This blog post analyses the evolving ‘safe third country’ concept in EU asylum law and its implications for the extraterritorial processing of asylum seekers. In light of the UK’s agreement with Rwanda and Australia’s arrangements with Papua New Guinea and Nauru, it explores the EU’s growing interest in outsourcing asylum procedures to third countries and the legal regimes that apply. Notably, multiple legal regimes would apply to European extraterritorial processing policies. Under current EU law, such agreements with ‘safe third countries’ are largely precluded by the connection requirement in the Asylum Procedures Directive. However, amendments to the new Asylum Procedures Regulation that significantly weaken this requirement were proposed by the European Commission in May 2025 and approved by the European Parliament and Council in February 2026. In particular, the amendments allow for transfers based on agreements or arrangements between EU Member States and third countries deemed ‘safe’. While this reform could enable extraterritorial processing, the blog post argues that such policies would likely violate other binding sources of law, including the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and international refugee and human rights law. Indeed, case law from the UK and the experience of Australia highlight the risks of refoulement and systemic human rights violations that extraterritorial processing entails. Ultimately, despite reforms in secondary EU law, the outsourcing of asylum procedures remains highly problematic in light of the multiple legal regimes that apply to EU Member States.

Introduction

The United Kingdom (UK) and Australia have famously concluded agreements to externalise asylum to countries like Rwanda^[1] and Nauru^[2]: asylum seekers are transferred to another country that is responsible for the asylum procedure, which is thus outsourced. Such extraterritorial processing policies serve as a source of inspiration for other states, most significantly in Europe. Several European Union (EU) Member States have explicitly expressed a desire for similar arrangements.^[3] Yet, the European ‘dream’^[4] of outsourcing asylum cannot be realised under current EU legislation, as the ‘safe third country’ concept in the Asylum Procedures Directive (APD) only allows EU Member States to transfer asylum seekers to a third state deemed ‘safe’ if there is a connection between the asylum seeker and the country in question.^[5] This connection requirement serves as an ‘anti-Rwanda rule’ because it largely prevents EU Member States from concluding agreements similar to the ones concluded by Australia and the UK.^[6] This is also the reason why the Protocol signed between Italy and Albania in 2023 provides for an offshoring rather than an outsourcing model.^[7] Under the offshoring model, Italy remains responsible for processing asylum claims – albeit using Albanian territory to do so – while under the outsourcing model, the third country is responsible for processing asylum claims. This blog post uses the term ‘extraterritorial processing’ to refer to the outsourcing model, in line with the desires of many EU Member States. Such outsourcing often relies on the notion of ‘safe third country’, as the underlying idea is that the asylum procedure can be outsourced to another country that is deemed ‘safe’.

The aforementioned connection requirement between the third country and the asylum seeker was maintained under the new EU Pact on Migration and Asylum, which will apply from 12 June 2026.^[8] However, in May 2025, the European Commission submitted a proposal amending the ‘safe third country’ concept in the new Asylum Procedures Regulation (APR), which makes it possible for EU Member States to conclude agreements with third countries to outsource asylum. The Council of the EU and the European Parliament approved this proposal in February 2026 and the amendments will apply from 12 June 2026 (the same day as the APR itself).^[9] This raises the following question: is changing the ‘safe third country’ concept in EU law sufficient to make extraterritorial processing agreements by EU Member States legal? We answer this question by examining the different legal regimes that apply to EU Member States, including norms of European and international law. We refer to this multiplicity of legal regimes as a ‘multi-level legal order’, since the EU legal system interacts with various other legal systems at the domestic, regional and international level. We assess the proposed changes through the lens of this multi-level legal order, focusing on European and international norms. We first briefly discuss the changes to the ‘safe third country’ concept in EU law, before examining the other European and international norms that apply to extraterritorial processing. Notably, with reference to the legal challenges faced by the extraterritorial processing agreements concluded by Australia and the UK, we find that although such agreements are expected to become possible under the APR, they are unlikely to comply with other norms of the multi-level legal order that applies to EU Member States. This is problematic, as compliance with other legal regimes is essential for the legality of the proposed changes and the (international) rule of law. By examining the ‘safe third country’ concept in EU law with a special focus on the extent to which it allows for extraterritorial processing, this blog post complements other contributions to this symposium. Our analysis takes into account developments up until 1 March 2026.

Changes to the ‘Safe Third Country’ Concept in EU Law

Under current EU law, Member States may apply the ‘safe third country’ concept to declare asylum applications inadmissible.^[10] A country qualifies as ‘safe’ if life and liberty are not threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion; if there is no risk of serious harm; if the principle of non-refoulement is respected; and if it is possible to receive protection in accordance with the Refugee Convention.^[11] In addition, a connection must exist between the applicant and the third country concerned that makes it reasonable to transfer them to that safe third country.^[12] Finally, each applicant is entitled to an individual assessment, which allows them to challenge the decision to transfer them to a third country deemed ‘safe’.^[13]

The APR, which replaces the APD from June 2026, broadens the ‘safe third country’ concept under EU law, making it easier for EU Member States to apply this concept.^[14] As detailed in another contribution to this symposium, the APR allows a country to be designated as ‘safe’ without requiring Refugee Convention-level protection – ‘effective protection’ suffices – and permits partial or conditional designations of safe third countries.^[15] As the European Commission was required to review the ‘safe third country’ concept by June 2025,^[16] it made a proposal to amend the APR on 20 May 2025, that was approved by the European Parliament and Council in February 2026.^[17] The amendment does not further lower the criteria for designating a third country as ‘safe’, as the Commission found no scope for this.^[18] However, it removes the automatic suspensive effect of appeals in ‘safe third country’ cases: asylum seekers could thus be transferred to a ‘safe third country’ while legal proceedings in an EU Member State are ongoing, except when there is a risk of refoulement.^[19]

Moreover, and of particular importance for this blog post, the amendment weakens the connection requirement. More specifically, it creates the possibility for asylum seekers to be sent to a ‘safe third country’ not only if there is a connection between the applicant and the third country concerned (as is the case under the APD) but also in two additional scenarios: 1) if the applicant has merely transited through the third country concerned;^[20] and 2) if there is an agreement or an arrangement that requires the third country to process the asylum claim.^[21] The addition of the latter scenario (‘Rwanda clause’^[22] or ‘unsafe fourth country rule’^[23]) thus enables EU Member States to implement extraterritorial processing policies similar to the UK and Australian models.^[24] Finally, the amendment includes certain safeguards: unaccompanied minors are excluded and it contains a transparency clause which requires Member States to inform the Commission and other Member States about such deals.^[25]

In sum, there appears to be a watering down of both substantive and procedural guarantees in the case of extraterritorial processing by ‘safe third countries’. In particular, while the connection requirement in current EU law explicitly prevents EU Member States from implementing extraterritorial processing policies following the Australian and British model, recent legislative amendments were designed to make such deals possible. Yet, if concluded, they must not only comply with the APR but also with other European and international norms of the multi-level legal order.

Extraterritorial Processing under EU and International Law

Notwithstanding any changes to the ‘safe third country’ concept in the APR, extraterritorial processing policies must also comply with other applicable legal norms. These include primary EU law as well as international refugee and human rights law. Accordingly, the following examines to what extent extraterritorial processing is permissible under the various legal regimes that make up the multi-level legal order that applies to the EU and its Member States. Notably, the legal challenges raised against the agreements concluded by the UK and Australia help us determine the legality of extraterritorial processing under international law.

Primary EU law applies when EU Member States apply the ‘safe third country’ concept.^[26] Therefore, any transfers from an EU Member State to a ‘safe third country’ must comply with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter), including: the right to asylum (Article 18); protection in the event of removal, expulsion or extradition, including the principle of non-refoulement (Article 19); and the right to an effective remedy (Article 47). Weakening the connection requirement in the APR – in connection with the watering down of both substantive and procedural guarantees regarding transfers to ‘safe third countries’ – increases the risk that transfers to third countries breach these provisions of the Charter, as there is a heightened risk that applicants are transferred to a country that is not safe, without sufficient possibilities to challenge that transfer.

In addition, ‘safe third country’ agreements concluded by EU Member States must also comply with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). In particular, Articles 2 and 3 ECHR prohibit refoulement to unsafe countries, and Article 13 guarantees the right to an effective remedy. Here also, the proposed changes to the ‘safe third country’ concept increase the risk that its application violates Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, as asylum seekers could be transferred to a third country that is not safe in practice. Removing the automatic suspensive effect of appeals would make it extremely difficult for asylum seekers who have been transferred to a ‘safe third country’ to challenge their transfer, possibly violating Article 13 ECHR. Moreover, EU Member States have similar obligations under international law, including the Refugee Convention and human rights treaties like the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT).^[27]

The principle of non-refoulement is particularly important as regards extraterritorial processing. When the UK Supreme Court held in November 2023 that the policy of transferring asylum seekers to Rwanda was unlawful, it did so because there were substantial grounds for believing that the removal of the claimants to Rwanda would expose them to a real risk of ill-treatment.^[28] In order to come to this conclusion, the Supreme Court took into account the general human rights situation in Rwanda, the (in)adequacy of Rwanda’s asylum system, and Rwanda’s non-compliance with assurances given under its arrangement with Israel – a similar extraterritorial processing agreement concluded earlier. The Supreme Court also relied significantly on information provided by UNHCR,^[29] which had concluded earlier that the policy would be highly likely to violate international refugee and human rights law, a conclusion later echoed by the Human Rights Committee.^[30] This case signals that, in addition to EU law, EU Member States that wish to conclude extraterritorial processing agreements must comply with their international obligations, notably the ECHR, and that there is a considerable risk that such agreements fail to comply with these obligations.

While the UK Supreme Court’s judgment confirms that extraterritorial processing agreements risk violating the principle of non-refoulement, the plight of asylum seekers transferred from Australia to Nauru and Papua New Guinea (PNG) illustrates what human rights violations asylum seekers experience after being transferred to a third country under extraterritorial processing agreements.^[31] UNHCR has repeatedly held that the transfer of asylum seekers to PNG and Nauru did not extinguish Australia’s legal responsibility for their protection and that Australia and PNG and Nauru, respectively, shared responsibility to ensure that the treatment of transferred asylum seekers complied with their obligations under the Refugee Convention and international human rights law.^[32] It concluded that extraterritorial processing by Australia does not comply with international refugee and human rights law.^[33] Multiple human rights treaty bodies have confirmed that Australia has human rights obligations towards transferred asylum seekers because it exercises effective control – and hence jurisdiction – over them.^[34] Moreover, these bodies have concluded that severe human rights violations have taken place in Nauru and PNG, including protracted periods of mandatory detention, acute isolation, overcrowding, inadequate health care, sexual abuse, no fair and efficient asylum procedures and no legal representation.^[35] The Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture confirmed in decisions regarding individual complaints that detention in Nauru and PNG was arbitrary and amounted to ill-treatment.^[36] Even after PNG’s processing centre was closed – following a ruling of the Supreme Court of PNG which found that the detention of asylum seekers was unconstitutional^[37] – concerns remained about the arrangements for long-term viable relocation solutions, and years after having been recognised as refugees, children and adults were still not resettled, and some remained detained, with no certainty about their future.^[38]

Conclusion

The idea of externalising asylum by concluding extraterritorial processing agreements with ‘safe third countries’ is gaining traction in the EU, as EU Member States seek to shift responsibility for asylum seekers to third states. The changes in the ‘safe third country’ concept introduced by the APR thus allow EU Member States to apply the concept more easily and extensively, and the recently approved legislative amendment – that considerably weakens the connection requirement – explicitly refers to extraterritorial processing agreements. Therefore, it clearly aligns with the political will of many EU Member States. Yet reforming the ‘anti-Rwanda rule’ is not sufficient to make extraterritorial processing agreements by EU Member States legal. Even if secondary EU legislation is amended to enable the outsourcing of asylum, such policies must still comply with other norms of the multi-level legal order, which serves as a lens to assess the legality of the new ‘safe third country’ concept.

These other norms include primary EU legislation, including the Charter, as well as the ECHR and international refugee and human rights law. Yet the British and Australian examples suggest that it is unlikely that extraterritorial processing under the amended APR would comply with these norms. In fact, the foregoing shows that weakening the connection requirement in combination with broadening the criteria for designating a third country as ‘safe’ and watering down procedural safeguards increases the risk that the transfer of asylum seekers to ‘safe third countries’ violates their rights. Therefore, we do not expect that the probable amendments to the concept of ‘safe third country’ under EU law will make it possible for EU Member States to outsource asylum procedures in a manner that is compliant with European and international law.

In response to these constraints, EU Member States can also seek to change the other applicable norms to align with their policies. Yet while they can relatively easily amend secondary EU law like the APR, it is considerably more difficult for EU Member States to amend primary EU legislation, such as the Charter.^[39] Moreover, the question whether transfers to ‘safe third countries’ comply with EU law must be adjudicated by the Court of Justice of the EU, an independent judicial body. Furthermore, extraterritorial processing policies implemented by EU Member States must also comply with the ECHR. EU Member States cannot amend the ECHR as easily as the APR, and here also an independent judicial body, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), can determine whether extraterritorial processing policies comply with EU Member States’ obligations under the ECHR – notwithstanding attempts by some EU Member States to influence the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on migration.^[40] Likewise, it is considerably more difficult for EU Member States to amend or eliminate their obligations under international refugee and human rights law than under secondary EU law, especially when treaties are interpreted by an independent monitoring body.

Finally, while it may be possible in theory for states to withdraw from refugee and human rights treaties, this often comes at a high cost. Moreover, certain legal norms that apply to extraterritorial processing, like the prohibition of torture, non-refoulement and the right to life, are part of customary law and at least some have also reached the status of jus cogens, which means that states would continue to be bound by these norms after amending the APR and even if they were to withdraw from the Refugee Convention and human rights treaties. Thus, the multi-level legal order and the applicability of numerous legal regimes enhances rights protection. If extraterritorial processing is ultimately implemented, the non-compliance with international and European norms jeopardises the (international) rule of law.

Part of this blog post is based on the following publication: A. Pijnenburg and K. van der Pas, “Litigating Externalisation Policies: The Added Value of a Multi-Level Legal Order?”, Refugee Survey Quarterly, 44(3), 2025, 345–369, https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdaf004.

Footnotes

1. Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Rwanda for the Provision of an Asylum Partnership Agreement to Strengthen Shared International Commitments on the Protection of Refugees and Migrants (5 December 2023). ↑
2. Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Nauru and the Commonwealth of Australia, relating to the Transfer to and Assessment of Persons in Nauru, and Related Issues (29 August 2012), superseded by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Nauru and the Commonwealth of Australia, relating to the Transfer to and Assessment of Persons in Nauru, and Related Issues (3 August 2013), superseded by the Memorandum of Understanding between the Republic of Nauru and Australia on the Enduring Regional Processing Capability in Republic of Nauru (20 October 2021). ↑
3. Joint Letter from the undersigned Ministers on new Solutions to address Irregular Migration to Europe, 15 May 2024, available at: https://uim.dk/media/12635/joint-letter-to-the-european-commission-on-new-solutions-to-address-irregular-migration-to-europe.pdf. ↑
4. M. Lemberg-Pedersen, “Externalisation and Northern European Dreams of Avoiding Asylum Seekers”, Externalizing Asylum, 24 July 2024, available at: https://externalizingasylum.info/externalisation-and-northern-european-dreams-of-avoiding-asylum-seekers/. ↑
5. Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection (recast) OJ L 180, 29 June 2013. This Directive and the entire Common European Asylum System do not apply to all EU Member States; Denmark and Ireland can decide to opt in. Ireland has decided to opt in for the new EU Pact measures on asylum, see E. Guild, “The EU’s New Asylum Pact and Ireland’s Opt-in”, European Journal of Migration and Law, 27(1), 2025, 41-65. ↑
6. D. Thym, “Safe Third Countries: The Next ‘Battlefield’”, EU Migration Law Blog, 5 June 2024, available at: https://eumigrationlawblog.eu/safe-third-countries-the-next-battlefield/. The Treaty between the UK and Rwanda is still in place, but the Labour government has decided to discontinue the policy: see C. Roberts, “Change We Can’t Believe In: A Bleak Review of Labour’s Promises on Asylum”, RLI Blog on Refugee Law and Forced Migration, available at: https://rli.blogs.sas.ac.uk/2024/07/23/change-we-cant-believe-in-a-bleak-review-of-labours-promises-on-asylum/. ↑
7. Protocol between the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania and the Government of the Italian Republic of 6 November 2023 for strengthening Cooperation in the Field of Migration (6 November 2023). For an English translation see: https://odysseus-network.eu/wp-content/uploads/2023/11/Protocol-between-the-Government-of-the-Italian-Republic-and-the-Council-of-Minister-of-the-Albanian-Republic-1-1.pdf. ↑
8. On the Pact see: https://home-affairs.ec.europa.eu/policies/migration-and-asylum/pact-migration-and-asylum_en. ↑
9. Council of the EU, “Council gives final Greenlight to Measures to Make the EU’s Asylum System more Efficient and Robust”, 23 February 2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/23/council-gives-final-greenlight-to-measures-to-make-the-eu-s-asylum-system-more-efficient-and-robust/; European Parliament, “Asylum: New Rules for Safe Third Countries and EU Safe Countries of Origin List”, 10 February 2026, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260205IPR33617/asylum-new-rules-for-safe-third-countries-and-eu-safe-countries-of-origin-list. ↑
10. Article 33(2)(c) APD. ↑
11. Article 38(1) APD. ↑
12. Article 38(2)(a) APD. ↑
13. Article 38(2)(c) APD. ↑
14. Commission Staff Working Document “Review of the Safe Third Country Concept”, SWD(2025) 600 final, 20 May 2025, 3-4; S. Peers, “Towards a Euro-Rwanda Policy? The Proposed new EU Asylum Law Rules on ‘Safe Third Countries’”, EU Law Analysis, 21 May 2025, available at: https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2025/05/towards-euro-rwanda-policy-proposed-new.html. ↑
15. Recital 46 and Articles 57 and 59 APR. ↑
16. Article 77 APR. ↑
17. Council of the EU, “Council gives final Greenlight to Measures to Make the EU’s Asylum System more Efficient and Robust”, 23 February 2026, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2026/02/23/council-gives-final-greenlight-to-measures-to-make-the-eu-s-asylum-system-more-efficient-and-robust/; European Parliament, “Asylum: New Rules for Safe Third Countries and EU Safe Countries of Origin List”, 10 February 2026, available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20260205IPR33617/asylum-new-rules-for-safe-third-countries-and-eu-safe-countries-of-origin-list. ↑
18. Commission Staff Working Document, 1. ↑
19. European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 February 2026 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept (COM(2025)0259 – C10-0088/2025 – 2025/0132(COD)). ↑
20. The Court of Justice of the EU ruled earlier regarding the APD that mere ‘transit’ is not sufficient to establish a connection; see Case C-564/18, LH v Bevándorlási és Menekültügyi Hivatal, judgment of 19 March 2020, ECLI:EU:C:2020:218; Joined cases C-924/19 and C-925/19, FMS and Others v Országos Idegenrendeszeti Főigazgatóság Dél-alföldi Regionális Igazgatóság and Országos Idegenrendeszeti Főigazgatóság, judgment of 14 March 2020, ECLI:EU:C:2020:367; Case C-821/19, European Commission v Hungary, judgment of 16 November 2021, ECLI:EU:C:2021:930. ↑
21. European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 February 2026 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept (COM(2025)0259 – C10-0088/2025 – 2025/0132(COD)). ↑
22. Peers, “Towards a Euro-Rwanda Policy?” ↑
23. G. Romeo & F. Rausis, “The EU’s Quiet Shift Toward an ‘(Un)safe Fourth Country’ Asylum Policy”, The Loop: ECPR’s Political Science Blog, July 2025, available at: https://theloop.ecpr.eu/the-eus-quiet-shift-toward-an-unsafe-fourth-country-asylum-policy/. ↑
24. Article 59(7) APR foreshadows this development: it introduces a presumption of safety for third countries with which the EU has concluded a ‘safe third country’ agreement pursuant to Article 218 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. ↑
25. European Parliament legislative resolution of 10 February 2026 on the proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation (EU) 2024/1348 as regards the application of the ‘safe third country’ concept (COM(2025)0259 – C10-0088/2025 – 2025/0132(COD)). ↑
26. Case C‑617/10, Åklagaren v Hans Åkerberg Fransson, judgment of 26 February 2013, ECLI:EU:C:2013:105. ↑
27. For instance, the principle of non-refoulement is also enshrined (implicitly or explicitly) in Article 33 Refugee Convention, Article 3 CAT and Articles 6 and 7 ICCPR. ↑
28. UK Supreme Court, R (on the application of AAA (Syria) and others) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKSC 42, paras. 60-63. ↑
29. UNHCR, UNHCR Analysis of the Legality and Appropriateness of the Transfer of Asylum Seekers under the UK-Rwanda Arrangement, 8 June 2022, available at: https://www.unhcr.org/uk/media/unhcr-analysis-legality-and-appropriateness-transfer-asylum-seekers-under-uk-rwanda. ↑
30. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the eighth Periodic Report of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, UN Doc CCPR/C/GBR/CO/8, 3 May 2024, para. 40, available at: https://docs.un.org/en/CCPR/C/GBR/CO/8. ↑
31. Although the agreements in the Pacific do not explicitly use the notion ‘safe third country’, the model is built on the presumption that Nauru and PNG are safe countries that can process asylum claims. ↑
32. See for instance: UNHCR, Submission by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Inquiry into the Incident at the Manus Island Detention Centre from 16 February to 18 – The Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, February 2014, available at: https://www.refworld.org/legal/natlegcomments/unhcr/2014/en/116650; UNHCR, Submission by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees for the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights’ Compilation Report Universal Periodic Review: Australia, March 2015, available at: https://www.refworld.org/policy/upr/unhcr/2015/en/107907; UNHCR, Submission to the Senate Select Committee on the recent Allegations relating to Conditions and Circumstances at the Regional Processing Centre in Nauru, 27 April 2015, available at: https://www.unhcr.org/au/media/submission-senate-select-committee-recent-allegations-relating-conditions-and-circumstances. ↑
33. UNHCR, Submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee. ↑
34. See for instance: Committee against Torture, Concluding Observations on the combined fourth and fifth Periodic Reports of Australia, UN Doc CAT/C/AUS/CO/4–5, 23 December 2014, para. 17, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/790514?v=pdf; Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the sixth Periodic Report of Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/AUS/CO/6, 1 December 2017, para. 35, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1326627?v=pdf. ↑
35. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, Concluding Observations on the eighth Periodic Report of Australia, UN Doc CEDAW/C/AUS/CO/8, 25 July 2018, paras. 53–54, available at: https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n18/238/18/pdf/n1823818.pdf; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the combined fifth and sixth Periodic Reports of Australia, CRC/C/AUS/CO/5-6, 1 November 2019, paras. 44–45, available at: https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/g18/346/83/pdf/g1834683.pdf; Committee on the Rights of the Child, Concluding Observations on the initial Report of Nauru, UN Doc CRC/C/NRU/CO/1, 28 October 2016, paras. 52–53, available at: https://www.refworld.org/policy/polrec/crc/2016/en/115131; Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women , Concluding Observations on the combined initial and second Periodic Reports of Nauru, UN Doc CEDAW/C/NRU/CO/1-2, 22 November 2017, paras. 42–43, available at: https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/n17/394/20/pdf/n1739420.pdf; see also UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants on his Mission to Australia and the Regional Processing Centres in Nauru, UN Doc A/HRC/35/25/Add.3, 24 April 2017, paras. 72–84, available at: https://www.refworld.org/reference/mission/unhrc/2017/en/116974. ↑
36. Human Rights Committee, Nabhari v Australia, UN Doc CCPR/C/142/D/3663/2019, 25 October 2024; Human Rights Committee, M.I. and Others v Australia, U Doc CCPR/C/142/D/2749/2016, 31 October 2024; Committee against Torture, A.A. v Australia, UN Doc CAT/C/83/D/1079/2021, 27 November 2025. ↑
37. Supreme Court of Justice of Papua New Guinea, Namah v Pato [2016] PGSC 13; SC1497. ↑
38. Human Rights Committee, Concluding Observations on the sixth Periodic Report of Australia, UN Doc CCPR/ C/AUS/CO/6, 1 December 2017, para. 35, available at: https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1326627?v=pdf. ↑
39. S. Peers, “Asylum Pact 2.0: the EU Amends the Rules on ‘Safe Third Countries’ and ‘Safe Countries of Origin’”, EU Law Analysis, 23 February 2026, available at: https://eulawanalysis.blogspot.com/2026/02/asylum-pact-20-eu-amends-rules-on-safe.html. ↑
40. L. Riemer and L. Acconciamessa, “From ‘Original Intentions’ to ‘Unforeseeable Change of Circumstances’: The 2025 Escalation of Pressure Towards the ECtHR”, EJIL: Talk! 5 January 2026, available at: https://www.ejiltalk.org/fromoriginalintentionstounforeseeablechangeofcircumstances/ ↑