it, arguing that this is required under Ghanaian law. In September 2025, Ghana’s President John Mahama said that 14 deportees of West African origin had arrived in the country following an agreement reached with the US. He later added that all of them had been returned to their countries of origin, though the Foreign Minister contradicted him by saying that only most of them had been returned. Mr Vormawor’s court application contradicts both of them, saying that 11 deportees are still in detention in Ghana.^[70]

At the time of writing, deportations to Ghana are continuing, with a number of them having been sent from Ghana to their home countries. However, they face a very uncertain future there, as in the case of Mrs Rabbiatu Kouyiateh from Sierra Leone. She applied for protection from being deported home, saying she feared being tortured because of her father’s ties to the political opposition. An immigration judge granted her request, but on 5 November 2025, she was deported to Ghana. There, she said, she was detained at a hotel for six days before being forcibly returned to her home country.^[71]

This is not the first time Ghana has taken in deportees from another country. In January 2016, two Yemeni nationals who were held by the US at Guantanamo Bay were deported to Ghana as part of an agreement between the Ghanaian Government and Barack Obama’s Administration. At the time, Ghana said it had agreed to the deal, which saw the US give Ghana $300,000 to house the two men for two years, on “humanitarian grounds”.^[72] Nevertheless, the following year, the Supreme Court of Ghana ruled that the country’s Government had acted unconstitutionally by agreeing to take in the two men, and Parliament later ruled that the detainees could apply for refugee status, which would allow them to stay in Ghana indefinitely.^[73] In detail, Ghana’s Supreme Court ruled that, under Article 75(2) (“Execution of Treaties”) of the 1992 Constitution, international agreements that create binding obligations for Ghana require parliamentary ratification.^[74] Ghana claims it is accepting US deportees not as an endorsement of President Donald Trump’s immigration policies, but on humanitarian and pan-African grounds. Ghana had legal cover to take in the deportees because they are from member states of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). According to the 1979 ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, citizens of ECOWAS member states can stay in other West African countries for up to 90 days without a visa.^[75] Yet, in mid-November 2025, 19 West African nationals who the we had deported to Ghana were subsequently moved to an unknown location, fearing for their rights.^[76]

The second recent episode regards pro-democracy protesters from Eswatini who gathered outside the US Embassy in Pretoria (South Africa), voicing strong opposition to a reported deal between the US Government and Eswatini’s monarchy that would see deported migrants returned to the southern African kingdom. Protesters accused King Mswati III, Africa’s last absolute monarch, of striking the deal for personal gain, allegedly accepting up to $5m in exchange, with no benefit to ordinary Swazi citizens.^[77] In mid-November, Eswatini confirmed for the first time that it had received more than $5m from the US to accept dozens of people expelled under Washington’s mass deportation drive. Until now, the kingdom has taken in 15 men. A document revealed by HRW in September said Eswatini agreed to take 160 deportees in exchange for $5.1m to “build its border and migration management capacity”.^[78] The first group of five men arrived in July^[79] , with a second batch received in early October.^[80] They are being held without charge in Eswatini’s maximum-security Matsapha Correctional Complex, notorious for detaining political prisoners.

In this regard, in a landmark ruling that reinforces the fundamental right to legal representation, an Eswatini High Court has ordered correctional authorities to grant a local attorney access to five deportees detained at the Matsapha Correctional Complex. The judgment, delivered 27 October 2025, comes after Attorney Sibusiso Nhlabatsi took the Commissioner of His Majesty’s Correctional Services and the Attorney General to court for blocking him from consulting with the detainees. The five individuals were transferred to the kingdom around 16 July 2025. Attorney Nhlabatsi, acting as a correspondent for US-based lawyers, argued that he was unlawfully denied access after officers at the facility informed him that the detainees did not wish to see him. In a strongly worded judgment, the court found that the basis of the Correctional Services’ opposition was founded on “hearsay”. The judge ruled that it was improper for prison officers to act as intermediaries and relay the detainees’ alleged refusal to consult. The court ultimately granted Attorney Nhlabatsi the relief he sought, allowing him access to the detainees for consultation purposes.^[81]

Along the same lines, in March 2026, the Eswatini Litigation Centre, with other human rights associations, submitted a Notice of Appeal to the Supreme Court of Eswatini, contesting the dismissal of their case, a High Court challenge to the US-Eswatini deportation agreement, which involves receiving third-country deportees in exchange for financial compensation.^[82] On 12 March 2026, the Government of Eswatini announced the arrival of a third batch of four more deportees from the United States, nationals of Somalia, Sudan, and Tanzania, bringing the total number of people held in Eswatini prisons under this arrangement to at least 19. Despite having already served their sentences for crimes committed on US soil, these individuals remain imprisoned in Eswatini, held in a country to which they have no connection, with no clear legal status and no access to legal representation.^[83] On top of this, conditions of detention in the country are very hard, as illustrated by Mr Pheap Rom, a Cambodian, who was deported to Eswatini for five months before being finally repatriated to Cambodia.^[84]

The most recent (and peculiar) case under scrutiny regards Cameroon, where in January and February 2026, under a secret agreement, the US Government deported to Cameroon 17 men and women, including asylum seekers and a stateless person from nine African countries. To convince Cameroon to host deportees, the US adopted a new strategy. Paul Biya has led Cameroon for more than four decades. The Trump Administration opted not to criticize his disputed re-election in October 2025,^[85] and said nothing afterwards when security forces waged a deadly crackdown on protesters. That gave the US an advantage weeks later, when it came time to negotiate a deportation deal. The correspondence does not say that the US withheld criticism in exchange for taking the migrants. Still, diplomats made clear that they believed the silence would play to their advantage in negotiations. Then on 12 January 2026, two days before the first flight carrying deportees left the US for Cameroon, the US State Department announced a $30 million payment to the United Nations’ refugee programme in Cameroon. According to the funding memo, however, the payment was made in support of the deportation agreement between the two countries. A US official described the payment as part of an emerging Trump Administration pattern of withholding money for country-specific United Nations programs as leverage in deportation deals.^[86]

Sadly, two of the migrants transferred to Cameroon in January have ended up back where they fled from: Morocco. They suffered physical and psychological abuse in their home country for being homosexual and being obliged to hide.^[87] In this regard, on 25 February 2026, Judge Murphy, who already declared the same in 2025, ruled that the Government’s deportations to third countries are illegal and must be halted. However, he suspended his ruling for 15 days to allow for an appeal. Murphy said migrants have the right to “meaningful notice” and the opportunity to object before being sent to a third country. The deportees were expelled without due process, and the US Government disclaims responsibility for what happens to them once they are outside its territory.^[88]

Cameroonian authorities immediately detained the deportees, despite having no legal basis for doing so. Joseph Awah Fru, a lawyer assisting some of the deportees, said representatives from United Nations agencies spoke to them about the possibility of seeking asylum in Cameroon. However, the deportees told the lawyer they felt pressured to return to their countries of origin.^[89] Yet, not only are the conditions of the deported persons dire, but the Cameroonian Government seems to want to keep the silence over the entire affair. In this regard, it is not surprising that on 17 February 2026, judicial police in Cameroon’s capital, Yaoundé, detained reporter Nalova Akua, photographer Angel Ngwe, and videographer Arnold Ndal, who were on assignment for the Associated Press news agency. Freelance reporter Randy Joe Sa’ah was accompanying Mr Fru. The presence of unknown people taking photographs of the detention centre alarmed its director, who checked their photos and video footage, questioned the journalists and Fru closely, and called in the judicial police.^[90]

Conclusion

Rwandan President Paul Kagame, in the past, has defended plans to send asylum seekers and refugees to Rwanda, for example, from Israel in 2017-2018^[91] and Denmark in 2021-2022.^[92] The latest talks with the US present an opportunity for the country to profit from Western countries' desire to externalise and shift their asylum obligations and responsibilities. The benefits for Rwanda are not only financial but also include the opportunity to expand its geopolitical influence and improve its international reputation. Notably, the discussions were happening at a time when the US was pushing Rwanda and the DRC to enter bilateral economic agreements with the US that would bring Western investment to support mining in the countries.^[93] The DRC was also discussing a separate peace agreement with Rwanda, which would allow both countries to establish a legal and transparent minerals supply chain, in partnership with the US Government and private investors.^[94] Finally, a Peace Agreement between the DRC and the Republic of Rwanda was signed in Washington on 27 June 2025.^[95] This agreement, however, according to Amnesty International, failed to address serious crimes committed in eastern DRC.^[96] Additionally, the situation of the forcibly displaced persons in the area remains very critical, as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Fact-Finding Mission on the Situation in North and South Kivu Provinces of the Democratic Republic of Congo, released in early September 2025, clearly shows.^[97] It is hoped that the signing on 15 November 2025 of the Doha Framework for a Comprehensive Peace Agreement between the Government of the DRC and the M23 could mark an important step toward addressing the root causes of the conflict in eastern DRC and removing the obstacles to peace in the Great Lakes Region.

On the other hand, the Trump Administration’s deportation programme has provided financial incentives and visa relief to other African countries in exchange for accepting US deportees. As mentioned above, Eswatini received $5.1 million, while Equatorial Guinea, another country involved in the programme, received $7.5 million, and Ghana secured visa concessions.^[98] To date, it is still unclear what Uganda received in exchange for hosting the deportees, who began landing in President Museveni’s country in early April 2026.^[99] The Ugandan Foreign Ministry accepted the migrants in compliance with Agreement for Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Requests signed in July 2025 by the US and Uganda.^[100] This “Safe Third Country” agreement allows nationals from other countries in Africa to be sent to Uganda in accordance with the principles of non-refoulement. Article 4 of the agreement stipulates that operating procedures will be drafted to implement the agreement. It is not clear if those procedures have been drafted.

In contrast, what is already clear is that the Uganda Law Society (ULS) announced it had gone to court to challenge the deportation, which the ULS called “an undignified, harrowing and dehumanizing process that has reduced them (the deportees) into little more than chattel, for the benefit of unnamed, private interests, on either side of the Atlantic”.^[101]

With these kinds of incentives, it is doubtful that the flow of deportees from the US to Africa will stop in the near future. On the other hand, however, a number of Democrat Senators in the US, in February 2026, released a comprehensive report detailing how the Trump Administration’s secret deportation deals are undermining US interests and coming at great cost to taxpayers. “Through its third-country deportation deals, the Trump Administration is putting millions of taxpayer dollars into the hands of foreign governments, while turning a blind eye to the human costs and potentially undermining our diplomatic relationships. For an Administration that claims to be reigning in fraud, waste and abuse, this policy is the epitome of all three”, Senator Shaheen, one of the promoters of the report, says. More in detail, this report identifies six central ways in which the Trump Administration’s use of third-country deportations has undermined US interests: expensive and ineffective operations, needlessly wasting taxpayer funds, providing money to corrupt governments without oversight; failure to monitor and enforce agreements; secret deals that do not serve American interests, as well as circumventing US Immigration Law.^[102]

In any event, and also in light of the recent developments in the different African countries concerned by the deportations from the US, individuals cannot be safely deported to countries with poor human rights records and where the rights of those deported could be seriously threatened and their well-being undermined. This is possibly the case of the West Africans deported by the US to Ghana and, afterwards, stranded in Togo after being dumped in the country without documents.^[103] This action is in violation of the principle of non-refoulement, by which states cannot expel or return individuals to a country where they face a real risk of persecution, torture, or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. The protection extends to all individuals at all times, regardless of their migration or international protection status. It further protects both against direct refoulement (sending someone to a third country where he/she is at risk) and indirect refoulement (sending someone to a country which further sends him/her to a country where he/she is at risk).^[104] The African Comthan chattelmission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) has recently highlighted the importance of respecting this principle in a resolution adopted in October 2025, dedicated to the obligations of African countries in the context of the externalisation of migration governance (para 4). In the following paragraph, the ACHPR clearly condemns the engagement of African states to any agreement with non-African states leading to collective expulsions and forcing transfers of migrants carried out without individual examination. In its analysis, the ACHPR recalls that Article 12(5) of the 1981 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (Banjul Charter), which constitutes violations of customary international law, prohibits such practices.^[105]

In the end, while the process of deportation is not always safe for the deported foreigners, it is certainly believed profitable by the African countries concerned, whose governments believe they can gain something by being so “hospitable” to those foreigners that the US Administration does not want on its soil. This happens even though the ACHPR, in the same resolution of October 2025, encourages African states to privilege “South-South cooperation” in migration management rather than what the Commission defines as “asymmetrical partnerships” (para 6).

Footnotes

1. Anonymous, Denmark: Plans to send asylum-seekers to Rwanda “unconscionable and potentially unlawful” (Amnesty International (AI), 5 May 2021). Available at:

   https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2021/05/denmark-plans-to-send-asylum-seekers-to-rwanda-unconscionable-and-potentially-unlawful/ (last accessed 15 September 2025). ↑

2. Karl Sexton, “Italy sends 40 rejected asylum seekers to Albania” (Deutsche Welle (DW), 12 April 2025). Available at: https://www.dw.com/en/italy-sends-40-rejected-asylum-seekers-to-albania/a-72225909 (last accessed 15 September 2025). ↑

3. Reuters Staff, “Netherlands explores plan to send rejected African asylum seekers to Uganda” (Reuters, 17 October 2024). Available at: https://www.reuters.com/world/netherlands-explores-plan-send-rejected-african-asylum-seekers-uganda-2024-10-17/ (last accessed 15 September 2025). ↑

4. Rajeev Siyal, Kiran Stacy and Tom Ambrose, “UK passes bill to send asylum seekers to Rwanda” (The Guardian, 23 April 2024). Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2024/apr/22/rwanda-deportations-bill-passes-parliament-sunak (last accessed 15 September 2025). ↑

5. Berra Ince, “Sweden is asking migrants to go back. The incentive is $34,000 per family” (TRT World, 13 September 2024). Available at: https://www.trtworld.com/article/18207506 (last accessed, 15 September 2025). ↑

6. Al Jazeera Staff, “US deports immigrants to African country of Eswatini amid rights concerns” (Al Jazeera, 16 July 2025). Available at:

   https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/16/us-deports-immigrants-to-african-country-of-eswatini-amid-rights-concerns (last accessed 15 September 2025). ↑

7. Al Jazeera Staff, “Trump administration completes contentious deportations to South Sudan” (Al Jazeera, 5 July 2025). Available at: https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2025/7/5/trump-administration-completes-contentious-deportations-to-south-sudan (last accessed 15 September 2025). ↑

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98. Solomon Ekanem, “Trump’s deportation program rewards African partners: $5.1m for Eswatini, $7.5m for Equatorial Guinea, Ghana gets visa relief” (Business Insider Africa, 19 November 2025). Available at: https://africa.businessinsider.com/local/lifestyle/trumps-deportation-program-rewards-african-partners-dollar51m-for-eswatini-dollar75m/ndjgyt4 (last accessed, 20 November 2025). ↑

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100. Department of Homeland Security, Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Uganda for Cooperation in the Examination of Protection Requests, 90 FR 42597/2025-16808 (Federal Register Volume 90, Issue 168, 3 September 2025) https://www.govinfo.gov/app/details/FR-2025-09-03/2025-16808/context

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103. Agence France Presse in Abuja, “West Africans deported from US to Ghana ‘dumped without documents in Togo’” (The Guardian, 29 September 2025). Available at:

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105. African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (AHPR), Resolution on the Obligations of African States in the Context of the Externalization of Migration Governance and the Extra-Regional Transfer of Migrants to Africa, ACHPR/Res.645 (LXXXV) 2025 (30 October 2025). Available at: https://achpr.au.int/en/adopted-resolutions/645-achprres645-lxxxv-2025 (last accessed 20 November 2025). ↑